

BOOKS BY
ELIAS TOBENKIN

WITTE ARRIVES
THE HOUSE OF CONRAD
THE ROAD
GOD OF MIGHT
IN THE DARK
STALIN'S LADDER

BY ELIAS TOBENKIN

STALIN'S LADDER

WAR & PEACE IN THE
SOVIET UNION



MINTON, BALCH & COMPANY
NEW YORK • 1933

COPYRIGHT, 1933, BY ELIAS TOBENKIN

**All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must
not be reproduced in any form without permission.**

**MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AT THE VAN REES PRESS**

TO MY WIFE AND SON
Who Bore the Brunt of the Book
with Me

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The chapters dealing with criminology and prisons in the Soviet Union, except for the final chapter which discusses political prisoners, were originally written for the Bureau of Social Hygiene, New York. The author herewith expresses his thanks to the Bureau for permission to use this material and his indebtedness to Lawrence B. Dunham, Director, and to Prof. Thorsten Sellin of the Bureau's staff, for their helpful criticism during the preparation and revision of the text. The chapters dealing with the Soviet preparedness programme are reprinted with the permission of the North American Newspaper Alliance. Thanks is hereby given also to *Current History* for permission to reprint the chapter titled "War Fears and War Plans in Moscow" which originally appeared in the pages of that publication.

E. T.

CONTENTS

BOOK ONE: WAR

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| I. TOWARD MOSCOW | 3 |
| II. CHANGING THE FACE OF RUSSIA | 13 |
| III. A LAND DIVIDED | 28 |
| IV. WAR FEARS AND WAR PLANS IN MOSCOW | 36 |
| V. A NATION IN ARMS | 52 |
| VI. WAR AND THE WOMEN | 71 |
| VII. THE RED ARMY | 79 |

BOOK TWO: PEACE

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| VIII. "HOME, SWEET HOME" | 89 |
| IX. "SOVIET WIVES" | 105 |
| X. THE INTELLIGENTSIA | 120 |
| XI. THE SINS OF THE FATHERS | 136 |
| XII. IN JEWISH FIELDS | 152 |
| XIII. JEWS IN OFFICE | 169 |
| XIV. YOUNG RUSSIA | 183 |

BOOK THREE: PRISONS

| | |
|---|------------|
| XV. THE SOVIET WAY WITH THE CRIMINAL | 203 |
| XVI. ALTERNATIVES FOR PRISONS | 218 |
| XVII. THE DRAMA OF REGENERATION | 238 |
| XVIII. SOVIET DYNAMICS OF CRIME | 261 |
| XIX. POLITICAL PRISONERS | 287 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES | 295 |
| INDEX | 303 |

BOOK ONE: WAR

TOWARD MOSCOW

FOR ten months I lived in the Soviet Union and, except when travelling through the interior I did not spend a single night under a hotel roof. I lived in Russian homes with peasants and workmen. I ate the food they ate and in the same scant and sparing rations. I slept on beds without linen and in unheated rooms. I was witness to their workaday worries and shared in their holiday festivities. I became familiar with their moods of sullenness and gayety and learned to know them when they were drunk, as well as sober.

I was fully initiated into their hopes and dreams and was permitted to have a glimpse of their disillusionments and disappointments.

Time and again during these ten months my thoughts would revert to that chapter in the Old Testament which describes Solomon's choice. The Lord, it is stated, came to Solomon in a dream and asked him, "What shall I give you?" And Solomon answered, "An understanding heart to judge and to discern between good and bad."

Understanding and patience in infinite quantities are what the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics calls for in a foreign observer today.

During the ten months which I lived under the Soviet flag my moods and attitudes toward the Kremlin government and its policies would change on an average two or three times daily. I would wake in the morning in a mood of tolerance. A walk through the streets of Moscow around noon-time would frequently disclose such perversions of human freedom—a one-time professor walking the streets barefooted with a bundle of books under his arm; a scientist out of touch politically with the Bolshevist powers, standing with outstretched palm on a street corner, begging; a merchant of the "first guild" under the old régime, peddling tooth brushes because he was "de-classed" and no government industry would give him employment—that I would find myself completely repelled by the Soviet order.

By the evening, however, I might be coming upon some phase of Soviet justice which would once more reconcile me to the Communist régime.

To illustrate these changing moods with a personal incident: during the trial last March of the dozen professors, economists and former social democratic leaders, who were charged with Menshevism, I returned home from the court room a little after ten o'clock one evening. As I got off the street car, I recalled that I had not had any dinner that day. I lived

in a workmen's district, known as Sokolniki, and there were no restaurants in the neighborhood. I had no bread in my room and walked into a provisions store which was still open.

I asked the clerk for a pound of bread. He demanded to see my bread card. I told him I had no bread card. In the manner of the traditional Chinese laundryman he replied, "no card, no bread."

I began to argue with him and several women customers stopped to listen. The afternoon papers had been full of stories about a supposed secret visit to Moscow by the Menshevist leader, R. Abramovich, and the atmosphere was tense with hatred for everyone un-Russian and especially for everyone unproletarian. The women searched me with their eyes. My clothes were American, my appearance that of an intellectual. "No bread for him" was their recommendation to the clerk both with their looks and by word of mouth.

I stepped into the manager's office. He told me the same: he could sell bread only on the presentation of a bread card. I explained that I was a foreigner and had no bread card. The manager was adamant in his refusal.

Trembling with rage I reached across his desk for the telephone receiver. He grasped my arm: "Whom do you want to call?"

"The G. P. U.," I replied. "I shall inform it that an American citizen, willing to pay for it, is refused

a pound of bread in the capital of the Soviets." The G. P. U. is the political secret service of Russia, charged with the protection and defence of the communist state.

The effect was instantaneous. The manager took me over to the clerk and ordered him to sell me a pound of bread without a card.

Disgust with the barbaric crudities of Soviet civilization, which instead of diminishing seem to be increasing, rankled with every bite I took that evening. This mood was still upon me the next morning when I suddenly became aware of a jubilant commotion in the room across the hall from my own.

The room was occupied by a family, the head of which, a mechanic, had been an invalid for more than a year. His middle-aged wife had taken a job as a street sweeper to keep her little family together. Their two sons, still in grade school, were too young to be of help. The plight of the family had been desperate. But their ship arrived a few moments before.

A letter from the Commissariat of Welfare had just been left by the mailman. The husband had been found to be an "invalid of labor" and thenceforward, according to the letter, would receive a pension of fifty rubles a month. The record of his children in school had also been examined and since both of the boys were found to be most diligent the ministry of welfare had referred them to the Commissariat of Education, which awarded them a government stipendium for their secondary and college courses.

My personal grievances and resentments of the night before were instantly forgotten in the face of this simple and humane attempt on the part of the government to deal adequately with a social problem commonly neglected elsewhere.

Such contrasts are a daily occurrence in the Soviet Union. Barbarous medieval discriminations alternate with acts of most enlightened justice. The foreign observer is constantly either appalled or gratified. He finds himself uttering a terrific indictment of the Soviet regime at one moment and apologizing or even defending it, the next.

I ENTERED Russia by way of Poland.

Beyond Warsaw, five or six hours' ride in the direction of the Soviet frontier, the picturesque peasant countryside underwent a transformation. The Polish terrain assumed more and more the aspect of a military zone. Slonim, the last large Polish city, two hours by train from the Russian border, bristled with soldiers and officers.

A Polish official, speaking in German, proudly characterized his country as a foremost "military state" (*militaerstaat*). The territory through which we were passing, he advised me, would be the Armageddon of the coming war "between civilization and communism."

That a war between Russia and the rest of the

world is imminent is the firm belief of every man, woman and child in Poland. The conservative Poles feel certain that such a war will wipe out the Bolshevik regime. The Polish communists on the other hand are just as firmly convinced that the next war will result in communism not only in Poland but in the rest of Europe. Both sides expect this war to start on Polish territory. —

The temper of the two peoples is one of smoldering hatred and unconcealed mistrust of each other, which flame up at the least provocation.

Just before the Polish crew surrendered the train to the Russians at the Soviet border the Polish official, still speaking German, said to me with a leer:

"I trust you haven't forgotten to take along a plentiful supply of 'lausepulver' (insect powder); you will need it *over there*."

An hour later, on Soviet territory, I came face to face with the reciprocal loathing of Bolshevik officials for the Poles.

In the Soviet custom house an official motioned to a Polish woman belonging to Warsaw's aristocracy to follow him. She was led into a side room and was gone nearly half an hour. When she finally emerged her face was flushed as if she had just come out of a Turkish bath. She swore under her breath. She fumed and threatened in her native tongue. As soon as she got to Moscow she would report the matter to the Polish Ambassador. She would make these Russians pay for

it. The officials, it appeared, had turned her over to a secret service woman. She was made to undress and was searched from head to foot as if war between Russia and Poland were already a fact and she were suspected of being a spy.

There was a change of trains. I stepped up to the ticket office and asked for sleeping car accommodations to Moscow.

"Do you want your berth in the International or Russian sleeping car?" the ticket agent asked.

"What is the difference?" I inquired.

"Twelve rubles," he answered, thinking merely of the price.

"Any difference in service?" I demanded.

The agent was non-committal on that subject and I bought a ticket in the Russian sleeper. I regretted it an hour later.

I was given a berth but without sheets. Upon inquiry I was told that linens could be obtained from the car attendant. The attendant, however, informed me that they were all out of linens for this trip. If I wanted linens I should have gone to the International car. I unrolled my blanket and made my own bed.

Before retiring I went into the dining car. I don't know why but the picture which momentarily came to my mind was that of Charon, the mythological ferryman, conveying the souls of the dead from the upper to the nether regions. I suddenly felt as if I had entered a "nether region" myself. There were none of

the comforts of normal civilization in the Soviet dining car. The attendants were shrunken, shriveled men, unkempt, unshaven, with calloused fingers and black fingernails.

Several young men were sitting about tables. They were army officers wearing the blue and brown uniforms of the G. P. U. regiments, the highest type of Soviet troops. In contrast to the Polish officers, who were swaggering and loquacious, these men were tense and quiet. In the border zone each of these men is given the authority to make quick life and death decisions. They spoke softly and were polite but this only heightened the terrible nature of their work and missions.

I was late in falling asleep and late in waking. When I emerged from my compartment next morning the passengers were lined up against the windows in the long narrow passageway of the car, talking in undertones or watching the scenes outside with absorbed silence. I found a place near one of the windows and joined the crowd of rapt onlookers.

A PALE-RED sun hung over a vast snow-covered horizon. It was 9 A.M. on a midwinter morning. The Moscow Express, three hours late, was roaring along at top speed. Every four or five minutes a village rose into view—sixty or eighty peasant huts strung out in single file; a well at one end of the village, a windmill

at the other. The snow on the straw roofs was a foot thick; it was three feet high on the ground. The weather was thirty below zero and the smoke from their chimneys ascended in fiery columns or spirals. There was an unbroken brooding over the land; man and beast were indoors. It was Russia, the traditional, white, epic Russia. Anecdotes of Peter the Great came to mind.

Abruptly the scene changed.

Without the slightest warning the skeletonized form of a modern, almost American city, sprang from the frozen plain: Factories in various stages of construction; homes in the making; a schoolhouse, a hospital, a public bath. On scaffolds men in sheepskin tunics and shaggy pelt hats drawn over their ears, were swinging hammers, plying riveting machines, working with unnatural haste. The small railway platform was crowded with bales, crates, boxes—materials, tools, machinery bearing labels and inscriptions in a half dozen languages. These were being loaded upon sleds by peasants unaccustomed to the handling of such objects, who shouted and gesticulated excitedly. Along the railroad tracks bonfires were blazing and every few seconds one or another of the peasants would rush up to warm his hands.

For an instant I had the sensation of having run into a weird, unreal world. The defiance of nature seemed so unreasoned, the entire picture chimerical. But the illusion died and I was gripped with the reality

of the spectacle. What one stood face to face with was an outpost of the Five Year Plan, Russia's, or more properly Stalin's ladder to an industrial millennium such as hitherto had existed only in the pages of books on utopias.

CHANGING THE FACE OF RUSSIA

IT may as well be stated first as last that no industrial, political or social project emanating from the Communist party of Russia—and the Communist party is the government in the Soviet Union—is ever wholly free from the taint of propaganda. The Five Year Plan which officially came to a close on December 31, 1932, nine months in advance of its originally appointed schedule, has been conducted with a great deal of fanfare and theatricality calculated to impress a lean if patient working class at home and a zealous and very impatient Communist following abroad. Nevertheless it would be not only shortsighted but even calamitous to ignore the multiplicity of natural and human forces which the Five Year Plan has liberated in a territory one-sixth the size of the earth, or to dismiss it contemptuously as another Tower of Babel, preordained to confusion and failure.

Though the Five Year Plan—the *first* five year plan, as it is already spoken of in Russia—falls short of its appointed goal, it has nevertheless changed the

face of Russia in a most far-reaching manner. The Plan has failed to live up to many of its rash calculations and hasty promises, such as "overtaking and surpassing" in five years the technical and economic levels of the more advanced nations of the West. It has not brought to the Russian people relief from the acute shortage of manufactured goods. It has not improved the standard of living—the rationing system has, if anything, grown stricter in recent months. Nor has the Five Year Plan abated the housing crisis in Moscow and in other large centers in the Soviet Union. These glaring material shortcomings, however, are counterbalanced by a host of intellectual and spiritual investitures which the Five Year Plan has brought to the Russian nation.

Whatever one's sympathies, the awakening of the Russian people, accelerated by the stupendous industrial expansion of the past five years, is one of the greatest spectacles of modern times. The thinking of the nation as well as its economic processes have been revolutionized. New administrative classes have sprung up; trade and commerce have been transferred onto new rails. Man's ambitions have been changed from an individual to a social basis. The slogan of "one for all" has become more than a passing phrase. A new morality has been set up and new loyalties have arisen whose effect upon the rest of the world is bound to be tremendous.

From an international standpoint the Five Year

Plan forms a new and colossal war instrument which in another European conflict—and the Soviet leaders look upon such another conflict as inevitable in the very near future—will forever end the tradition of Russia as a “beaten nation,” which, in the main, it has been all through its history, and will lift it to a level of military efficiency second to none.

A glimpse at the Five Year Plan, its drama to the Russian people and its intrinsic threat to the enemies of the Soviet system, is essential to an understanding of the New Russia which is being hammered out by some of the world's greatest industrial, engineering and scientific experts who have been attracted to Moscow by Joseph Stalin and his coworkers in the Kremlin.

For the past five years Russia's 160,000,000 inhabitants have been living on bread and dreams. Bread was rationed; the dreams were supplied in unlimited quantities. Russian bread was—and still is—made of a mixture that is part flour and part corn meal, or some other cheaper substitute for flour. Of what consistency are their hopes and dreams?

The dreams upon which the Russian people have been feeding since October 1, 1928, when the Five Year Plan was launched, consist of steel. Steel in the literal sense; steel from which plows are made, which goes into the construction of scythes and tractors and harvesters; steel from which defence and war implements are produced.

Land and machines—these are the two things the

Russian people had hungered and prayed for most under the old régime. Lenin converted his Bolshevik coup d'état, which many of his revolutionary coworkers expected to last scarcely more than a few months, into a stable political order by the simple expedient of giving the peasants the land they asked for. Stalin has made himself dictator—though he denies being anything but a leader—by promising the Russian people machines.

The first Five Year Plan, which has just come to a conclusion, the second Five Year Plan, which is already in operation, and the Third and Fourth plans which will undoubtedly follow, are the concrete form which this promise has taken.

Bread is not the only thing that is rationed in the Soviet Union today. Meat and fish, tea and sugar, next to bread the most important staples in the Russian home, are rationed. Milk, eggs and butter, when obtainable, are given only to children. Wood is rationed, soap is rationed, tobacco is rationed. Women stand in line for hours at a stretch to obtain a kilo of potatoes, a litre of kerosene, or two or three yards of flannel.

Nor are these the only sacrifices that the Stalin industrialization programme has imposed upon the Russian nation.

Millions of men have been dislodged from their homes temporarily; some permanently. Huge forests have been cleared, marshes drained and vast areas

of steppe and swamp put under cultivation by armies of workmen transported two, three and even five thousand miles for the purpose. Those who stayed behind have had their regimen of life completely changed. They have submitted to the taking of their Sundays (the great majority in spite of deep-seated religious habits) and the substitution of other days of rest in order that the work of industrialization might go on uninterruptedly. They have allowed their habits of rest, amusement, sleep to be changed, transposed by the introduction into many industries of the twenty-four-hour day, which requires the employés of these industries to alternate regularly between day and night work. They have been trained to disregard the seasons and construction work in open, unprotected country is carried on in the midst of Arctic winter. Opposition to this programme is a political offence.

Here and there workmen speak sententiously about the "vlast," the authorities. Yet there is nothing either poignant or concrete in their grumbling. It is merely the expression of a vague desire that things might take a turn for the better a little more quickly and the load on their backs be lightened. There is no acid in their complaints, no political significance. From the factory workers, from the cities generally, the Soviet rulers have nothing to fear.

Yet there is chaos in Russia and the atmosphere is electric with the dread of failure. It is among the leaders that the fear of disaster to the government's

gigantic construction programme and presentiment of a débâcle are most acute.

To get the full force of this division among Soviet leaders over the Stalin industrialization programme, particularly over the pace with which it is conducted, over its methods and so-called tempos, one need but to scan the Soviet press for the names of the men connected with the fashioning of the Soviet state from its earliest beginnings and note their absence from public life and the complete yet diffident silence with which the mention of their names is greeted.

Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, leaders of the so-called "left opposition" and a host of their followers and lieutenants, are either in exile or imprisoned. Disagreement with Stalin not over ultimate socialist aims, but over immediate industrial policies, has resulted in their political hari-kari.

In a like manner Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, leaders of the "right opposition," have been sidetracked to unimportant posts. Speaking in the name of the peasantry they oppose the Stalin programme for the too great sacrifices it demands. They fear that many of the huge plants, which are being hastily constructed with the aid of foreign engineers and materials, will, at the end of a few years, be standing idle, or half idle for want, among other things, of skilled, responsible Russian workmen with whom to man these factories. They are for a more gradual pace and for slower tempos....

THE supreme court of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is in session. The five proletarian judges—the secretary of a trade union, a metal worker, a woman weaver, a literate day laborer and a former lawyer of noble birth who had, however, expiated his unproletarian origin by his life-long career as a revolutionist—are trying fourteen men for high treason to the Soviet state. It is one of those political trials of which the Soviet government makes a public function. Tickets have been issued to the various factories to send “workmen’s delegations” to witness it. I was present in the court room for nine days and as many evenings.

The ages of the defendants ranged from 39 to 57 years. By profession they were scientists, professors, economists, *littérateurs*. By conviction they belonged to a political party, which, in the Soviet Union, where no other parties than the Communist are permitted by law to exist, is outlawed. In addition to subversive political work the fourteen defendants were charged with attempting to wreck the government’s industrialization programme. Occupying highly strategic posts in the Government’s Planning Commission, in the highest economic councils, in banks, these men, it was charged, were directing their various departments, and in some instances entire branches of industry over which they had charge, in a manner calculated to bring failure and discredit to the government programme.

All of the fourteen men had signed complete and

elaborate confessions before they were brought to trial.

The trial, with its "class approach" to justice, with its one-sided legal methods and the ominous shadow of the Soviet Political Police—the G. P. U.—which hovered over the proceedings is not part of this chapter. But a fleeting statement made by one of the accused, in a weak attempt at self-defence, belongs here. He and his fellow defendants, the prisoner explained, had resorted to sabotage, to "wrecking" as the Russian expression is, because they felt that the Stalin industrial programme was exacting from the Russian people a price in suffering, hardships and privations equal only to that of a great and exhausting war.

Men come to Moscow from a distance of five or six hours by train for the sole purpose of getting once in a week or ten days a square meal at one of the three hotels which serve them, the Savoy, the Grand, the Europa. The price of such a meal runs from twelve to twenty rubles, six to ten dollars. A glass of hot milk even in a popular restaurant sells for eighty kopeks, forty cents; a two- or three-cent roll for seventy-five kopeks. If one wishes to buy bread above the amount rationed, which is only a pound a day for any one who is not a common laborer, the price in Moscow's free markets is a ruble per pound.

A washwoman demanded five rubles for washing three shirts and as many pairs of socks. When I protested that the price was too high her answer was that the five rubles would barely suffice to pay for a

pound of salt herring. (In the provinces no herring is to be had at any price.) An izvostchik (cabman) demanded ten rubles to drive me a distance of a mile and a half. When I said that I would rather walk than pay such an unheard of price, the peasant pleaded: "Barin, I pay eighteen rubles a pood (thirty-six pounds) of hay."

Men and women in every strata of society are noticeably undernourished and nervous. A generation of weak, anemic children is growing up. Ordinary ailments frequently take on epidemic proportions because of the low vitality of the population. Yet the Soviet Union is not without food. There are warehouses filled to the bursting with edibles. Supplies are constantly being rushed to the workers on the "industrial front." They are being exported to foreign countries. It is with her exports that the Soviet Union very largely pays for the technical imports and machinery demanded by the increasing expansion of its industrial programme. Grain is one of the principal exports.

Why must the century-old gap between Russia's economic backwardness and Western progress be filled violently instead of gradually? Why these contests and competitions between various branches of industry at the expense of the workers, their health and often their very lives? Why so little regard for the material wants of the Russian nation by the men in charge of its destinies? Why the wild pace, the frenzied intensity, the ruthless advance of the Stalin programme?

I put these questions to a responsible Soviet official in one of the highest government departments in Moscow. He replied:

"We are hurrying our building programme, because events are hurrying us. Economic events in the principal countries of the world are combining to make war on us not only probable, but inevitable."

He proceeded to amplify his point of view:

"I do not mean that the principal nations of the world will wake up one morning and say, 'we do not like the Bolshevik order, let's combine and make war on it.' But the industrial equilibrium of the world cannot be restored until Russia is once more a part of the world market. We are willing, anxious, in fact, to rejoin the world market, but can do so only on the terms which the new order of society in our country imposes. The world is insistent that we come back on the old basis only. Such irreconcilable conflicts have at all times ended in war. If our basic industries are undeveloped or insufficiently developed before such a war comes, the Soviet Union will emerge from it as a second China, as a semi-colonial country. The pace of our industrial programme is frankly a war pace."

Unofficial views explain the pace and tempos of the Stalin programme as the lengthened shadow of the man behind it. Such views place Stalin in a class of Russian rulers—great rulers—who, having become convinced of the righteousness of a certain course, proceed to force their conviction upon the nation as a

whole regardless of the latter's willingness or unwillingness to follow in the ruler's tracks.

Thus Vladimir the Holy, in the tenth century, having become converted to the Greek orthodox religion, drove the inhabitants of his capital, Kiev, into the waters of the Dnieper and gave them the alternative of being baptized or being drowned. Peter the Great, on his return from Holland, sought to westernize Russia by summary orders to his noblemen to shave their beards and to change to German clothes. Joseph Stalin, it is asserted, with not a dissimilar zeal, is determined to make "socialism in our lifetime" a reality in Russia and himself the mysterious and revered apostle of the cult.

In the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics—formerly Russia—only two heads loom today from the pages of the press, on the walls of public offices, from posters and from school books. One is the sardonic head of Lenin; the other, the brooding face of his recluse-like successor, Joseph Stalin. The two names are coupled from every platform and in every editorial or pamphlet. For every sentence quoted from Lenin a sentence is quoted from Stalin.

It is Joseph Stalin's grim and unalterable purpose to exhibit to the world, within his lifetime, a Russia that will be not only one hundred per cent industrialized, but one in which industry and agriculture, trade and the professions will be completely run on a civil service basis—socialism is the word he uses. To make

every peasant and workman in the Soviet Union as much of an employé of the community, of the state, as a postman is, or a tax collector and, in special circumstances, even as a soldier, is an inalienable part of the Stalin plans.

The fundamental conception in which the Soviet industrialization programme is grounded is mistrust of Western, or "capitalist" civilization. Communist Russia, it is felt by the Soviet leaders, must be prepared for war at any time. Raw materials will determine the victories of the future. Hence the Soviet Union must become completely independent of the rest of the world in the matter of raw materials. Since the year 1919 three hundred and seventy individual scientific expeditions, financed by the Soviet government, have plumbed the resources of the country. Literally thousands of engineers and geologists, chemists, metallurgists, physicists have probed and located Russia's hidden wealth of natural resources. The laying of new railroads, the digging of new canals, the construction of new dams have been planned with a view to making the most of these resources.

Heavy industries come next in order. In prewar Russia light industry predominated. In the Soviet programme light industries, the industries which are to relieve the country's famine of manufactured commodities, come third, or last. It was planned originally by the Soviet government to allay this famine in manufactured goods in the closing year or year and a half

of the first Five Year Plan. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria changed the situation. Renewed emphasis was placed on the procurement of raw materials and the further rapid development of heavy industry until the threat of war on the Soviet's Far Eastern doorstep has abated. The development of light industry was made the principal factor of the second Five Year Plan which went into action on January 1, 1933.

The output of heavy industry in Russia today is more than four and one-half times the 1913 figure. Under the old régime there were no electrical or machine building industries in Russia. The Soviet government has built these industries up to a stage where they now rival those of the most advanced nations. The Soviet Union now ranks first among the countries of Europe in iron and steel output. At the zenith of the first five year plan, in 1932, twenty-four hundred plants and combinations of plants were in the process of rehabilitation or construction in the Soviet Union. In area these plants spread from the Ukraine on Russia's western boundary, to Sakhalien on her Siberian frontier, from Pamir on the Indian border, to Murmansk on her northern extreme.

Included in this list of enterprises are giant steel mills and iron foundries, a chain of hydro-electric power stations, which gird the country like a ring; a whole new chemical, fertilizer and cement industry. New coal mines are under construction in hitherto dormant coal regions. Vast stretches of untapped oil

lands have been equipped for exploitation, entirely modeled after American methods of oil boring and refining, it may be added parenthetically. Vast areas of virgin land have been converted into huge "grain factories" and stock farms operated by the government through the medium of hired laborers and are known as Soviet State Farms, or "Sovkhozi." A host of new cities have been built and the old cities have taken on an added importance.

To date a total of approximately sixty-five billion rubles have been poured into the country's industrialization enterprises by the Kremlin government, foreign loans playing only a minor rôle.

Much as Stalin might resent any comparison between his own methods to promote Russia industrially and the methods which his Czarist predecessors have used to promote the country militarily, such comparison is unavoidable. Just as the Czars built up the military forces of Holy Russia with the aid of foreign military experts, chiefly German and French, Joseph Stalin is building the Soviet's industrial machine with the aid of foreign technical experts. A total of close to twenty thousand foreign engineers, foremen and mechanics, chiefly German and American, had been enlisted by the Soviet government prior to the completion of the first five year plan.

The extent to which unemployment and the depression elsewhere have contributed to the rapid progress of the Soviet's industrial planning and achievement, by

releasing to the Soviet Union, on comparatively reasonable terms, some of the greatest engineering and construction experts of both Europe and the United States, will no doubt form a theme for the historian of the future to speculate on.

A LAND DIVIDED

CONCERNING Joseph Stalin, once the "stable boy" of the Russian revolution, today its temporal and spiritual head—a sort of Bolshevist pope—sentiment both in the Soviet Union and in foreign countries has undergone a dramatic change. With thousands of new factories dotting the Russian land, with brand new mines and steel mills in operation, with newly built railroads uniting some of the far-flung and hitherto inaccessible regions, Stalin has come to be accepted, if not as the most rightful, at any rate as the most logical successor to Nicolai Lenin. He is regarded as one of the most successful rulers in the world today.

Yet the success of the Stalin policies is by no means as complete and unanimous as appears on the surface. Stalin has strikingly changed the face of Russia, but the brain of the peasant has not been made over. The dictator has, in the main, won the city or factory population to his industrial programme. But the parallel movement for the nationalization of agriculture has no such popular support. The bulk of Russia's 90,000,-

ooo peasants have merely submitted to the government's collectivization edicts—they have not accepted them.

They are not visibly opposing the Kremlin's collectivization policy, for active opposition to it is punishable with imprisonment, exile and even death. But they are not helping the collectivization movement along; they are not pushing it forward. They let things take their course and hope that this course will ultimately result in the failure of the government's agricultural programme and in a return to more personal and individual methods of farming and to the private ownership of his crops by each peasant.

What Lenin has feared and warned against has come to pass: The Soviet Union is today, if not irreconcilably, at any rate gravely, divided between town and country, between industry and agriculture, between the workers and the peasantry.

By comparison with the peasantry the city and particularly the factory population of the Soviet Union is today not only a favored but a pampered class. It is better fed and better housed. The cooperative stores in the industrial centers are more adequately supplied with manufactured goods and with other necessities. The factory worker enjoys greater government benefits in the form of old age pensions, sick and employment insurance, medical attendance. His children have greater opportunities for education; they dress better.

A government commission studying health condi-

tions in the Ukraine has investigated 8,200 villages having a population of half a million. Exactly 23 per cent, or almost one-quarter of the families in these villages, it was disclosed, went habitually without soap for either laundry or toilet uses, while another 24 per cent of the families received less than a pound of soap per household. The other 57 per cent fared slightly better, 26 per cent receiving per household one pound of soap a month, 16 per cent receiving two pounds, 5.8 per cent receiving three pounds and the remaining 5 per cent receiving between three and four pounds of soap per month.

There is a scarcity of soap in all of Russia owing to the wanton slaughter of cattle by the peasantry at the start of the collectivization movement. Nevertheless there is not a worker's home in Moscow or in any other industrial center that does not receive its monthly allotment of laundry and toilet soap, and the rations run nearer one pound per person than per family.

Skilled labor, moreover, is the aristocracy of the Soviet Union. It is from among this class that the Soviet régime chooses its trusted officials, its political commissars, the heads of big government trusts and corporations, the directors of government industries and cooperatives.

The peasant has the conviction, though he does not express it too freely, that the Stalin régime seeks to take back that which the revolution had given him—the land. He is not alone in holding this viewpoint.

Rykov, Tomsy and Bukharin have repeatedly assailed in the party councils Stalin's whirlwind collectivization methods. Such tempos, they warned Stalin and the Communist party, were reducing vast numbers of Russian peasants to a state of serfdom.

Lenin is claimed as the spiritual father of the Soviet's collectivization programme, but for the pace and tempos with which it is conducted Stalin alone has made himself responsible. His critics, whether of the "right" or of the "left," were deprived of their offices and their places have been quickly filled by younger men, brought up in the rigid discipline of the Communist party and trained to carry out its mandates and policies without question.

The peasant realizes that his own methods of tilling the soil are antiquated and not in line with progress. He welcomes the introduction of agricultural machinery; he had craved for such machinery all his life. He is for the most part even reconciled to working the land cooperatively. He will agree to a certain amount of collectivization. But he wants the limit to such collectivization clearly set. The peasant insists that collectivization must also leave room for individual initiative and individual gain. He wants to have more to say about the crops he raises and about the products of his own toil than he has had in the past three or four seasons. He wants less direction from the center—Moscow.

The peasant does not want the monarchy back. He

has no quarrel with the Soviet régime as such. In its structure and content the Bolshevik state, in the main, is quite well suited to his mentality and rudimentary political training. But, when he is at all permitted to become articulate, the peasant demands that the power of the Communist commissars, who now rule over him with an iron hand, be curbed. Emboldened or embittered peasants will now and then even let fall such a phrase as "We want soviets without communists."

FOURTEEN and a half million peasant households in the Soviet Union, slightly more than half of the total, have, since the inauguration of the Five Year Plan, ceased to exist as individual farm entities. Their implements and livestock have been communized. Each peasant has become part of a collective household—"kolkhoz" is the Russian abbreviation for it—which works under instructions from the government as to how much grain and other commodities it must produce and what proportion of these is to be the government's share at the close of the harvest.

The collectivization policy of Stalin is one of advance and retreat: advance two steps, retreat one. As originally announced only eighteen per cent of Russia's peasantry was to have been communized by the end of the Five Year Plan. The collectivization was to come about voluntarily. The peasant was to be convinced by observation and experience that working the

land in a commune is more profitable than working singly. There was to be no coercion of any sort.

Actually impressment rather than argument soon became the chief driving force in the collectivization campaign. The better fixed peasants, known as kulaks, who resisted such forced collectivization of their property, had it confiscated and with their families were deported to the frontier provinces, there to start life anew on less desirable and sometimes totally unfit land. Close to four hundred million rubles' worth of property has in this manner been taken from the richer peasantry and turned over to the budding communist farms for general use.

In January and February, 1930, sanguinary peasant uprisings broke out in various parts of the Soviet Union, and Stalin in his now famous statement, "Dizziness from Success," blamed the entire situation on the inexperience or overzealousness of certain officials and directed that the collectivization processes be slowed down. However, in the winter and especially in the spring of the following year, the former collectivization tempos had not only been resumed, but even been greatly intensified. The avowed policy of the Kremlin is to have all or nearly all of Russia's 26,000,000 individual peasant households united in huge communist farms by the end of 1933.

While the former tempos have been resumed, new methods are today being employed to get the peasant to sign up as a member of a collectivized farm and

to part with his horse and plow. Peasants are not being shot or exiled for refusing to go into a "kolkhoz," they are merely being boycotted. The government owns the banks, it controls the sale of machinery and the distribution of seed for planting. The official orders are to supply the communized farms with these things in the first instance. The peasant who stands out for his individual acres finds himself minus credit, minus the ability to buy machinery. He is almost an outlaw.

Official explanation for the resumption of the forced collectivization marches which in the past have nearly brought ruin upon the Soviet scheme is that Russia has at last entered the golden period of socialism industrially and that the agricultural development of the country must keep pace with industry. The peasants must adopt on the land the methods and tempos employed by their brothers in the factories. Actually the feverish collectivization tempos are dictated by the Soviet's ever-expanding building programme, which is constantly being intensified by the war fears and the war plans of the Kremlin.

The products of the soil have today become almost the sole means of financing the Five Year Plan. The rôle of the cities and their populations as a source of revenue is dwindling from month to month. The government feeds, houses and amuses its workmen at a loss. The theatres, the various chains of cooperative stores, the housing trusts, must be continually subsidized by the government or cease to function. That

part of national economy which in other countries is grouped under the head of trade and commerce, and brings the government substantial revenue, in Russia is run almost universally at a loss, despite the profitable showing made by an occasional sector in this branch of national economy.

The peasant bears the brunt of taxation in the Soviet Union. The 90,000,000 mouzhiks pay for the Stalin experiment. It is therefore important for the government not only to increase agricultural production, but to be in a position to "commandeer" as much of these products as its financial needs and emergencies may call for. Collectivized, wholesale farming is relied upon to do both of these things for the Soviet apparatus. Up-to-date machinery and scientific methods of work are expected to bring crops up to a satisfactory state. Being run by managers and superintendents who are either communists or direct government officials, such farms will place the government in a position to take for its own share, as taxes, as much of the crop as it needs without having to overcome the slyness or hostility of the individual peasant owner who has his own conception as to how much his taxes should amount to.

WAR FEARS AND WAR PLANS IN MOSCOW

THE overwhelming impression which the visitor to the Soviet Union, who has had occasion to move about the country freely, carries away with him is the dread of war which hangs over the Russian people and the mammoth defence plans which the Kremlin government is putting through in preparation for it. During the ten months which I spent in the Soviet republic the following major demonstrations calculated to have vital bearing on questions of war and peace between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world took place:

One: Joseph Stalin, in an address to Soviet industrialists, reaffirmed his belief in world revolution and characterized the Soviet state as a lever in such revolution. The success of the Five Year Plan, he predicted, would "turn the world upside down."

Two: Premier V. Molotov, in his first message to the Soviet congress, warned the nations of the West that continued economic blockade of the Soviet Union on grounds of alleged "dumping" and "forced labor" would inevitably lead to war. In such a war, Molotov

was convinced, Russia would be the victor and would be in a position to make the "aggressor nation" pay to the fullest extent.

Three: Climenty Voroshilov, Soviet War Commissar, in an address before the convention of the League of Communist Youth (Comsomol), added his own belief to that of General Ludendorff that Europe was on the verge of scrapping the Peace of Versailles and that the danger of a world war had once more become acute. The War Commissar in unequivocal language told the representatives of more than 3,000,000 communist youths, whom he termed the "natural reserve" of the Red Army, what their duty in the next war would be.

Four: The Commissariat of education in Moscow had adopted a programme for the "military reeducation" of the country's teaching personnel so that it might bring the schools of the Soviet Union in closer cooperation with the needs and plans of the War Office. . . . The Soviet press, the theatre and the arts have been mobilized along military lines . . . The Osoaviachim, Russia's national security organization, having a membership of more than ten millions, has set aside a ten-day period known as the "decade of defence" and held scores of thousands of meetings throughout the country to imbue the population with a proper regard for the "approaching war danger."

Five: The eleventh plenum of the Third, or Communist, International met in Moscow and proclaimed

to its followers in every part of the globe that "the danger of an imperialist attack on the Soviet Union has never been greater than it is today." In the event of such an attack, the plenum instructed all communist parties affiliated with the Comintern to turn the "imperialist war against the Soviet Union" into a civil war at home.

Preparedness is preached and practiced in the Soviet Union with an intensity and on a scale unknown in any other country not actually at war. In the factory and behind the plow, in the home and in the school, the "next war" is spoken of with a sense of finality as if the enemy were already mobilized and on the march. Young and old of both sexes share in these preparations and all are made to pay for them. Every class in the Soviet Union—and Communism thus far has not abolished classes, but has merely changed them around—is made to feel the pinch of want and the chronic shortage of commodities occasioned, in large part, by the government's war economies. The Soviet home is run on a war basis. The warehouses where commodities are stored are under strict military guard. Office, factory and bank employ  s hold regular drills in wearing and adjusting gas masks.

A spy mania exists. Soviet citizens are warned to guard their speech—that there are agents of "foreign imperialism" about. They are especially cautioned against coming in intimate contact with foreigners living in the Soviet Union. Such Russians as are obliged

to deal with aliens, whether with temporary visitors or with foreign technical experts employed by the government, are instructed to carry on their transactions with a maximum of politeness and a minimum of words. After work and office hours the Russian leaves the foreigner severely alone.

In one of the public schools of Moscow, during the hour set aside for the discussion of current problems, a boy put up his hand and inquired:

"According to figures published in this morning's newspaper we have raised nearly a third more grain in the past twelve months than we have in the preceding year. Why is bread still rationed?"

The teacher, an alert young communist, blandly replied that that was one topic they would take up for discussion later in the year. When the class was dismissed he called the pupil into his private office.

"You should not put such questions publicly," the teacher warned him. "We are saving all the bread we can for the next war."

From the Gulf of Finland to Afghanistan, from the Polish border to the Island of Sakhalin, the country's human and natural, technical and educational resources are being mobilized, combined and fitted for war. Industry has been placed on a reversible basis to be used interchangeably for war or peace. Every citizen is an actual or potential soldier, every factory a prospective munitions plant, every peasant hut a fortress.

The Soviet war industries operate on a twenty-four-

hour basis and never rest. The ravages from red tape and bureaucracy, which is the curse of every other industry in the Soviet Union, are unknown in factories producing war munitions, airplanes or war chemicals. Here drunkenness by a workman is not accepted as an excuse and irregularity, if it is repeated, becomes a counter-revolutionary crime. These industries do not complain of shoddy materials or half-way work. In front of each of these establishments a red soldier is stationed who turns aside all visitors not provided with proper admission credentials.

Amazing as this may seem it is a fact none the less that this vast military superstructure has been reared entirely on a foundation of peace. The pacific aims of the Soviet Union are continually stressed by its governmental spokesmen: its willingness to enter non-aggression pacts, its offers to disarm completely, or in part. Stalin's statement that the Soviet republic has no imperialist designs, and is not looking for a single foot of foreign, subjugated soil, has been brought to the attention of every man, woman and child who is asked to support the government's arms programme. They have been given the highest assurance that the only war they will be asked to fight will be a war for the integrity of the Soviet frontiers, a defensive war only.

Many Russians today complain of the overzealous propaganda of the Communist machine. The Soviet Union, they assert, would have progressed more rapidly if the Kremlin leaders were not so bent on

making the Russian people serve as the "shock brigade" of world socialism. Popular disapprobation of the government's collectivization goals, of other extreme measures is frequent despite all suppression. In the matter of national defence, however, the Kremlin leaders have behind them a united people.

There are 180 separate nationalities living under the Soviet flag. They speak in a hundred and fifty different languages and dialects. Each of these nationalities has been reached in its own tongue by the government's defence programme; each has been imbued with the belief that the principal capitalist nations of the world are united on an anti-Soviet platform and stand ready to invade Russia and to dismember it "like a second China." The war danger to the Soviet Union has been translated to them in poster language as follows:

"The world bourgeoisie is preparing to execute a 'surgical operation' upon Bolshevism . . . The capitalist class is plotting a holy war against the Soviet Republic. . . . France is welding our neighbors into an iron ring about us . . . Poland and Rumania have concluded a military agreement against the fatherland of the proletariat . . . England is establishing naval bases in Rumania and Finland—what for? Czechoslovakia has been drawn into our enemy chain . . . The French navy has been placed at the disposal of Poland in the event that the latter attacks the Soviets. . . ."

The war psychology—some insist on calling it "war psychosis"—of the Soviet Union has its foundation in

Socialist dogma. Karl Marx, more than half a century ago, pointed out the "fundamental antagonism" between capitalism and socialism and maintained that a recourse to arms would ultimately be necessary to determine which of the two should inherit the earth. Lenin, the first to attempt to test Marxism as a system governing an entire country, warned his followers shortly after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia that "the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist governments for any considerable length of time is unthinkable" and that a war between Communist Russia and capitalist Europe is inevitable.

Stalin expressed the conflict even more bluntly at a recent party convention in Moscow. "There are people," he said, "who think that it is possible for us to conduct a revolutionary foreign policy and have the bourgeoisie of Western Europe kiss our hand for it. Such people can have nothing in common with our party. . . . We are doing something in the Soviet Union the success of which will turn the world upside down. Our continued existence revolutionizes the working classes of other countries."

The Kremlin leaders do not believe that the present world-wide depression is something that will cure itself, as was the case with industrial crises and panics in the past. They regard the present economic disorganization as evidence of the collapse of capitalism as a social system. They predict that from the economic crisis everywhere there will evolve a political crisis, a "sharp-

ening of class divisions in all bourgeois countries." The upper and middle classes, they assert, will everywhere seek a way out in fascism, while the working classes will tend to become more and more revolutionary. This situation, it is believed, will be still more aggravated by "colonial revolts" in India, China, Indo-China and elsewhere.

The final attempt of the bourgeois governments to allay domestic strife and to compose colonial difficulties, so the Kremlin predicts, will be a foreign war, which, no matter where it begins or for what reason, will soon resolve itself into a war against the Soviet Union as the fountain head of world proletarian unrest. "Red Moscow," Climenty Voroshilov, Soviet War Commissar, recently warned his countrymen, will be made responsible for the mistakes and failures which capitalism has been piling up since the World War.

As evidence that public sentiment all over the world is being mobilized for war with the Soviet Union, the Kremlin cites a long list of international "incidents" which, it avers, can only be interpreted as acts presaging intervention by the leading bourgeois governments in the affairs of the Soviet Union.

Included in the list of such "incidents" are the assassination of the Soviet Ambassadors, Vorovsky and Voikov, the former at Geneva, the latter at Warsaw, and a number of other attempts on the lives of Soviet officials. The so-called clerical campaign, as the Russians term the protests by the Pope, the Church of

England and the clergy of the United States against the Soviet's treatment of religion, is considered by Moscow in the light of a clarion call to war on the Soviet Republic. The disappearance of the "White Russian" general, Kutieпов, in Paris and the attempt to link the Soviet Government with his disappearance is declared to be of similar intent—to inflame public opinion everywhere against the Soviet Union. The Kremlin takes the same view of the so-called Amtorg falsifications and the activities of the Fish committee in the United States.

Most important among these "incidents" which the Soviets consider as inevitably leading to war with the capitalist world is the campaign everywhere against Soviet imports which are alleged to be products of forced or prison labor. The Soviet Government declares these charges to be baseless, and quotes Bismarck's famous saying that "never do people lie so much as just before the outbreak of a war."

It would be underestimating the sense of realism of the Soviet Government, which is known to be as keen as that of any other European government, to assume that Communist dogma alone could inspire such intense war preparations as those carried on in the Soviet Union. Territorial differences exist between the Soviet Republic and four of its six immediate European neighbors. These serve as a perpetual source of dispute. Moreover, the Russians see a distinct threat of war in the failure of each of the successive disarmament con-

ferences. They consider that these conferences were deliberately "sabotaged" by the principal capitalist governments, particularly by France.

Some obscure town on either the Polish or Rumanian border will be the Sarajevo of the next war in Eastern Europe, but it is France that will be directly charged with responsibility for such a war. It is against France that the Soviets are most bitter. "France," says a Bolshevik broadcast, "is the most implacable foe of the Soviet Union." The French general staff is charged with formulating the war policies of Poland and Rumania; French banks are charged with financing their armies.

France was the largest Russian creditor under the old régime and was the heaviest loser as the result of the Bolshevik upheaval. Russian industry, railroads, mines and metal factories were, to a large extent, owned by French capitalists. Russian banks were under French control. But there are other complications between Moscow and Paris. The Soviets, indirectly, are in conflict with French influence in the Far East. French bankers financed the Chinese end of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, which is jointly owned by Russia and China, and the final disposition of which is a matter of grave complication.

The attempt of the late Aristide Briand to organize a "United States of Europe" was looked upon in Moscow as nothing more than a means to isolate the Soviet Republic from the rest of Europe. Precisely the same

attitude was assumed by the Soviet Government toward the more recent plan of M. Tardieu for an economic union of the Danubian States. Moscow branded this effort as another French scheme to unite the small nations of Europe into a single anti-Soviet bloc. The Soviet Foreign Office is convinced that a "union between France and Japan is already an accomplished fact" and that when war does come the Soviet Republic will be called upon to defend itself simultaneously on both its European and Asiatic borders.

The antagonism between the Soviet Union and France comes to a head over the treatment which the French Government accords to the so-called White Russian émigrés living in France. It is estimated by the Kremlin that 1,250,000 former Czarist officials, military men and landowners fled from Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. Nearly 500,000 of these exiles reside in Germany, but it is those living on French soil who are the most stubborn opponents of the Soviet régime. Moscow asserts that the 400,000 Russians in France are, for the most part, military men and that they maintain the apparatus of what might be termed a White Russian State. They not only keep intact certain units of the Czar's army, which left Russia in a body, but also are training a new White army on French soil. At the first outbreak of war Moscow expects these émigrés to join the enemies of the Soviet in the hope of smashing the Communist régime and setting up a new government in Moscow. In their propa-

ganda literature the Soviets accuse the French Government with being a direct accomplice in the plans and conspiracies that are being hatched in Paris by the Czarist officers and some of the former Russian Grand Dukes.

Although the Soviet Union and Poland have been at peace since 1920, it is Poland that, after France, is considered by Russia as the principal enemy. The Poles do not deny this. "Our army stands at the frontier of two worlds," a Polish statesman said recently, "the capitalist world on the one side and the Communist world on the other. And from the Communist side comes the cry, 'Over the dead body of Poland to an all-world conflagration.' "

Between 1922 and 1928 twenty-two munitions plants were constructed in Poland, while the total number of workers employed in the production of war materials has risen to more than 60,000. Between 50 and 70 per cent of Poland's national budget, according to the calculation of Moscow, is devoted to military expenditures, and year by year these have progressively increased. In 1928 Poland's war budget amounted to \$85,500,000; in 1929 it rose to \$91,000,000, in 1930 to \$95,000,000 and in 1931 to \$96,500,000.

"Incidents" on the Polish-Soviet frontier of the type that frequently precede a war of late have become numerous. According to official Polish figures military courts during a six-month period condemned fifty-nine persons to death on charges of espionage on behalf of

Russia. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, recently declared that Polish terrorists were "hiding in Polish diplomatic uniforms" in Moscow and were directing plots on Soviet soil.

The prevailing opinion among Soviet officials is that Poland's intensive war preparations are motivated by aggression rather than by defence. It expects to emerge from a war with the Soviet Union as a "Greater Poland," as a "Poland from Sea to Sea," the dream of the more militaristic elements of the country for years. The hope is for a Poland stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, with the port of Odessa and that part of the Ukraine which leads to it—one of the most fertile areas in Europe. The military groups want portions of White Russia and expect to be rewarded with these territories in the course of the dismemberment of Russia which, as they anticipate, will follow a victory over the Soviet Union.

Between the Soviet Union and Rumania no treaty of any sort exists and there is no commercial or diplomatic exchange between the two countries. The Soviet Government has never recognized Rumania's seizure of Bessarabia and disregards completely the sanction of the Versailles treaty in the matter.

Rumania's war budget in 1931 was \$65,500,000, which, in proportion to population, exceeds even the Polish budget. Military aviation, to mention but a single form of armament, has grown to colossal proportions for so small a country. Rumania had only

sixty war planes in 1923; today the number is 280. Furthermore, the Soviets insist that there is an agreement between Rumania and France which stipulates that in the event of a war with the Soviet Union the French Government will supply Rumania with additional aircraft, with tanks and with chemical equipment for warfare.

The general staffs of Poland and Rumania openly cooperate with each other and the combined staffs of these countries are closely connected with the French general staff in Paris. An agreement between Poland and Czechoslovakia provides for the unhindered passage of French ammunition through that country to Poland and thence to the Soviet border.

Estonia is another link in the chain of border States which forms a sort of *cordon sanitaire* about the Soviet Republic and keeps Bolshevist civilization from coming into direct contact with the countries of Central and Western Europe. Estonia, too, has her territorial ambitions and border grievances. The Estonians believe their territory should extend not to Narva but to Novgorod, in the Soviet Union. Estonia's war budget is only \$5,000,000, but in the event of a war with the Soviet Union the country would possess strategic importance for an offensive by other capitalist nations.

Finland lays claim to the small, adjacent Soviet republic of Karelia, whose population is largely of Finnish stock. But as Finland's war budget has remained at \$14,200,000 since 1928 and a non-aggres-

sion treaty has recently been signed between that country and Moscow, the menace to Soviet Russia would not seem to be very great.

The Russia of the old régime was never very successful in carrying on war. Ethnological and geographical conditions, together with a certain genius for foreign diplomacy, favored the expansion policy of the Czars. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and part of the fifteenth, Russia paid tribute to the Tatars, a much smaller but more warlike and determined people. Ivan the Terrible ended this Mongolian menace, but his successors were harassed and humiliated by Lithuanian and Polish nobles. Peter the Great imported foreign officers and organized Russia's first modern army, but it was beaten by the Swedes. In the middle of the nineteenth century Great Britain and France prevented Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman empire. At the opening of the twentieth century Russia was beaten by the Japanese.

Under the Czars the loss of a foreign war was invariably followed by a grave domestic upheaval. Russia's defeat at Port Arthur, for example, ushered in the revolution of 1905, while her débâcle in the World War cost Nicholas II not only his throne, but his life. The Kremlin leaders have taken complete and poignant account of these historically significant facts. The preparedness programme of the Soviet Union is predicated upon the determination that in the next war Russia shall not be defeated.

The Red Army numbers 560,000 soldiers, one-third the size of the Russian army under the Czar. This is an average of one soldier to every 240 persons in the Soviet Union; in Poland the proportion is one to eighty, while in France there is one soldier for every sixty civilians. "How do you account for the smallness of your standing army in view of your assertions that the peace of the Soviet Union is continually threatened by its capitalistic neighbors?" the writer asked an important Soviet official in Moscow. He replied laconically: "The Red army is not an army of soldiers, but of officers, of commanders, as we call them. Our soldiers are *the whole of the Russian people*." The answer was not a flourish, but a statement of fact. The Soviet Union has undergone a military revolution as thorough as the political, social and economic transformation.

A NATION IN ARMS

THERE are 60,000,000 children under seventeen years of age in the Soviet Union, a population greater than that of either France or England, and all pass through a military mold. That mold is the Soviet system of education.

Lenin went to the New Testament for the most powerful slogan of the revolution, that about "the last being first and the first last." Stalin chose his epitome for the Soviet's military programme from the Old Testament. David's injunction to "teach the children of Judah the use of the bow" has been translated by the Communist party of Russia into an incisive edict as follows:

"Every young person must become proficient in some branch of military science and battle practice. . . . Every young worker, every young clerk, every young office employ   must learn to handle a machine gun . . ."

The next war will be a war of peoples rather than of armies in the view of Moscow's war office. There will be no civilians in it; all will be soldiers. Aviation,

chemistry, far-striking artillery will wipe out the difference between front and rear. Because of the highly industrialized nature of future military operations, the factory will become as much a theatre of war as the trenches. Victory will go to the nation with the greatest reserve of raw materials. The Soviet schools are dedicated to the service of both industry and the army.

Education in the Soviet union assumes a technical aspect the moment the pupil leaves the grade schools. The very name for high school in Russia today is "technicum." Virtually all secondary schools are affiliated with industry.

The oil industry supports technicums where boys and girls with an interest in oil obtain their book education along with practical study of the industry in which they will later seek their livelihood. There are technicums affiliated with the automobile industry, aviation, with machine and tractor plants. There are agricultural technicums in connection with the huge collectivized or government-owned farms.

Between the ages of 10 and 50 every man and woman, every boy and girl, in the Soviet Union today is provided with some sort of "military qualification," whether this be for work on the battlefield or behind the lines. Machinery for the training of large masses of the population in war practice has been set up in every part of the country.

Each factory is provided with a "military corner" (voyenni ugolok). Every village has its defence house

(dom oboroni), a small scale armory for military practice and instruction. In every large city is a "central house of the Red Army," which serves both as military school and museum for the city and district.

The whole of the Soviet Union is covered with a network of shooting circles, and men and women periodically undergo rifle practice. Every boys' club in the country sees youths and children practicing military gymnastics, for all sport in the Soviet republic is conducted with an eye to military usefulness. Theoretical and practical military education is carried on in grade schools, high schools and universities.

There is an Army Press, consisting of a daily paper, the *Red Star*, and of a dozen or more weekly and monthly publications. One publication, which "writes down" to the masses and is entitled *On Guard* (*Na Strazhe*), circulates 460,000 copies weekly. The Army Press has 120,000 volunteer correspondents who report to it the progress military training is making in every corner of the Soviet Empire.

The training of the citizen-soldier starts with the child's entry into the grade school at the age of seven. Military training of the type which in other countries is reserved exclusively for students of military colleges was made an integral part of the general school curriculum in the Soviet union at the inauguration of the Five Year Plan. This policy acquired added scope in July, 1930, from the all-Russian congress for military training in public and higher schools. The congress,

under the guidance of the war department and the commissariat of education, has greatly intensified the military programme for each of the three types of schools—grade, secondary and universities.

From each category the government requires: "A minimum of military training of a character that can be put to practical use at any time." The high spots in the programme for each follow:

The grade schools look after the physical development of children with a view to their subsequent army fitness. Military discipline is maintained in all schools. All children must be sufficiently trained in war science to become liaison agents between the army and the home. They must be impregnated with the idea that war may come at any time; they should be directed to inoculate their elders with the same expectation of war.

In secondary schools, military education becomes more specialized. Here, direct pre-army training is the order. These schools are expected to turn out youths who can be designated with the military classification "individual soldier."

In the third category, the universities are directed to turn out subordinate officers for army, navy and air.

The extent to which universities and higher technical and professional schools have assumed an importance as military colleges is attested by the fact that the director of military science at such an institution also has the rank of assistant to the president or chancellor of the institution.

The militarization of the Soviet Union's educational system has gone ahead rapidly since Stalin assumed dictatorial sway over the country. It was Lenin, however, who originated the plans Stalin is carrying through.

The remaking of Russia militarily as well as economically by its young people, its children, was one of Lenin's fixed ideas. His widow, Mme. Krupskaya, to the present day is devoting all her time to this plan to have the young generation regenerate Russia economically and spiritually as well as militarily.

Critical as Lenin was of Western civilization, which he dubbed "imperialist, capitalist," he was no less captious about the absence of appreciable symptoms of civilization in his own country.

The lack in the Russian nature of order, concreteness and practicality, the want of persistent methodical application, the tendency to talk and dream endlessly, to put off until tomorrow what should be done today, were constantly emphasized by Lenin to his disciples. He feared for the success of the revolution they created, for their dream of establishing a socialist state, if these tendencies were not counteracted in the new generation. The children of the Soviet Union, Lenin warned, must not be infected with the indolence of their parents.

He advocated as the corner stone of the new Soviet educational system "a military-technical background" for every Russian pupil. This has evolved into the

present system of militarized education for every boy and girl in the Soviet Union.

The text books have been rewritten to present the defence programme of the government in conspicuous and emphatic form. The system of teaching has been changed to connect discussion of the country's war and defence plans with every topic presented to the class.

In the study of arithmetic, for instance, an example which formerly added so many cords of wood to so many more cords of wood has been changed to the addition of so many companies of soldiers to so many more companies. The study of geometry uses by way of illustration "war trenches." In the study of chemistry all examples are drawn from the country's plans and programmes for chemical defence.

In a circular of instruction issued by the Commissariat of Education to school authorities all over the Soviet Union it is made clear that no teacher who underestimates the country's war danger is a fit preceptor of the young. Before starting his daily lesson the teacher must take a few minutes to call the attention of the class to some event connected with the country's war programme. He must link this event with the lesson to be studied. He must present the subject of preparedness to the children in a manner that will arouse "appropriate patriotic emotions." Special institutes have been established for the reeducation of teachers along these lines. Sport has been militarized.

There are two types of grade schools in the Soviet

Union, four-year schools for the country population and seven-year schools for the city inhabitants. In both the pupils study the history of the Red Army, and have a survey of the country's defence problems. They are required to take "military gymnastics." They are taken on military excursions into the country, where they undergo such exercises as they might find useful if the country had to be defended against invasion. The pupils organize military circles and specialize in some branch of warfare and defence. Pupils who reach the seventh year in their school career are required in the final year to put in 60 hours in more advanced military training.

The secondary schools or technicums have two and three-year courses. The students are required to put in 180 hours for three years, or 120 hours for two years, to perfect themselves in specialized branches of service. As the students in these technicums are invariably attached to some industry in which they are employed while going to school, the military problems connected with that industry are presented to them in detail.

A youth attending an engineering technicum is required as part of his military training to familiarize himself with some phase of war engineering. A pupil in a chemical technicum is required to study some phase of chemical warfare. The students of an automobile technicum are duty-bound to make a study of the latest phases of motor transport and conveyance in the army.

A "hard minimum" of efficiency in military theory and practice is required of all pupils in secondary

schools. If they fail to meet these requirements they are denied a graduation certificate, and are not considerably handicapped in their career, thereby. The military discipline in the primary schools runs right on through the secondary schools till the student reaches the university.

In the universities, where military science in its advanced forms is taught, the most noteworthy feature is the absence of distinction between sexes so far as military training and practice are concerned. Girls in primary and secondary schools receive training along sanitation and Red Cross lines. They are encouraged to become nurses and hospital orderlies, and to learn to take care of homes or institutions for disabled soldiers. Women students in the universities are trained for all branches of service for which men are trained.

A pen picture of the actual training of Soviet youngsters for warfare is supplied by a woman correspondent in Moscow, who attached herself to a children's military excursion into the country. The children were between 8 and 12.

The Russian writer's account of some of the incidents is given verbatim:

"The leader of the children's company had just explained to the youngsters that the 'difficulty' with China over the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway had been amicably settled.

"'But,' the leader asked, 'can we now relax our vigilance?'

" 'No,' the children replied in one voice.

" 'Why not?' the leader asked.

" 'Because,' the children answered, 'we are surrounded by enemies.'

" 'Why must we go on preparing?'

" 'Because,' the children replied, 'the grown-ups are preparing. So we, too, must prepare, for when we grow up we will go into the Red Army.'

" 'Now, children,' said the leader, 'we are going to test and find out which little company is best prepared among you. All together, like regular Red Army soldiers, form according to companies. One, two, three! Attention!'

"All the companies formed as directed. The children stood as quiet as if they were little figures of stone. They were told to march. They marched in splendid order.

" 'Now, then,' the leader commanded, 'which company can march so quietly as to pass the enemy without being noticed?'

"All the children marched stealthily. Their steps were as noiseless as those of kittens."

FOR the war training of the adult population there exist 60,000 "military circles" throughout the Soviet Republic. The organization directing this mass military training is the Osoaviachim, the Soviet National Security Society, whose full name is the Association for

the Defence of the Soviet Union and for the Promotion of the Chemical and Aviation Industries.

During my 10 months in the Soviet Union, daily between 4 and 7 P.M., the streets of Moscow resounded with the tramp of marching men and women. The marchers were between 18 and 40. They wore civilian clothes, but the rifles over their shoulders were army rifles and their carriage was that of soldiers. As they marched they sang the songs of the Red Army.

From one end of Russia to the other, at the same hours, similar bands of men and women, workers' clerks, professional people, were undergoing the same type of military practice.

Every factory in the Soviet Union, every large commercial or professional establishment, every mine or mill, every collectivized or government-owned farm forms the nucleus of such a military educational circle. It has an arsenal which supplies the population with regulation army weapons. Sometimes these arsenals are in one of the factory buildings. More often guns and other equipment are stored in a workers' club or sport club.

In such rural communities as have not yet built a "Dom Oboroni," or defence house, the village "reading house" is used as an arsenal.

The Osoaviachim furnishes rifles and equipment to each military circle. It provides instructors for both practical and theoretical branches of the service. Its representatives select a site for target practice and do

all the executive planning. It organizes classes and lectures and keeps unbroken connection between civilian companies and regular army units in the district. The citizen soldiers make regular visits to the Red Army barracks. The Red Army returns this compliment by sending officers to address these military circles and to visit and fraternize with their members.

To keep the enthusiasm of the population for military training at high pitch, contests are arranged between military circles of different cities, different regions and even republics, with worth-while prizes and distinctions for the winners.

The commanding personnel of the citizens' army consists very largely of officers and soldiers of the reserve. Its educational and disciplinary régime follows closely that of the Red Army.

Despite the mechanization of modern warfare the individual soldier remains the backbone of every battle, and the rifle and machine gun are still considered the most effective weapons. The citizen soldier is therefore trained in the first instance to shoot and to shoot efficiently. War authorities in the Soviet Union have statistics showing that in the last war 24,000 Russian bullets were expended to kill a single enemy. The shooting circles conducted by the Osoaviachim are designed to better this record in the "next war."

Rifle and machine gun practice is the primary training the citizen soldier receives from the Osoaviachim. But the other branches of war are taught the civilian

recruit no less proficiently. There are circles designed for those who wish to qualify as tank operators. Other circles prepare experts in gas warfare. Still others train future army aviators.

There are engineering circles where various branches of army engineering are taught willing applicants. Special study groups are provided for army telegraphers and radio operators. There are courses for those who would specialize in wartime railroad problems and in army motor transport.

The citizen soldier is required to put in 75 hours of military training a year for two years, or 150 hours in all. Part of each course is devoted to general subjects in which every soldier must be proficient. The rest is devoted to the specialty in which each man chooses to perfect himself. To make the special courses really specialized, students are admitted in groups of 12 to 18 only.

Each fall the red and civilian armies meet and join hands. At this season the regular army conducts its annual maneuvers, in which the citizens army is invited to join. The citizen soldiers who distinguish themselves are not infrequently taken from their trades and professions and sent to higher military academies or colleges to be trained for command in the Red Army. Those who attain distinction, but are not so honored, receive other valuable recognition and privileges from the government.

It is only fair to emphasize that this army of citizen

soldiers is a voluntary army. But it is equally essential to qualify the statement by calling attention to the war psychology of the Soviet Union today, which is so tense and inflammable that any citizen who does not "of his own accord" show an enthusiastic interest in preparedness may find himself on the list of suspected and proscribed, which, under a dictatorship, is a serious matter indeed.

At the outbreak of the World War the army of the Czar numbered 1,423,000. Sixteen days after war had been officially declared the Russian Army had grown to 5,338,000. After three years, and just before the revolution in February, 1917, there were 15,000,000 Russians in the various armies of the old régime.

No figures are given by Soviet sources for the numerical strength of its army or trained citizenry. It is the determination of the Soviet government, however, so to manage its industrial and military affairs that every man or woman who can hold a rifle will have the training to take part in war.

THE will to victory is being planted in the Russian mind by Joseph Stalin in this year of 1933 with no less vigor than it was planted in the German mind by William Hohenzollern in 1913. The upbuilding of a great air fleet is considered by the Soviet dictator the surest means to victory.

Aviation today is one of the foremost war indus-

tries in the Soviet Union. The sum of 150,000,000 rubles was spent on it by the government during the last year.

Officially the industry is labeled civil or commercial aviation. Every one in the Soviet Union, however, knows that the feverish construction of airplanes and dirigibles is intended for "the coming war," which, it is feared, may come any day.

The industry is carried on under the direct authority of the Council of Labor and Defence. Moreover, in a special decree by the Council of People's Commissars, the Soviet cabinet, the trusts selling construction materials were ordered to supply the aviation industry at the same reduced rates paid by Soviet War and Navy Departments.

The development of the Russian air fleet did not begin until 1923. Before that, the Bolsheviks were concerned largely with fighting internal and foreign enemies, and in this they used whatever planes the old Czarist army had had. The years 1923 and 1924 were largely experimental. In the two years following, aviation took root in Russia. Beginning with 1928, which ushered in the Five Year Plan, aviation in the Soviet Union had a surprising upward swing.

There were 11,971 kilometers of air route in the Soviet Union in 1928, covering mainly central or European Russia. This was increased to 18,342 in the next twelve months, and to 26,500 kilometers in 1930. In 1931, the government brought the total to 46,412 kilo-

meters. By the end of 1933 the Kremlin expects a total of 110,832 kilometers of air routes.

Such widely divergent regions as Turkestan, the Caucasus and Siberia; such far-flung cities as Vladivostok, Tashkent and Archangelsk, are today united with the center, Moscow, by the Soviet air routes. Airplane factories are scattered throughout the country. New hangars and airdromes are going up in various parts of the republic. To the aviation schools already in existence five were added in the last year. Fifteen thousand pupils entered these schools in that period.

Russia is covered with "air circles," where peasant boys learn by playing with aircraft models. The benefits of aviation are brought home to the peasant in connection with his crops. Scores of thousands of acres have been saved from destruction by locusts and other pests by air squadrons, which spray the fields with chemicals. In like manner the forests are being preserved by the air forces which quickly detect forest fires from the sky.

Russian authorities cite figures for the number of commercial planes possessed by the more advanced countries of Europe and by the United States, with which the Soviet air industry is actively competing. They mention the outstanding types of Soviet-constructed planes—the K-5, the ANT-9 and the latest model, STAL-2, characterized as the Ford of the sky.

The extent of the Soviet plane force and air personnel is kept secret. There is, however, the statement

of V. V. Quibishev, chairman of the State Planning Commission and a member of the all powerful political bureau, that the air forces are ample to defend the country.

"We have created a powerful air fleet," M. Quibishev said. "It is already sufficient to repel any attack on the Soviet border."

Soviet authorities speak more freely about dirigible construction. Seven dirigibles are being built. Part of the money has been raised by public subscription. The dirigibles will be named Lenin, Stalin, Old Bolshevik, Pravda, Klim Voroshilov, Osoaviachim and Kolkhoznik.

There is a legend in the Soviet Union that while Lenin was in exile, during the World War, he once exclaimed: "Wait until we get our own dirigibles!" The phrase has been reechoed from one end of Soviet Russia to the other, with excellent propaganda results. The new dirigibles will be known as the "Lenin squadron."

Four dirigibles were built by the Soviets between 1920 and 1930. They are named Red Star, October, Moscow Chemist and Comsomol Pravda. Except the last, all are out of service. Each was used for demonstration only.

The workers of Leningrad some time ago adopted the slogan, "Make every factory a fortress." The factories of the chemical industry in the Soviet Union can be called that. Precisely as the Soviet government

is making Russia a respected rival of the great nations of the world in air navigation, it is making Russia's chemical industry one of the most formidable weapons for offence and defence in "the next war."

There were 4,200 chemists in the Soviet Union at the close of 1929, but new chemical colleges and laboratories have opened since, and the Soviet educational and war authorities plan to increase the number of chemists to 30,000 by the end of the current year.

The peasant of Czarist Russia formerly used only a gram of chemicals to every 1,000 grams used by English or American farmers. Here, too, the Soviet government is causing basic changes. Eight million tons of mineral fertilizer have been produced in accordance with the specifications of the Five Year Plan, and that amount is declared one quarter of what Russian agriculture must have.

It is a slogan of the Kremlin to make the Soviet Union independent of the rest of Europe in those branches of chemistry used primarily in warfare. Soviet military publications assert the high tempo of the Five Year Plan has already made the people, especially the Red Army, independent of other countries in chemical equipment. No secret is made of what the Soviet Union is doing to protect the civilian population from chemical attacks by an invader.

In regions where a gas or chemical attack is most likely to occur, the Osoaviachim has an organized body of 100,000 men and women ready to aid the population

in such an attack. It maintains 2,000 "circles" for their training by chemists and scientists, members of the Institute of Chemical Defence, also an Osoaviachim organization.

In these regions refuge cellars have been provided and by frequent drills the population has been trained in their use. Instruction also is given in making such areas safe from gas penetration. A ring of observation posts has been established and men and women are trained to distinguish enemy planes and to signal their approach.

Perhaps as indicative as anything of the extent to which all life in the Soviet Union is governed by the expectation of war is the widespread military standardization of all objects that can be used in war.

If a peasant goes to a store for a water bucket he will receive one made for the Red Army. Government-owned farms have military field telephones. Harness is of army type. Caterpillar tractors, built by the government for plowing and harvesting, are constructed in accordance with military specifications. The boots the peasant buys are made exactly as the boots of the soldier.

Even the civilian clothes are cut on military pattern. Mind and body are constantly reminded that the enemy is standing at the gate.

That the war hysteria of the Russians is, in part, at any rate, being utilized by the Kremlin to stimulate Russian workers and peasants to their utmost in the

government's industrialization programme is doubtless true. But it is possible to overestimate this phase of the Soviet war psychosis. Russia's war preparations are genuine and desperate. The geography of the Five Year Plan illustrates this beyond a doubt.

Just as Lenin, early in the Bolshevik régime, decided on an inland capital for the newly-formed Soviet government, and abandoned Leningrad for Moscow, Stalin has decided on inland cities as the capitals of Soviet industry. Rostov, Saratov, Stalingrad, Nizhni Novgorod, Kharkov, Sverdlovsk, Zaporozhie, to mention merely the principal areas connected with the Five Year Plan, are well in the interior of the country in order to make the newly-established industries in them safe from attack by a foreign foe.

Kiev was once a famous city in Russia, but the Soviet government overlooked it in its building programme because it has on occasion proved too near the Polish border. Odessa has shared a like fate. A port city of major importance in the Soviet Union, it plays practically no rôle in the industrial construction connected with the Five Year Plan because it, too, has in the past been easily accessible to enemies of the Soviet régime.

Leningrad is the only city on the fringe of the Soviet Union that figures strongly in the Five Year Plan. It does this very largely, however, because it has been the seat of some of Russia's principal industries in the past.

CHAPTER VI

WAR AND THE WOMEN

IT is the aim of the Soviet régime in "the next war" to give the world the spectacle of a nation run by its women while the men do the fighting.

Two million women in the ranks of the Osoaviachim, the Soviet's militant preparedness society, are training for war. Some are preparing to bear arms side by side with men soldiers at the front, others are training for defensive work, to ward off enemy attacks, especially gas and chemical attacks, at home.

Millions of women, not members of the above organization, are being trained by the trade unions and the Communist party to take the place of men in the industries and on the farms. They are taught to manage public affairs and to run municipalities, large and small.

A train on which I traveled from Moscow to the Crimea, a forty-hour journey by express, had a woman conductor. In the Pullman the porter was a woman. Women section workers were keeping the roadbed in condition. Women linemen were sitting high up on

telegraph poles and working expertly among the wires. In one town we passed women mechanics were repairing a water main; in another a gang of women laborers, managed by a woman foreman, were digging a sewer.

In Alexandrovsk, half way between Moscow and Sevastopol, in a harvesting plant, which manufactured threshing machines, more than half the 7,000 workers were women.

One million six hundred thousand women in the Soviet Union during 1931 left their places in the home to become wage-earners. Nearly a million of them were absorbed by industries, principally heavy industries, and by the railroads. Agriculture, the collectivized and government-owned farms run on a factory basis, absorbed the remaining 600,000.

The unprecedented industrial expansion of the country, grouped under the general head of the Five Year Plan, accounts in part for this vast migration from kitchen to factory. The rest of it must be ascribed to the war spirit brooding over Russia today.

What Russian women must do to help win "the next war" was outlined by Climenty Voroshilov in a speech entitled "Working Women and the Defence of Our Country," delivered before the All-Union Congress of Women Workers and Peasants.

"The men will go to the front," the war commissar told his audience, "and women must take their places in shops and factories. On the work of women trainmen, women conductors, women chauffeurs, women

machinists, women traffic dispatchers, women administrators, will depend the success of military operations at the front. For in modern warfare, success on the battlefield is dependent on the efficiency with which the country's industries are operated thousands of miles away.

"Finally, many women will serve in the ranks of the regular army. Women in the Soviet Union having become the equals of men economically, must also share with the men the greatest of all duties—to defend with weapons in hand the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics."

The distribution and training of the newly recruited women workers are conducted with utmost deliberation by three of the highest governmental bodies responsible for the industrialization of the Soviet Union—the supreme council of national economy, the commissariat of labor, and the government planning commission, the organization directly responsible for the success of the Five Year Plan.

The chance to advance from unskilled work into more mechanical positions is frequently given women before they are fully ripe for it. Their apprenticeship is short. From mechanical work they are drafted into executive positions with the same rapidity. They are compelled to attend education and technical classes conducted by the factories in which they are employed. In 1931, nearly 9,000,000 adult women in the Soviet Union had "liquidated" their illiteracy, that is, they had

learned to read and write. The specter of war and the women's industrial programme for defence contributed in no small measure to this educational uplift.

Evidence that the government's programme for the industrial militarization of women is accomplishing tangible results is becoming cumulative throughout the Soviet Union. In one of the government-owned farms, "Gigant," which puts under cultivation nearly a million acres of land annually, the "tractor work" on these million acres in the last season was done almost entirely by women.

Women chauffeurs operated the tractors both for planting and harvesting. Women mechanics attended to the necessary repairs, and did so competently. As far as this particular sector of the government's bread industry is concerned, the men might go to war any day; the women will attend to the grain raising without difficulty.

In the Magnitogorsk steel works the workers had failed to live up to a certain minimum of production required by the government. A brigade of women industrial shock troopers replaced a particular set of male workmen. Result: The government's programme was filled out 105 per cent, and on time.

Many factories throughout the Soviet Union have women directors. The Rubezhansk factory, a very large enterprise, has thirty-two women engineers. Women workers are continually sent to pull up the quality of production when the men workers in a

particular industry fail to live up to expectations. However, this is not yet the full extent of the government's plans for woman's place in industry in war time.

The technical schools of the country have recently been so reorganized as to make it possible for the factories to send their most intelligent and promising women to these institutions for higher technical training. The number of women students admitted to the engineering schools of the Soviet Union during the last year and a half has been so great that even after allowing for the large percentage who no doubt will be unable to keep up with their studies, the government still expects that by the end of the present year it will have 20,000 university-trained women engineers.

Figures for the number of women in the Soviet Union who are training for regular army service are unavailable for the past two years. But in the year 1930, nearly a quarter million women were undergoing such training in the various military schools conducted by the Osoaviachim. About 60,000 women took up general military training. Fifty-five thousand qualified as rifle experts and machine gunners. Forty thousand more specialized in quartermaster's problems and similar military organization work. Something over 10,000 women specialized in war chemistry, while the remainder took up artillery and aviation.

Exactly fifty women entered higher military academies and colleges in 1930.

In the Soviet Union are thousands of women who fought side by side with men during the civil wars which followed the advent of Lenin and Trotsky into office. These women veterans today form the nucleus about whom the women training for active warfare frequently group themselves, precisely as the men undergoing such military training group themselves about the officers of the reserve and the discharged Red Army soldiers.

The battalion of woman soldiers organized during the Kerensky régime for continued participation of Russia in the World War still has a number of members, but these are carefully kept out of the ranks of Bolshevik woman soldiers. The women who served under the provisional government are looked upon as "bourgeois" and unworthy of the confidence of the proletariat.

The cities in the Soviet Union where women's military organizations have achieved more than local renown are Petrograd, which has a famous company of woman snipers composed exclusively of the workers of a single rubber factory, and Moscow, which has recently graduated the first corps of militarized women telegraph and telephone operators.

Other cities which have attained distinction are Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, whose sniping companies are among the best-trained in the Union. In Omsk the Osoaviachim maintains a woman's college for the training of shooting instructors, most of the graduates

of this institution being used to organize and train the women of Siberia and Mongolia, up to the Chinese boundary.

Special attention also is given to the women of the Soviet East, the Mohammedan women, who are citizens of the Bolshevist Republic. These had only recently taken off their veils and thrown overboard other medieval superstitions. They make excellent fighters.

Camps for Summer training and fall maneuvers for this woman's volunteer army of 250,000 are maintained by the Osoaviachim, jointly with the camps for men, in the vicinity of Kostroma, Riazan, Ufa and Novosibirsk. The training at these camps lasts one to two months. After the women have attained proficiency in their military training they are organized into mixed divisions, the proportion being about thirty per cent women to seventy per cent men soldiers.

One of the most important duties of the women volunteer soldiers in the Soviet Union is inland policing and inland military intelligence. In addition to millions of former land owners, former army and civilian officials and former merchants who have been killed, exiled or declassed, the Stalin régime by its collectivization policy has in the last three years antagonized millions of so-called kulaks or rich peasants. It is these peasants, burning with resentment over confiscation of their land and the loss of their homes, who are considered a serious war menace by the Soviet. The Soviet fears that if a foreign enemy once sets foot on Soviet

soil these outlawed peasants may flock to its standard to revenge themselves.

The women soldiers are trained to be always on guard against any peasant who falls into the group of the malcontents. They are required to report to the secret service authorities every suspicious move of such a neighbor, every unguarded utterance. They are trained especially to keep watch over factories and storehouses to see that these are not tampered with or destroyed by the enemy within.

The women in the border provinces are charged with the additional duty of keeping up a steady vigilance over the Soviet border, which is 40,000 kilometers long and lends itself to incursions by foreign foes, whether of the bandit or the reconnoitering type.

THE RED ARMY

IN "the next war" most of the rank and file of the Soviet Army and practically all its officers will take the field as agitators as well as soldiers. They are trained for both.

They will go to the front armed with "the book," in this instance the Communist bible, "Das Kapital," by Karl Marx. They will go forth to conquer by propaganda as well as by sword.

The Red Army has been molded in accordance with an assumption that the human race is irreconcilably divided into opposing camps, the Soviet Union on one hand and the Capitalist world on the other, and that lasting peace between them is impossible.

"The fairy tale about the World War having been the last war," Lenin told his followers, "is ridiculous and dangerous." He foresaw "a series of terrible conflicts between the Soviet republic and the rest of the world" and accordingly warned the Soviet leaders: "Be on guard; take care of the Red Army as if it were the apple of your eye."

Many Communist leaders in the Soviet Union to-day may be said to desire war far more than they fear it, for they are guided by a dogmatic belief that "the next war" will complete the revolution the World War started.

The Soviet Union will not seek territory, but it expects to emerge from such a war with new political and class allies. It is confident a number of States in Eastern and Central Europe will go Communist, and that Bolshevism will sweep all of the Far East as the result of a world conflict.

Its class conscious make-up and revolutionary purpose distinguishes the Red Army from any other in the world. The sons of the proletariat and the peasantry, with a slight sprinkling of the sons of loyal intelligentsia, alone are permitted to enjoy the rank and privilege that go with Red Army service. It is as difficult for the son of a former priest, of an ex-landowner, of a so-called kulak or of a "declassed" merchant to enter the army as it is for the proverbial rich man to enter the kingdom of Heaven. The sons of these classes bear their share of military work and responsibility at nondescript and unpleasant tasks. They are not trained or trusted to bear arms.

Military service is compulsory for all males of 21, and it covers five years, during which the soldiers are permitted one, two and three-year leaves, depending on their branch. The navy exacts the longest period of active service. Sailors serve four years and have

only one year's leave. In the air forces and in other branches requiring technical training the soldiers serve three years and have two years' leave. The infantry and artillery of the Red Army serve only two years and have three years at home.

Annually 1,200,000 youths are called. About 800,000 meet the physical qualifications, and of those 260,000 are selected for the Red Army, while the remainder are assigned to the territorial armies. In the territorial armies they serve, technically, for five years also, but here the length of actual military training and practice for the entire five years is only six months for one category and eight to twelve months for the other. The rest of the time the territorial soldiers work behind the plow or in factories, though, like the Red Army soldiers, they are subject to call without notice during the whole of the five years.

For all youths between 19 and 21 four weeks yearly are set aside for pre-army training.

With every person in the Soviet Union acquiring a substantial military background from the first school year up, the various Red Army institutions resolve themselves into an aggregation of higher military schools for the entire country. This is so defined in the government's army manuals.

"In time of war," says one official guide for soldiers, "the various divisions of the army are transformed into numerous separate armies. In peace they are schools for military and military-political training,

preparing in a short period large numbers for military service."

The revolutionary-apostolic mission of the Red Army is outlined by Stalin with characteristic brevity and clearness.

"The strength of the Red Army," he says, "lies in the fact that it is raised in a spirit of internationalism, respect for other nations, love and respect for working masses of every land and of all continents. It is because our army is raised in such a spirit that it is the army of world revolution."

Lenin's injunction to "guard the Red Army as if it were the apple of your eye" is observed by the Kremlin leaders with utmost fidelity. Nearly two million persons passed Lenin's tomb in the Red Square at Moscow during a recent Bolshevik celebration. They were a bleak-looking lot, except for the 40,000 troops who headed the parade. The run of civilians appeared at least 35 per cent undernourished. A whole suit of clothes or a new pair of shoes was a rarity. In spite of the martial music and stirring emblems, the civilian marchers had a tired, listless presence.

But the soldiers did not show any signs of food rationing. Their uniforms were spotless and of excellent material. Their boots and belts were of finest leather, their equipment in the best condition.

It is the ultimate objective of Stalin and the Soviet régime to have none but Communists in the army. This has already been realized half way. Fifty per

cent of the soldiers are affiliated today either with the Communist Party proper or with the League of Communist Youth. Of officers and commanders, 51 per cent owe allegiance to the Communist organization. The time for military training has been reduced from eight and a half hours a day, as in the army of the Czars, to five and a half hours. Four and a half hours are devoted by the soldier to political and general educational work.

It is the claim of the army that every soldier, on discharge, takes home a "Bolshevist-Leninist education."

"Instead of alcohol, cards and disease, which the soldier of the Czarist armies took back to his village," writes one army authority, "the Red soldier takes home books, an electric lamp and the very latest knowledge of crop raising."

This is not an idle boast. The army has made a sort of gentleman of the soldier. He is polite. His speech is guarded. He is never seen drunk. He is the first on the scene in a street accident, and knows how to maintain order and what to do. It has become almost an axiom that if you want something attended to quickly and properly, a Red soldier must do it.

The Red Army maintains 838 clubs for its soldiers. In the barracks are 6,000 "Lenin corners," where the soldier may sit and listen to a talk on the radio, or otherwise, on politics, government, foreign affairs. The army maintains 1,500 stationary and 8,000 movable

libraries with 9,000,000 books, those on economic topics being in the majority.

It is true, as the War Department says, that the youth in the Red Army has his entire mentality made over. Many special classes are conducted, to meet every taste and deficiency. A promising peasant is not rejected if there has been no school in his district and he is illiterate. He is taken into the army and sent to a regiment which conducts special classes to eliminate illiteracy.

To a not inconsiderable extent the army is also a training establishment for civilian life. Of the discharged soldiers, thousands upon thousands go home with a trade, as chauffeurs, as machinists. Their education has fitted many soldiers to manage stores, warehouses and agricultural collectives. They have been trained to become policemen, court attachés, judges. Nearly 150,000 discharged soldiers entered these callings in 1930.

With such diversified studies and interests, with thoughts of world revolution and utopias filling his mind, what sort of figure would the Red soldier cut on the battlefield?

A very good figure, according to Climenty Voroshilov, war commissar. The propaganda with which the soldier's head has been filled, the commissar holds, will add to his fighting qualities. Like the Mohammedan soldiers who offered their opponents the Koran or the sword, and slew them if the book was refused, the

members of the Red Army have been trained to fight to win if their propaganda is spurned.

"Our latest maneuvers," Voroshilov reported to the congress of Moscow trade unions, "have shown that the army is excellently prepared militarily and politically. It maintains high discipline. On its technical side the army measures up most satisfactorily to the needs of modern warfare. It stands high culturally and is in every respect equal to any of the armies of any of our most probable opponents. The Red soldier is an ardent defender of the Socialist Fatherland."

What would be the chief tactics of the Soviet government in war? They would be the same which Lenin advocated in the World War, agitation for world revolution.

In accord with Bolshevik methods of appealing to the least advanced nations first, propaganda for world revolution would be centered most heavily in the Orient, in China, in India.

Trotsky, as war chief during the years after the revolution, rigged up a printing shop in a fast train and filled the trenches of the enemy with revolutionary leaflets. In "the next war" such leaflets would rain down upon enemy trenches from the sky, for every Soviet dirigible will carry a completely outfitted printing office in addition to its chemical poisons and T.N.T.

The Soviet government's estimate of its complete fighting strength—"the army in civilian clothes" as well as the Red Army—was recently given by L. M.

Kaganovich, member of the all powerful Politbureau and next to Joseph Stalin and Premier Molotov the most powerful man in the Communist party of Russia.

"To our enemies at home and abroad," M. Kaganovich said, "we wish to state that our army is growing and becoming stronger day by day. It consists of the working class, of the collectivized farm laborers, of the poor peasants. Our organized forces include 11,000,000 members of trade unions, 9,000,000 members of voluntary defence organizations, more than 1,000,000 delegates to the Soviets, 5,000,000 members of the League of Communist Youth and 4,000,000 pioneers. The leaders of this army are 2,000,000 members of the Communist party, the best organized proletarian party in the world."

The "5,000,000 members of the League of Communist Youth" which Kaganovich mentions in passing are in their own right a portentous military factor. The members of this organization range in age from sixteen to twenty-three. Their training so nearly approximates that of the regular soldier that they are usually spoken of as the Soviet's "Junior Army."

BOOK TWO: PEACE

"HOME, SWEET HOME"

A COMMUNIST, whose standing in the party was so firm and unquestioned that he was not afraid to have a foreigner come to his house, asked me to tea, which in Russia means supper. He was married and his wife, not yet thirty, was not only lovely to look at, but the possessor of a brilliant mind and an excellent education. She held a position in the Soviet apparatus equal in importance to that of her husband, who was a construction engineer.

The invitation was repeated twice in the next six months. A short time before leaving the Soviet Union I again received a call from my Communist friend to visit his home. He added that I was to come without fail.

Husband and wife greeted me with the usual cordiality and welcome. But the eyes of both were dimmed with tragedy. Their faces gave the impression that they had been weeping. I have seen such a look in the faces of parents who had lost an only child. In the Soviet Union I often observed the same expression in the eyes

of those who had some one dear to them ordered deported to some Siberian town or confined in the prisons of the G. P. U. I. was beginning to suspect that something of this nature had befallen a near relative of either the husband or the wife, when my host explained matters.

"I have just received a *comandirovka*," he said, "and am leaving for Mongolia in ten days."

To receive a *comandirovka* in the Soviet Union means to be ordered to another part of the country to work. The change of residence may be for a month or it may be for a year. A *comandirovka* to Mongolia could scarcely be for less than six months; the place was so far away, on the Chinese Siberian border. My friend and his wife had been married, or, in Communist phraseology, had been living together, less than five years. They were very much devoted to each other, very much in love.

I glanced up at his wife. She averted her gaze. The husband replied to my unspoken question.

"She is not going with me," he announced. "They won't permit her to leave her job."

Left alone for a brief spell later in the evening my Soviet friend "explained himself," as he put it, though I had not been looking and certainly had not asked for an explanation.

With the passion for "confessions," for self-revelation and self-torture, which is one of the mystifying and sometimes annoying traits of the "Russian soul,"

he disclosed an episode from his, or more correctly, their, personal life, as if it were not only my right but my duty to know it.

This was the second time he was ordered to Mongolia. Three years earlier they had sent him there and he had been away from his wife nearly a year. Did I have any conception of what life in that part of Siberia known as Mongolia was like? The loneliness for a cultivated, civilized individual was something indescribable. He had stood it for months. Then there was a woman . . . She was older than himself by fifteen or twenty years. She too had been sent in comandirovka; she too was a specialist in her work. They met in the course of some common assignment and became friendly at first and later—intimate. This lasted for four or five months, until he got back to Moscow.

Some one had reported the matter to his wife. . . . On the other hand, to him, too, matters had been reported. During part of the twelve months he had been away from home, his wife had been intimate with a friend of his, a professor.

"Neither of us," my host continued his self-imposed revelation, "have ever questioned or reproached the other. My wife and I love each other as dearly and as passionately as ever, but both of us have the feeling that the twelve months we were apart form a black, disagreeable page in our book of life. It has left a painful memory which neither of us can forget no matter how we try."

"And the worst of it is," my Soviet friend continued, "that the present comandirovka to Mongolia means the writing of another such black page in our book of love. Intense loneliness diminishes one's ability to work and a communist must not let anything interfere with the task assigned to him."

Still later, as he was accompanying me to a street car, my host added:

"I suppose you are surprised that I talked this way to you, but I do not know another man in Moscow to whom I could confide the things I told you this evening. With us the highest morality is loyalty to the country in its present stage of inner and outer adjustment. To a communist his work is the most important thing; his personal life he can live as he sees fit. Formerly the word in the Russian language for unfaithfulness by wife or husband was 'treachery.' To-day each man or woman can make his or her own code of morals."

"If I told my Communist associates," the man concluded, "my scruples or my pains over the things I and my wife had done, my career would be in jeopardy. I would be branded as soft and sentimental, a man not to be trusted with great tasks and important missions."

Just as incidentally, a week or ten days later, I came upon another intimate but lighter side, of the home and family problem in the Soviet Union.

An acquaintance, a man close to forty, came to my

room one morning as I was having breakfast. It was his "fifth day," or day of rest, he explained, and he thought he would drop in for a chat. Over a glass of tea he confided to me "a little problem" which was troubling him.

The problem was—marriage. He was planning to get married. The girl, or rather woman, he was considering was what might be termed an ideal person. There was an undoubted spiritual affinity between them. The woman's father had been a famous musician under the Czar. She had received an excellent education. There was also an agreeable practical side to such a match. The woman was a cook in one of the higher priced restaurants run by the government. Her own food would be no problem. Moreover—at this my friend lowered his voice—she would even be in a position to manipulate an extra ration of food for him occasionally.

There was, besides, also an agreeable religious feature connected with such a marriage. The young woman was a believer. My friend, though posing as an atheist for the sake of the position which he occupied, was in fact, also a believer; secretly he served as a trustee in one of the orthodox churches of Moscow. He had already made all plans for a church wedding, had seen a minister, arranged the time and place. But there was a difficulty. . . .

"The difficulty," the visitor explained, "is with regard to our home, our future residence."

"But I thought you had a room," I said.

"I have," the man replied, "an excellent room, in fact, located in one of the finest sections of Moscow. But she also has a room and that's where the problem arises.

"You see," he went on, "she won't give up her room and come to live with me. Suppose, she says, she decides to obtain a divorce in a month or two. If she gives up her room, she will have no home to come back to."

"Well, then why don't you give up your room?" I suggested.

"But then," the visitor became very red in the face and began to stammer, "suppose she does get a divorce after a month or two, if I give up my room, then I will have no home to come to."

I was unable to help my Russian friend with any further advice. A week later, however, he came to me again, beaming with joy. He was married. His wife had hit upon an idea. They were secretly wed by a priest, but did not record their marriage with the ZAGS, the government recording office. Since legally they were still single, they retained their separate rooms. One night she came to his room and the next night he went to hers. People, of course, assumed that they were "living in sin." But since living in sin was not legally sinful in the Soviet Union and both had retained their rooms, in case their marriage went on the rocks, the arrangement was ideal. They were perfectly happy.

Two fundamental causes explain the haphazard nature of the home and family in the Soviet Union. One is the revolution; the other the building of the new and, as Stalin calls it, socialist order.

It was to the interest of the Bolshevik revolution, as fostered by Lenin and his associates, to break up the patriarchal form of the family in Russia because canonical marriage among the Slavs virtually made the women slaves to their husbands. It is to the advantage of the Soviet's reconstruction plans that the youth of Russia—and Russia today is preeminently a country governed by its youth—should "take sex easy," without too much sentimentality; that the young should devote their capacity for romance, for dreams, less to gazing into women's eyes and more to constructive planning and working "for the good of the Fatherland and of socialism."

The wife of an important official in one of the autonomous republics of the Soviet Union recently lodged a complaint against her husband with the "highest authority" in that republic. The husband had transferred his affections to another woman. She was advised that if her husband had neglected to make proper financial provision for their children and for her, until she found work, or in case she was unable to work, there was a special government department where such complaints were heard. If, however, her husband had fulfilled the legal requirements in the matter of care and support, then there was nothing further to be done. A man's

soul was his own to do with as he pleased, to love whom he wished. She could do likewise.

Yet the Soviet Union in the past two years has given much evidence that home life and family relations are undergoing vital changes. You can still obtain a divorce in Russia for the price of a cup of coffee and doughnuts and in no more time than is required to swallow a quick lunch. However, people no longer rush to the divorce court. Divorce has lost its thrill. The old marriages have a tendency to become permanent and the new marriages are contracted with less haste.

It is the young who lead in the movement for the rehabilitation of home and family life on a more conservative and lasting basis. This is not unnatural. It is the young generation that has suffered most from love and sex excesses since the revolution.

There are in the Soviet Union today thousands of young women who, with their ailing and deformed bodies, bear witness to the fact that abortions even when made with the sanction of the law (the Soviet government has legalized abortion) and by reputable physicians, still leave ravaging physical consequences. There are numbers of young men throughout the country, some of them mere boys, who bear on their conscience the suicide of young girls whom they wantonly promised to marry but, when the girls became mothers, went back on their word.

The Comsomol, or League of Communist Youth, now takes up all such perversities of comradely rela-

tions between the sexes among its members and the boy or youth found guilty of them is expelled from its ranks. Not infrequently he is turned over to the law for more drastic punishment than the mere ostracism of his fellows.

It was the government itself, however, that has given the spontaneous movement for a return to stability in family life its greatest impetus through the recent revision of the Soviet marriage laws. The amended marriage code, which went into effect February 1, 1931, eliminates the state as a partner in marriage. In other words couples marrying in the Soviet Union today can no longer bear children and expect the government to raise them.

"Parents are legally bound to care for their children who are under age," the new marriage code reads. "They are especially charged with the duty of educating and preparing their offspring for a useful life." In the Soviet Union, where the state is the employer, these are not idle words. Machinery has been set up which sees to it that parents do their duty by their children. Russia is not trifling with its younger generations. A father derelict in his duties toward his child is a father headed for considerable explaining and, if these explanations are not satisfactory, for serious punishment.

The age at which marriage can be contracted has

been advanced from 16 to 18. Registration authorities are instructed to question closely both parties to a marriage contract and if one is found to be living in marriage relations with another person, whether such marriage relations have been registered with the government or not, to refuse to marry the couple. The above provision is the only one which guards against bigamy. No other provisions exist and no punishment for bigamy is cited anywhere.

A provision in the revised Soviet marriage and divorce code which tends to give greater permanency to the home is the strengthening of the bond between married couples by extending their relations to one another even after they are divorced. Thus a man cannot obtain a divorce from his sick wife and forget all about her. For a period of twelve months from the date they were divorced he must look after her physical welfare. The same is true of woman. She may obtain a divorce from her sick husband, but she must support him for twelve months from the date the divorce has been granted.

There is a similar provision in case one or the other of the two parties to a marriage contract is unemployed. You can divorce your wife because you have ceased to love her and consider it therefore immoral to go on living with her in wedlock. But for a period of six months after the divorce you must support her if she is out of a job. You must give her a chance to find work, to again make a place for herself indus-

trially. The same right extends to the husband. If the man is out of work, his divorced wife is legally bound to come to his assistance during a period of six months from the date of the divorce.

The feeling of family obligations and respect for home and blood ties have been reestablished by the 1931 marriage and divorce code in a series of measures which provide that members of a family have definite responsibilities toward each other. Children have responsibility to their parents and both children and their parents have a responsibility to their grandparents. Older brothers and sisters bear a responsibility for the younger ones. Children bear a responsibility toward their foster parents. There is likewise a definite responsibility on the part of parents toward stepchildren. There is no more neglecting or tyrannizing a stepchild unheeded and unpunished.

Great improvement has been made in the matter of determining the fatherhood of a child. In accord with the Soviet law there are no illegitimate children. Before an infant is born the prospective mother has not only the right, but the duty to come to the ZAGS, the government registration office, and state who the father of her future child is. The government so records it. Regardless of whether the man is married or single he is declared to be the legal father of her child. Men in such instances have in the past frequently denied their paternity and have produced witnesses to show that the woman had been intimate with more than one man,

with the result that their names would be taken off the books and the child would be left without a father to support him.

The courts are now instructed in all such cases to make the investigation as thorough as possible and to fix the paternity upon one of the men, the one who, common sense would indicate, was the father of the child, and to make him responsible for the support and bringing up of the youngster.

THE return of stability and of a certain standard of normalcy to the Russian home and the family is vitally indicated in the decline of the influence of the so-called workers' clubs. These places have been encouraged out of all proportions in the early days of the Soviet régime, among other things, for the purpose of training away the young generation from the "narrowing influences" of the home with its inclinations for private possession and individual rather than social interests.

When I visited the Soviet Union in 1926 these club-houses teemed with humanity. Young mothers would deposit their infants at some nursery for the evening and would run to the clubhouse; young husbands were almost never at home from bed time to bed time. To-day father and mother take their child or children and spend the evening in a nearby park. The young Moscow husband, like the New York suburbanite, can be seen returning home toward evening, gleefully carrying a

"primus" or kerosene cook stove which he had luckily obtained after months of waiting, or some other present or necessity. Moscow boys and girls meet at the movies during the winter evenings. On spring and summer nights the boys pick up their harmonicas and play and dance in the streets or on the boulevards to the admiring glances of the young girls and to the joyously forgetful handclapping of the older men and women.

A most striking evidence of the return of the old home life to Russia is the reversion back to the church ceremony in marriage. It is no easy matter. To get married by a priest, rabbi or mullah one must do so in secret. There is no law against it, but if it were known that so-and-so had been married by a clergyman he might lose his job. So the thing is done secretly, but it is done. Only the immediate members of both families are present at the clergyman's residence, or at any other residence offering greater seclusion and privacy. The very stealth, however, which accompanies the marriage rite adds to its thrill and romance and church marriages are gaining in popularity.

While the approach of a new order of home and family life in the Soviet Union is discernible on the horizon, the tragedies which too easy divorce has created, are in evidence at every step.

Adjoining the room I occupied in a Moscow tenement district, lived a young couple with a child, a little girl, five years old. Twice or three times a week a man

would knock on their door a little after seven in the evening. He nearly always had some sort of a package in his hand. The woman of the house would greet him cordially; the little girl would jump up into his embrace and fall upon his neck. The husband would greet him like a family friend.

The man gave the appearance of being old. He was bent and had a preoccupied look. His smile too was one of tragedy. Closer observation revealed him to be only in his middle thirties. The woman of the house always seemed to hover about him. I presumed that he was an older brother of hers, an uncle to her little daughter, until I learned that he was the woman's former husband.

His wife had worked in an office and there the man she was now living with fell in love with her. She did not exactly love him and her husband had always been very good to her. Nevertheless she could not resist the flattery of being taken away from her husband by another man.

One day she came home and asked her husband to move. She explained that she wanted to marry the other man. The husband knowing his wife's caprices—that it was no use arguing with her—moved. However, almost every other night he came to see “his children” as he now spoke of his divorced wife and his little daughter. He brought them part of his salary and whatever products he could obtain, the same as formerly, when the home was still his home. With

every visit, however, his hair was turning more and more gray.

There is a good deal of coarse trading in family and home conveniences in the Soviet Union. Thus a woman of forty living on the same floor with me, who had been married four times and had a girl of fifteen, came home one evening hanging on the arm of a red-headed youth of eighteen. It was her fifth husband. The boy had come from Siberia. Good in his school work, the local soviet had given him a scholarship to go to Moscow to study. He had difficulty in finding a room to live in and this woman offered to take him into her room—as her husband. They were married in the government registration office fifteen minutes after she made the proposal to him.

The most tragic sight I have encountered in connection with the anarchic state of family life in the Soviet Union was the following incident:

I had occasion to look for a certain man. When I came up to his room I found him and his wife at the table, eating their evening meal. As my gaze roamed about the room, I became aware of a partition to one side and of a woman and baby behind the partition. The woman and baby did not leave their seclusion during the half hour I spent in the room. My acquaintance did not volunteer to explain who they were.

But the next day I learned from a friend that the woman and child were the man's first wife and baby. He had divorced her and married another woman. In

view of the housing crisis, however, he and his second wife were sharing the home with his first wife and baby. His first wife always kept to her room when anyone came to the house. She felt too humiliated to be seen by any of their former friends.

"SOVIET WIVES"

AN American technician, newly arrived in Moscow, came to see me at my home, bringing regards from a mutual acquaintance in New York. I was not in when he called and he left a note giving his address and asking me to pay him a visit. A month passed before I found time to return his call.

The young man—he was in his early thirties—lived in one of the modern apartment houses which the Soviet authorities have recently built for their high-priced foreign specialists. The place looked beautiful from the street and was artistically furnished on the inside. My new acquaintance was speaking of New York and I was listening avidly, when a door opened and a young woman stepped into the room. We both rose.

"My wife," the host introduced her.

The young woman shook hands with me and took a chair beside us. There was something about her manner which indicated that she was not at ease. She gave the impression of being a guest herself instead of the

mistress of the house. A servant girl, speaking German, came into the room. She asked where and how the "Herrschaften" wished their tea and my host gave the orders. He indicated the kind of biscuits he wanted with the tea. He mentioned a special brand of jam, an unopened jar, which he had that afternoon bought at the Torgsin, the government's store for foreigners. His wife listened completely uninterested.

His wife played something on the piano. My acquaintance listened to the playing as one not too familiar with the music nor with the person who was playing it.

Conversation was resumed. My host asked questions about Moscow, about the foreigners living in it, especially Americans. I mentioned the names of several New Yorkers holding important positions with the Soviet government.

The young woman listened with deep tension. She seemed relieved to find that none of the men whose names I had mentioned were personally known to her. Throughout the evening she had not once alluded to her past, or her family. Nor had she once addressed her husband by his first name.

When I was leaving, my host insisted on seeing me to the street car. He inquired of the young woman whether she wished to come along. She declined.

In the street he explained that the young woman was his "Soviet wife." Like himself she was from New York, but they had not known each other there. He

had met her in Moscow and they were immediately attracted to one another. As a foreign expert he had the beautiful apartment I had just seen all to himself and that served as an added stimulus. They decided to dispense with the "bourgeois prejudices," as the phrase runs in Moscow, and to live together as husband and wife.

It was the second week the young woman had been sharing the apartment with him, the man continued. She was of course perfectly "free minded," he added. But she had not yet learned to look upon such matters as nonchalantly as some of the other foreign women in Moscow, and more especially as Russian women did.

"She is still horribly put out before strangers," the man concluded.

I asked my acquaintance whether at the expiration of his contract with the Soviet government he would return to America with the young woman as his wife. He dismissed the subject as too remote for practical consideration.

"Who thinks that much ahead—in Moscow?" his voice trailed off. "Here one lives for today only."

On a mixed excursion of Russians and foreigners to which I was invited, an American woman, forty, but still youthfully vivacious and pretty, introduced me to her "husband." He was a French youth of twenty-three or twenty-four.

"There is a price on his head," the woman informed

me ecstatically and proceeded to tell me the story of her husband's exploits. He had been a soldier in the French army and single-handed sought to start a revolt among a regiment of troops in one of the French possessions. Of course the revolt failed and the authorities ordered his arrest. But his comrades—the youth was a Communist—smuggled him across a number of countries to the Soviet border.

While the woman was describing the "thrilling" incidents of his life, the husband, two seats away, was engrossed in a French comic weekly. Since he did not understand a word of English he was accustomed to let his wife chat with her American friends while he amused himself by reading a French novel or journal or by watching the polyglot gatherings to which she usually took him.

Indirectly it came out that she was paying for the excursion. However, the woman did not really mind it, she said. She was not wealthy, she explained, but she had inherited from a grandfather enough money to make her comfortable.

"I suppose you'll have considerable difficulty obtaining a visa for your husband to go with you to America," I volunteered.

"They'll never give him a visa," the woman said proudly. "He'll never be admitted to the United States, oh no! Besides—he is needed here. The Russians would never give him up; they can't possibly spare him."

"Then—you intend to live in Russia all your life?" I hesitated.

"Mercy—no," the woman exclaimed. "I am going back to the States in a month."

"And your husband?" I persisted.

An angry flush suddenly came into the woman's cheeks.

"You are a pain with your questions," she ejaculated.

She moved over to the French youth and embraced his head.

"Aristide and I are going to be happy together as long as we can," she said, resuming her ecstatic attitude.

Among my acquaintances in Moscow were the Kawakis, a Japanese scientist and his young American wife.

The Kawaki home was an idyl. Mrs. Kawaki cooked her husband's meals, mended his clothes and darned his socks. But she would also study his peculiar charts and formulas with a scientific eye. To her friends she was the soul of devotion. Mrs. Kawaki had a variety of old-fashioned remedies for sore throats and chests that successfully defied Moscow's rigid winter. She was an expert dietitian and taught us how to make our meager Russian diet meet the needs of the changing seasons.

All of us in the Kawaki circle knew that there had been a romance between Mrs. Kawaki and her hus-

band back in the states; that it dated to their school or university days. But no one showed any curiosity about it. So perfect did their union seem that we accepted it as quite formal. Kawaki was as genial as his wife. He made every visitor as welcome as if the man were his brother.

A day or two before I left Moscow Mrs. Kawaki said to me:

"I am going home at the end of three months."

"For a long visit?" I inquired.

"Forever," she said. "Kawaki and I are separating."

And then she told me her story:

She and Kawaki had met at a middle western university where both were students. His professors foresaw a great future for Kawaki as a scientist. Though still an undergraduate he had come to be almost a part of the department in which both he and she were majoring. The professors invited him to their homes and treated him as an equal.

She went for a walk with him once and this was brought to the attention of her mother, an old California patrician, who summarily forbade her to have anything more to do "with that Jap." Well, she did not have anything more to do with him. Nevertheless for the next two years the man monopolized her thoughts. At the end of that time he went to Germany to continue his studies and they exchanged letters while he was there. Then the Soviet government offered him a laboratory and a staff of assistants to come

and work in Moscow. He wrote to her from the Soviet capital.

One day, nearly two years back, she reached Moscow with a party of tourists intending to remain in the city only five days. But she and Kawaki met—and she became his wife.

"If my mother had only permitted me to go out with him occasionally," Mrs. Kawaki said, "be near him, see him, I would have been able to renounce him after a time. The mistake she made was in forbidding me to love him; one can forbid marriage, but not love."

"And now?" the question escaped me.

"Now," Mrs. Kawaki hesitated a moment, "now both of us are strong enough not to let love kill his career and my mother. He cannot have a love that hangs tragically over his work, like a Sword of Damocles. As for me, I will soon be unable to keep the secret of my union with Kawaki from my folks. My mother is on my trail. My excuses for staying so long in Moscow are becoming exhausted. She is insistent that I come home, or she will come and get me. . . . The time has come for Kawaki and myself to be brave—and part."

THE marriage ideals of Communist civilization attract as many if not more visitors to the Soviet Union as do the frequent and brilliantly staged parades in Red

Square. Moscow is today the Greenwich Village of the world. From every part of the globe those who are, or believe themselves to be, unhappy in their family life make the Soviet capital their Mecca. In Moscow's free love atmosphere the tragically mated, mismated or unmated seek a cure, an inspiration, a solution for their emotional ills.

On Twerskoy boulevard on a moonlight night in July a white girl and her colored lover were reciting lines of Shelley to one another. In the Park of Rest and Culture I came upon a Hindu poet and his American sweetheart, the soulful daughter of a Jewish Talmudist. As far as the pair were concerned race differences had been obliterated. They strolled together in happy silent communion.

A woman formerly very active in the suffrage movement and widely known as a supporter of unpopular causes hung on the arm of her spade-bearded Russian admirer, who was explaining to her, in Russian, the simplicity and beauty of a certain Slav poet. The woman understood only one word in ten. But it did not matter. It was his chivalry and attention that touched and attracted her most, and these things she felt and understood without words.

FROM its earliest beginnings Moscow as a city has been undisciplined and Bohemian. While Leningrad was the official capital of the Czars since the days of Peter the

Great, Moscow had remained Russia's social capital. It was the winter resort of the nobility under the old régime. Here, in the section of Moscow known as "White City," the large landowners from every part of the country had their winter residences, luxuriously appointed palaces to which they took their families as soon as the harvest was over. In Moscow the whole of the long Russian winter was to them merely a "social season."

Moscow, too, was the Latin Quarter of the merchant class under the Czars. It was known from one end of Russia to the other as a city where all restraint ceases. Moscow's fashionable restaurants never opened before noon. The day did not properly begin till about 6 P.M. and people did not retire before four or five in the morning. Its hotels were famous for the orgies which were staged in them. The public bath houses of the city rivaled those of ancient Rome in their elegance and abandon. The sexes mingled freely in them.

All sorts of religiously erotic cults flourished in the "sacred city," as Moscow was popularly called and peasants who were reputed to be in possession of supernatural and divine powers became the favorites of ladies of the highest caste. Seers, monks and holy men of the type of Gregory Rasputin mingled in passionate séances with famed gypsy dancers and titled courtesans.

The Bolshevik régime has made an end of the noble and merchant classes of Holy Russia and of the orgies

in which they indulged, but it has not changed the city's proneness to irregularity in work and play and love. The revolution and the upheavals which followed it have in fact instituted an abandon of their own. There is a sense of insecurity and impermanency about existence in the Soviet Union today, which implants in people the feeling that it is best to snatch from life whatever one can, while one can.

"We live for the moment," a woman explained, "a drink of vodka and a bite of food and we are satisfied and almost happy. At the end of a week or perhaps tomorrow my husband may be arrested. He may be exiled, shot. Who can tell in these turbulent times!"

Moscow is as lax in its work and appointments as it is in its morals. There is something of the virtuoso about men and women in the Soviet capital today. A promise means nothing.

A woman occupying an important technical position in a government institution gave out a dress to make. She was told to come for a fitting on a certain date and came only to find that the dressmaker had completely overlooked the appointment. Unwilling to lose another half day from work the woman sought to confirm the next appointment by letter. The seamstress confirmed it. But when she came for the second time the dressmaker with an ingratiating *milaya* (dearie) told her that she (the dressmaker) had not been "in the mood" for work in the past day or two and would not her customer please come again in a week?

The Soviet government and press have much to say in criticism of the slovenliness, indifference and irresponsibility of the Russian workmen and office-holders. It is fighting the spirit of bureaucracy in its institutions vigorously. But the Russian who reads the caustic remarks of the government on the subject never concedes that it is himself who is meant. Each one thinks that these criticisms apply to his neighbor or in the next institution.

How exasperating such unpunctuality can become to a person who visits the Soviet Union on business I have myself experienced on several occasions. I cite a single instance.

I needed to verify some figures in connection with an article I was writing and went to a government institution in Moscow for the information. In Berlin, in Paris, in London, I would have been given the information in fifteen minutes. In Moscow the official I called on told me to leave the typewritten questions with him and come the next day. It was Monday; I came back on Tuesday. The official apologized, but said that he had had no time to answer my questions. The next day, Wednesday, was his day off and I had better come back on Thursday. I came on Thursday. He had the answers ready, but explained that he would send these answers to another department and that I was to call for them there the next day, Friday. I did as told. But the official to whom I was referred had his day off on Friday and I was told to come on Satur-

day. On Saturday I received the information. It took me six days to get it.

Moscow is scarcely aware of the bizarre manner in which its women dress. Russian fashions would be the despair of a woman in New York, but in the Soviet capital they are taken as a matter of course. Cotton flannel makes a modish summer dress for an office girl. Kerchiefs, red or otherwise, take the place of hats with most women. In the absence of material for a woman's coat a satin or silk lining is used to make the outer part of the coat. Women wear men's shoes and it is not considered bad form to appear in public in bed slippers.

Foreign women are especially charmed by the styles for men. The military tunic—Tolstovka it is called in Russian—with the belt or tasseled cord about the waist and with the high military collar encasing the neck, gives every man a martial and heroic aspect. It lends him an air of gallantry.

It is on the subject of beards that the Russian men and particularly the young men let their imagination play. Since Karl Radeck, editor of the *Izvestia*, affects whiskers of the period of De Quincey, a whole generation of young intellectuals trim their beards in the same manner. Others, especially tall thin young men, shave the upper lip and affect beards after the fashion of Abraham Lincoln. France is not popular in Russia and the French vandyke is likewise in disfavor. But spade beards and parted beards abound.

Every group of excursionists that enters the Soviet

Union today, whether it consists of Americans, Germans, British, sees a dwindling of its members, especially of its female members, before its time comes to leave the Soviet capital. The girls and women who remain in Russia temporarily find work in various Soviet Institutions. Life in Moscow is international and foreign stenographers, secretaries and translators are very much in demand. Some become teachers in the Soviet's Language Institutes. The study of modern languages, especially of the English language, is very popular in Moscow and American women are eagerly sought as teachers.

Some of the women, who came to Moscow sight-seeing and remained to work, have managed to find half-way decent accommodations. The majority, however, live very much as the Russians do, which means without the most elementary conveniences and privacy. There are three million people in the Soviet capital and it normally has room for less than half that number. Like the Russians, the foreign women in Moscow are compelled to crowd and double up. Some merely have what is termed an "ugol," or corner of a room; that is, they are permitted to place an extra cot in a room already occupied by four or five persons and to spend the night there. Taking a bath is an event. Their food is of the poorest. They cook on small kerosene stoves. Many of them go around half starved for weeks at a time. At best their diet is monotonous and trying.

"Why do you persist in staying here in the face of

such hardships?" I asked an American woman, forty years of age, single, who in a middle western city in the United States had occupied an important post as a welfare worker.

"Because," she answered, "as an unmarried woman things offend me here less than they do at home."

There is in the Soviet Union and in the Russian language no equivalent for the words Miss and Mrs. Nor is there such a distinction in the mind of the Russian. Woman is a female citizen. I emphasize the word female because the Russian language denotes the distinction between sexes by the suffix added to the root of a word. A male citizen is *Grazhdanin* and a female citizen *Grazhdanka*. If she is young and pretty a female citizen will be addressed as *Grazhdanochka*, which means "little citizen" and is a form of expression showing special liking or affection for a person.

But there are no distinctions in business or in social life to denote a woman's past or present family or sexual status. Sex in the Soviet Union is decidedly a private matter with which neither the state nor your neighbor is in the least concerned. The only time a Russian does begin to interest himself in a woman's family status is when she appeals to him and he wishes to make sure that she has no husband before he begins to pay court, or to propose marriage to her.

Questions of purity, chastity, however do not exist for the Russian youth. Whatever his own experience has been in the matter just such an experience he ex-

pects from the girl he is to marry. He is immune to jealousy especially with regard to a girl's past life and he cannot conceive of a girl being degraded because she has had an intimate love affair before coming to him as his wife any more than he can conceive of himself as having been degraded because of a previous intimacy with a woman.

The word "affair" as denoting something improper and even shameful in the relations between the sexes is obsolete in the Soviet vocabulary. So are such expressions as "blue stocking," "old maid," "spinster." The Russian of the younger generation classifies people according to their occupations, their political status, their personal worth and attraction, but never in accord with what their sexual and family life had or had not been. Love and sex are expected to be a part of every normal human life.

While the Soviet capital has become the Latin Quarter of many nations it is not an international Reno. Men and women come to Moscow to seek light in Lenin's ideas on the family, on marriage. Very many come merely to seek new experiences and sensations. But none comes to avail himself of the Soviet's easy divorce laws. Only one American woman, to my knowledge, has in the past two years obtained a divorce from her American husband in a Soviet ZAGS, or marriage and divorce office. Neither the wife nor the husband, however, have thus far ventured to test the validity of the decree outside of Russia.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

AN acquaintance of mine, formerly the owner of several chemical factories, now occupying a minor position in a Moscow warehouse, fell ill last March. It was five days before I learned of his illness and another three before I was able to see him. When I finally called at his home, he was sitting up in bed. His wife hovered about him with smiling face; his children watched his every move with tender solicitude. His condition in the first few days had appeared serious.

When we were left alone the man said to me: "Well, I was again disappointed." Before I could ask what he meant he continued:

"For the past three or four years, every time I have fallen ill, I secretly hoped that my sickness would prove fatal. I want to lie in bed hopelessly stricken for eight or ten days and then die. That would be sufficient time for me to take leave of my family and for my children to feel that I had not gone from them too suddenly."

The man had said this with so much melancholy

that I was left speechless. He resumed before I could interpose a word.

"It isn't that I am tired of life," he explained, "I am only fifty and there is nothing either in my physical condition or in my family life to make existence a burden to me. But I am tired of being a member of a class which is considered superfluous and is despised. Every one of us who formerly belonged to the intelligentsia, the nobility or the merchant class, is a living corpse today. The government tolerates us. It grants us our life and, when it needs our services, it gives us a job, but it does not trust us. We are treated with suspicion and contempt.

"As for my children," the man went on, "they are grown and don't need me any more except sentimentally. In fact I am distinctly a drawback to them. Their 'social history,' which they must give when applying for work, would be infinitely more acceptable to the authorities if they could write after the name of their father, the former manufacturer and capitalist, the single word, 'dead'."

On another occasion I had dinner at the home of a man who occupied a fairly responsible technical post in a Soviet institution and was loyal both to his work and to the Soviet régime. He was, comparatively speaking, a well fixed man. He and his family, five persons in all, occupied two comfortably furnished rooms. In the matter of food he was as well off as any one in his class. He received his bread card from the government

and received the other rations of food, clothing, shoes that go with such a card.

After the third glass of vodka and when he was certain that no one, not even his children, could hear him, he said:

"If the government gave me a passport to go abroad, I would agree to leave the country without a copper coin in my pocket. I would do any kind of manual work and would be satisfied to live on bread and water only not to have my past as an intellectual and aristocrat flung into my face as if it were something criminal."

A former pedagogue who was reduced to accepting the job of janitor said to me:

"If the government were to reopen the monasteries today thousands of men who formerly belonged to the intellectual and professional classes, would flock to them rather than put up with the scorn and abuse of both officials and populace."

FROM the first the Bolshevist revolution has sponsored the "class approach" in the government's attitude and conduct toward the various strata of Russia's population. "Divide and rule" was its motto. The city proletariat, in whose name a dictatorship had been set up, was to be favored at the expense of all other classes. The propaganda value of this move was of foremost consideration with the makers of the revolution. The

workers were to be impressed that they were the government.

It is the sentiment in the Soviet Union today, at least among those to whom it is applied, that this so-called class approach has in recent years degenerated into an out and out instrument of vengeance and persecution by the factory population upon the intellectual or white collar elements of former years.

The condition of these groups of citizens is only slightly better than the condition of the "declassed," those whom the revolution has declared as being outside the proletarian law. When two men apply for medical attention at a clinic the clerk first scrutinizes the application not for the nature of the applicant's disease, but his social standing. The patient with a proletarian pedigree is given unquestioned priority. The white collar applicant may be in need of an operation that might save him from cancer, while the proletarian worker may not need such urgent hospital attention, nevertheless if there is a vacant bed it will be assigned to the worker and the white collar applicant will be put on the waiting list.

If an apartment is vacant and two applications are made for it, the proletarian applicant will be given preference over a teacher, an accountant, a physician. The factory worker gets double the amount of bread that the white collar worker is allowed, the theory being that a man working in an office does not need as much as a man working at a bench or a machine. For

this there may be justification. But the difference in cards affects the children as well. The infant who was unfortunate enough to be born into the home of a professor, a bookkeeper, a salesman must pay for its mistake in reduced and less frequent rations of milk, butter, eggs.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Union is short of professional workers they are grouped in the same category with ordinary clerks and are paid and fed accordingly. I was charged ten rubles to have a typewriter cleaned, a job which required twenty minutes of a young mechanic's time. But a colleague who called a professor to examine his child, paid only six rubles for the visit, which lasted three quarters of an hour. A washwoman engaged for the day charges at the rate of a ruble an hour, while the services of a man or woman pharmacist, dentist or physician, can be had for from two and a half to three rubles a day.

Precisely as the Czars have systematically flattered the Russian nobility, the Soviet leaders flatter the proletariat with not dissimilar results. The nobility was all too frequently arrogant and brutal toward the less favored economic and national groups. It thrived on pogroms, it denied the Polish people its language and literature, it burned Tatar and Cossack villages and rode roughshod over all minorities.

The Russian proletariat today is only slightly less arrogant and brutal toward those classes which have been put down by the revolution. The methods which

proletarian officials and commissars have lately employed to "reduce" the so-called kulaks or rich peasants were not infrequently as summary and brutal as those of Czarist generals a generation ago in quelling peasant uprisings. When a prominent proletarian wants the room occupied by a member of the former Intelligentsia or middle class, a Soviet official will frequently sign an order for the evacuation of the premises. Similarly if the job held by a former intellectual is wanted by some unscrupulous or envious proletarian he will obtain it through the simple expedient of casting a slur on the man's "social status." An investigation will be ordered and the former intellectual will be "cleansed," or removed from his job for the good of the proletarian service.

I cannot pass over a few of the more glaring incidents of the humiliation of men and women from among the deposed classes by some of the more ruthless members of the class now in power, by ignorant or depraved members of the proletariat, that came under my personal observation.

On Petrovka, the Fifth Avenue of Moscow, a peasant drove his horse into a crowd of people at a crossing. They scattered in every direction with the exception of a young woman who was thrown to the ground. Her hand bag, the size of a brief case, containing her toilet articles, some business papers and her lunch, opened up and its contents were strewn over the street.

The peasant did not stir from his seat, but drove right on as if nothing had happened. No one attempted to stop him.

The woman got to her feet. Several persons helped her get her belongings back into the bag. She shook the dust from her clothes, adjusted her hat and started off. I walked over to her and asked her why she had not called an officer.

The young woman scrutinized me from head to foot. Apparently convinced that my inquiry was made in good faith and not for purposes of political provocation, she gave a hysterical laugh:

"Try and get justice against a peasant in Moscow."

In a restaurant on Twerskaya, patronized by that part of the proletariat that for some reason is not attached to one of the "closed dining halls," a woman of distinguished appearance rose from the table and called for the manager. A bedraggled individual came forward. The woman pointed to her plate of soup indignantly.

"It is not fit to eat," she said, "it is bitter and must have been cooked four or five days ago. You ought to be arrested for giving such soup to customers."

Some one in the crowd came up closer, studied the woman as if she were some sort of a curious animal that he had never before seen.

"Look at the *inteligentka* (woman who belongs to the former intellectual class)," the man finally burst out. "Look at the *lady*. Our proletarian food is not

good enough for her. Shall we perhaps order a special cook for her from Paris?"

A burst of laughter greeted this witticism. But the woman stood her ground.

"I am as much of a worker as you are," she said addressing her critic, "and I repeat what I have said: The soup is not fit to be eaten. There is no reason why any one should be handed bitter soup that was cooked a week ago. If you had a grain of intelligence you would not permit such a state of affairs. You would demand decent management of the place."

The guffaws subsided, but evil glances continued to be cast in her direction. She sat down, pushed away the plate with the bitter soup and began to eat the "second course," smoked fish and a thick porridge made of millet.

Shortly before Easter I was riding in a street car on the outskirts of Moscow when a priest entered. He was an old man and a workman rose and gave up his seat to him. Instantly pandemonium was let loose in the car. Several young men, members of the Society of the Godless, or Bezbozhniks, as they are called in Russia, were upbraiding the workman for giving his seat to a member of the despised religious group. The workman defended his action and this only added fuel to the flame. The young atheists threatened violence and some one blew a police whistle. The priest looked frightened and bewildered. As soon as the car stopped he made for the door and disappeared from the scene.

MISTRUST of the former intellectual and professional classes, which was one of the cardinal doctrines of the Bolshevik régime from its earliest beginnings, was violently accelerated by the Five Year Plan.

With the plan two new words, giving expression to the highest form of popular contempt, have come into widespread usage in the Soviet republic. These words are "vreditelstvo" (wrecking) and "vreditel" (wrecker). They denote the act of sabotaging the government's programme and the one who commits it. Both of these terms have in the past three or four years come to be universally applied to intellectual and professional workers of every kind.

For the government to succeed with its vast building programme in the appointed time, it was necessary not only to augment the engineering and technical forces of the country, but its white collar staffs as well. Engineers and skilled mechanics could be ordered from abroad, but clerks and stenographers, bookkeepers, superintendents and office managers had to be native Russians. The government had therefore thrown open the doors of white collar employment to scores and even hundreds of thousands of men and women who had formerly belonged to the classes hostile to communism. Their social status was disregarded and men of distinctly "bourgeois" origin and education were assigned to places of high trust and responsibility. Some of them were put in key positions.

Most of these workers, according to the testimony

of the Soviet government itself, were grateful for the opportunity given them to be useful again and to earn a livelihood by work which the proletariat could respect. They served the government industries conscientiously.

There were those, however, who, either as the result of the humiliation they had suffered or because of an almost constitutional hatred for the Bolsheviki, had taken their positions with the government largely for the purposes of revenge. The government charges very many of the employés in the latter group with acts of sabotage, with counter-revolution and espionage. It claims that members of this group were connected with the mining scandal known as the Shakhta case, with the counter-revolutionary movements led by Professors Ramzin and Kondratiev, with the Groman-Sukhanov case, which, the government has charged, was an attempt to invite intervention by foreign powers in order to overthrow the Bolshevik régime and re-establish the monarchy.

In the popular mind the whole of the former intelligentsia has become associated with the various food and coal shortages which the country has experienced in recent years. They were charged with disorganizing to some extent the basic industries; with spoiling thousands of tons of meat, fish and vegetables, in order to create a famine in the cities and thus bring about a revolt against the Kremlin leaders and the Communist régime. With the press of the country

printing only official communiqués in the matter and not permitting the other side to defend itself, the alleged acts of a small group of intellectuals were ascribed to the entire class with the result that millions of white collar workers, innocent of wrongdoing, have shared in the general opprobrium and popular persecution that have resulted from such acts.

After each of the political trials in the past three years thousands of white collar workers were dismissed from their places. Each government office instituted a "chistka" or clean-up and men were retained or discharged in accord with their social origin. Of the discharged men some were given such credentials as would enable them to find work in other institutions, though at a much smaller salary. Others were sent away without any recommendations, which meant that they could find no employment other than that of the lowest types of labor.

THE question whether the Soviet government is persecuting the former intellectual classes because of their participation in anti-soviet acts, or whether these groups, or more correctly certain members of them, have participated in anti-soviet acts in retaliation for their persecution by the government, is like the proverbial question as to which came first, the chicken or the egg. The outstanding factor in the situation is that after fourteen years of Communist rule the

antagonism between classes in the Soviet Union instead of subsiding is on the increase.

The brunt of the government attack against the former intelligentsia is at present concentrated in the universities. Professors have played a very prominent rôle in each of the recent anti-soviet conspiracies. It was shown moreover that the academic foes of the Soviet have imbued large sections of the student body with their political views.

In spite of the vast sums of money which the Soviet government has spent in recent years in scholarships and stipendiums for the sons of workers and peasants to induce them to study, it has not yet succeeded in creating an intellectual class which is flesh and bone of the proletariat. The "Red Universities"—graduate schools for the training of the teaching staffs for higher institutions of learning—turn out annually a certain number of "Red Professors." These, however, are prepared to act only as preceptors of Communist theory and practice. For instructors in the realm of science, in languages and in all other academic branches, Soviet universities still have to rely upon members of the former bourgeoisie.

The Soviet government recently discovered, however, that even the so-called apolitical subjects had their political significances and that a student studying chemistry under a professor who is critical of the Soviet order involuntarily imbibes the political views of his teacher.

In the Ukraine, for example, it was disclosed that students and professors were alike active in the organization of a league whose object it was to "liberate" that part of Russia, which is known as the granary of Europe, from the rule of the Soviets. Similar movements for "independence" from Kremlin rule were disclosed in some of the higher institutions of learning in White Russia.

In the Institute of Technology at Gomel, for instance, a professor openly declared that the Soviet régime divides society "into two classes, those who eat, namely the workers, and those who starve, the bourgeoisie." In a railroad technicum in the same part of the Union, a student sent a bullet through a portrait of Lenin as a moral protest against certain acts of the Soviet authorities; in another college the students in a similar spirit of retaliation against certain official acts, stood up and sang "God Save the Czar."

The number of students in Russia who in recent months have begun to describe themselves as "non-partisan" in politics has grown to a very considerable extent. Antisemitism, too, has come to the fore as an expression of anti-government activity. Even in the citadel of Communism, Moscow, a student at the First Moscow University recently startled the campus with his cries of "Kill the Jews."

The acts of such professors and students, in accordance with Soviet reasoning, are ascribed to the class from which such students and professors sprang.

Among the measures employed by the government to check the numbers and activities of such students and professors are therefore measures which affect the entire intellectual class.

Thus in very many middle schools and technicums in Russia there were recently appointed as principals "men from the bench and the shop," plain workmen who are known for their devotion to the communistic idea. Their duty is to see that the "ideology" of the school is not infected with "bourgeois prejudices" by the teachers. Such principals unhesitatingly limit the number of pupils from among the bourgeois classes to a painful minimum.

Thousands of middle aged women in Moscow who had never before worked have recently entered factories in order to obtain the status of proletarians for themselves and their children of school age and thus make it possible for them to obtain a secondary or higher education. Some women even divorced their husbands in order to make their change of status and independence more convincing. Elementary education is compulsory for all children.

The same "cleansing" methods, or "chistkas," which are resorted to in the factories and offices to weed out workers whose social origin the government considers hurtful and undesirable, are also used in the universities to eliminate professors whose views and ideals are considered subversive of Communist principles. Among the first steps taken by the Soviet educational

authorities to free the universities of the country from the influence of "ideologically hostile" professors was an order to the branch of the Atheist League connected with each university to investigate the members of the faculty and to report its findings to the government. On the strength of such charges dismissals are made.

A document dealing with the matter contains a special warning against the indiscriminate employment of professors who come "from the decayed and dying bourgeois class" as likely to attempt "to implant their own pessimism and futility in the minds of the young generation." It is the aim of the government, the document states, to make the universities of the country the home of "aggressive materialism." The cleansing committees are therefore especially instructed to be on guard against the "infiltration of religion into education through the medium of certain philosophic idealistic works" employed by the professors in their lectures.

A professor who can feel "the breath of God in the noise of falling leaves" is declared unfit to bring up Soviet youth. Similarly professors of chemistry, physics and mathematics are ordered carefully sifted and watched because a certain professor in that field had recently declared that the "natural sciences cannot explain the mystery of life" and that "absolute materialism" as a philosophy of life therefore falls short in many respects.

The document warns such government investigators that behind the screen of "metaphysics, mysticism and idealism" there often hides an enemy of the proletarian government—an active counter-revolutionist.

THE SINS OF THE FATHERS

ON the train going to Kharkov, a Soviet professor of natural science occupied a compartment with me. On my previous journeys I had shared compartments with Communists and my experiences were not always pleasant. The true blue Communist looks upon every foreign traveler in Russia as a representative of the "bourgeois class" and treats him with suspicion. He either leaves him severely alone or else attempts to do a little "missionary work," that is, tries to win the traveler to the Communist point of view.

The professor was different; he was neither aloof nor designing. Obeying the normal human instinct we spoke to each other freely as two persons, thrown together in the narrow space of a sleeping compartment for a whole day, will do. Eager for information he asked about American schools and colleges. He talked about Soviet schools, impartially, showing the democratic principles upon which the present educational system is founded. He also showed some of the perversions which, as he expressed it, the system has not

yet outlived. He spoke ruefully of the latter. One incident especially weighed on his mind and there was a painful expression in his face as he dwelt on it. I shall retell the incident as the professor told it to me:

Four or five years earlier a student of remarkable brilliancy came to his notice. He was a boy of 18. In the Soviet Union the "class approach" is used in admitting students to the University. The children of workers and peasants are the first to be admitted; the children of office workers and of soviet professional men are next in order, while the sons and daughters of the former bourgeoisie are kept toward the last which means that few of them ever get to college. Annually and sometimes more often there is conducted in every higher school of learning what is known as a "chistka" or a clean-up; that is, students whose social origin is not proletarian and who have somehow managed to evade the "class" entrance regulations are dropped from the University rolls.

This student survived all "chistkas." His entrance papers and other documents had been definitely declared "in order." They showed him to be the son of a Siberian clerk. This was not as good as being the son of a peasant or a factory worker. But a clerk was not a "bourgeois" and the youth was allowed to remain at the University and continue his studies.

He had specialized in the natural sciences. Upon completing his four-year course, his professor—my traveling companion—had recommended him for a

fellowship to one of the higher research institutes, and the youth had obtained it. It was then that the "something" happened of which the professor could not speak without sorrow and emotion.

The youth came to him one day and told him that he had been admitted to the University by a subterfuge. He had lied about his social origin and covered up the lie successfully. He was not the son of a clerk. The man in his home town whose name he gave as his parent was a clerk and had the same name as his father, but was not his father and was not related to him. His father was a priest, one of the "de-classed" clergymen.

The youth now proposed to come out with the truth and throw himself upon the mercy of the educational authorities. He hoped that the brilliancy of his record as a student would expiate his lie and the unfavorable family history which this lie sought to cover up. The professor was dubious about forgiveness by the educational authorities. Nevertheless he advised the student to tell the truth rather than hold to the lie and the painful uncertainty which it caused to hang over him.

The student then wrote a letter to the educational authorities telling them the facts just as he had told them to the professor.

He was summarily dismissed from the University. The fellowship for future study was at once withdrawn. And while the education which he already pos-

sessed could not be taken away from him, the right to employ it usefully was withheld. He was not permitted to teach; he had no right to use his training otherwise.

The youth now had no home and no occupation. He slept one night in one place and the next somewhere else. His teachers, believing that the young man had the making of a great scientist, searched the educational world of Moscow for a place where he might fit in, a place where he would be accepted without a diploma and without the University standing, which had been taken from him.

After eight months they finally found a laboratory which would risk employing this youth. They looked for him at his usual haunts, but he was nowhere to be found. He was finally traced—to a cemetery. He had committed suicide.

This was the professor's story. The only comment he made was that the condition of the "declassed" and their children in the Soviet Union was deplorable. On returning to Moscow I at once undertook an investigation of the "declassed."

ALMOST every country in the Eastern world has its "wailing wall" and a class or classes who do the wailing.

Russia's wailing wall is located directly opposite the Lenin Tomb in the Red Square, Moscow's historic

Place of Skulls, where Russian autocrats, throughout the middle ages, publicly beheaded their rebellious subjects. It is known as the All Union Election Commission and its function is to receive appeals from the "declassed" in every part of the country and to decide whether the individuals making these appeals should be reinstated into citizenship or whether their political disfranchisement and their economic outlawry should continue.

At ten o'clock one morning I sought the office of the All Union Election Commission. The door was locked. It would not be opened before noon, but a crowd of two or three hundred persons formed a long line on the sidewalk in front of the Commission's office. All of the men had waited there since early morning; a few had even spent the night under the open sky in order to be well to the fore in the line of applicants. This was especially the case with those who had come from far away.

The waiting crowd was a cross section of Russia geographically, racially, linguistically. Peasants in bark sandals from far-away Siberian provinces, who had not taken the government's land programme seriously and were shorn of their property and civil rights, rubbed shoulders with "declassed" landowners and ex-army commanders of the Ukraine. Former military contractors, provincial officials of the old régime, lawyers, teachers, intellectuals who in the early stages of the Bolshevik régime had their doubts about the

stability of the government, and had remained non-committal too long, now waited to plead their case alongside of former keepers of assignation houses, former gamblers and confidence men, former prison bullies and secret executioners.

Bishops of the Greek orthodox church and Jewish rabbis, Catholic priests and Mohammedan mullahs, faced one another mutely in that waiting line. Occasionally one offered the other a light and received a "thank you" in a tongue that was very remote and sometimes completely unintelligible.

A Jew close to fifty, with vivid eyes in which native humor had been violently changed to tragedy, explained that he was standing in line for the eighteenth time. As soon as his appeal for reinstatement was refused he made out new papers and resumed his place in line.

"It is not for myself that I am making this fight," the man explained, "but for my children. Two of my boys are eager to enter a technicum (manual training high school) but cannot gain admission on account of my status. I am a *Lishenets* (a declassed individual) and they have no standing anywhere. They offered to go to work in a factory for two or three years to expiate my sins, but this was denied them. The children of the declassed are the tragedy of Russia today. They are thwarted in their ambitions and held back. It is they who will one day be the bitterest rebels against the present régime."

I asked him why he had been declassified.

"Perhaps Stalin can answer that," he said with a laugh that sounded like a sob. "Stalin decided to disagree with Lenin and I was caught in the wheels of the disagreement. Lenin had said that the Nep, that private trading in a limited form, was necessary for Russia. I had been a trader under the old régime so I took up trading once more when Lenin gave permission. For years I earned my living that way and paid the government whatever taxes it demanded. Everything seemed in order, everything was apparently according to Lenin.

"Then came Stalin and said that the Nep must be abolished, private trading made unpopular and what is more an example must be made of such traders. Their life must be made so hard and bitter that no one will ever want to be a nepman. They must be declassified. I am one of those who had been made an example of."

A declassified banker who was listening to the above conversation thought that the ex-merchant had not been hit nearly as hard as he was by the new arrangement of classes.

"At least," the banker said, addressing his Jewish neighbor, "you have maintained your family. Your children are with you and your wife—if you have one living—is with you, I presume. As the consequence of my political disabilities I have lost both wife and children. They went away from me—they had to live."

THE sins of the declassed fathers rest heavily upon the children.

In the Russian newspapers it is a common occurrence to read an advertisement in which a son announces that he has severed all relations with his father, that he disclaims his parent in every way, and in the future will be entirely "on his own." There are similar advertisements by wives announcing that they have just obtained a separation. These steps taken by children against their parents, and by wives against their husbands, are a matter of necessity under Russia's industrial system.

The following advertisements by wives and children giving public notice that they had legally severed all connections with their declassed husbands and parents appeared in a single issue of the *Krasny Krim*, or Red Crimea, a provincial newspaper which I picked at random from a kiosk in the railroad station at Simferopol:

"I, E. A. Litvinenko, residing in the city of Simferopol at 11 Sablovsky street, renounce my declassed husband, Andrei Ivanovich Litvinenko and sever all relations with him."

"I, Edmund Wilhelmovich Gaar, renounce my declassed parents and sever all relations with them."

"I, E. A. Nersesov, resident of the village of Sarabuzi, renounce my declassed parents and sever all relations with them."

"I, Alexander Nikolayevich Yegorov, resident of

the vantage of Shumkhai, renounce my declassified father Nikolai Trofimovich Yegorov and sever all relations with him."

"I, Ameth Kelefiyev, renounce my declassified parents and sever all relations with them."

"I, Yelena Semionovna Kulik, renounce my declassified parents and sever all relations with them."

"I, Vasily Matveyevich Kuzmin, resident of the village Zuya, renounce my declassified mother, Yelena Vasilyevna Kuzmin, and sever all relations with her."

It is impossible for any one in the Soviet Union to obtain employment of the kind which can be dignified with the word "position" without submitting to the government's employment exchange, or to the employing concern direct, a minute family and social history. Only the lowest grades of common, or casual, labor are open to persons who refuse to give a complete and satisfying account of themselves. The son of a declassified individual can only overcome this handicap by legally renouncing his father, mother, or both and this not merely in name and appearance, but in practice.

In Russian factories there exists today a system of gratuitous spying, especially with reference to the class origin of each employé. A note sent in by a workman stating that such and such an employé does not seem to have the "proper" class origin and does not deserve the confidence of the authorities, will result in a most thoroughgoing investigation of the person's past. If

the charge is proved such an employé is dismissed and must seek work of a less trustworthy nature.

Frequently women obtain from their declassed husbands what in Russia is termed a "fictitious divorce," that is a divorce that was not intended in good faith, but merely to obtain a job. The wife having got the job as an independent and unmarried person is by the force of circumstances, however, compelled to live the life of such an independent person. She is afraid to go back to her husband's quarters lest some one see this and betray her to her employers. She accepts the invitations of other men in her place of employment to give verisimilitude to her status as a divorcee. After a time the fictitious divorce, too, becomes real.

Even sons and daughters find themselves in the same dilemma. A boy who renounces his declassed father for the sake of obtaining a job, finds that he is afraid to be seen with his father. He is even afraid to write to him. For if it should become known that he had merely used the advertisement of their separation as a subterfuge to gain employment he will be branded for life as a "simulator," or pretender, and his whole career may be clouded. He must keep distance always and distance makes for permanent estrangement.

However, not all wives nor all children will resort to the subterfuge of divorce or disclaimer to overcome the handicap of a declassed husband or father.

I met the sons of former bankers, ministers, mer-

chants who were working as day laborers in order to keep together their homes with declassed fathers at the head of them. I saw women in Russia who did washing for a living because it was the only work they could find that did not require them to have an acceptable family and social history and they were thus enabled to maintain their home-life with their declassed husbands.

One such woman in particular deserves mention in this connection.

She was the wife of a Greek Orthodox minister. Her husband was not only declassed, but his status was of such a special nature that he could be arrested at any time and "sent north," meaning to the Solovetsky islands, which are now used as a place of confinement for political prisoners. The priest, knowing that the police might come for him at any moment, always kept his clothes and a few medical and other indispensable objects packed in a grip ready to depart. Repeatedly he urged his wife to obtain a divorce from him and lead her own life; she was still young, under forty. But the woman would not hear of it. Every time he would talk to her of going, of leaving him, she would open the Old Testament at the place where the book of Ruth starts and tell him to read it and to stop his "silly talk."

Similarly I met a young man in the Crimea who was running a government factory in what actually was a medieval Mohammedan town, having a mixed

population of Greeks, Persians, Tatars and Russians. The youth, for he was only twenty-one, was living a hermit's life. As an executive he did the work of half a dozen men. He inquired wistfully about Moscow; he had been brought up in its schools, libraries, museums.

I asked him what made him take a position so far from the center, when men of his ability were at a premium in the capital and their services were competed for by several institutions at a time.

"But I am one of the declassed," the youth confided sadly, "that is, my father is the one who is declassed and I share his fate."

His father, he said, had once owned large factories in Russia. Executive ability ran in his family. The present job had been given him because the factory was so far from the center that no one with a reputation would volunteer to take it. He accepted it because it was the only way he could earn a living without becoming a street laborer. Besides, the job carried with it a promise of rehabilitation in the eyes of the law both for himself and for his father.

I asked him what he thought of the boys of his own age who disowned their parents in the newspapers.

"I don't blame them," he said. "It is terrible to suffer not only the physical hardships, but the ostracism which we have to go through. But I would never do such a thing. I could not renounce my father—not the kind of a father I have."

"Nor would you renounce your father if he were different," I ventured.

"Probably not," the youth smiled sadly.

WHATEVER view one may take not only of the ethics, but of the political wisdom of disenfranchising large groups of the population and of disabling them and their dependents economically, one phase of the situation must be made clear. None of these things are being done in a spirit of either race or religious persecution. Christians, Jews, Mohammedans are alike subject to these political and economic disqualifications on the basis of what the government considers their loyalty or disloyalty to the Communist régime.

Even being an atheist—and atheism is a sort of a state religion in the Soviet Union—will not save one from being declassed, if his political utterances and conduct actively counter the dictates of the Communist party.

It is nevertheless true that certain racial and national groups, because of their so-called "unproductive" pursuits, have suffered more from the government's disenfranchisement policy than other groups have. This is particularly the case with Jews who were merchants under the old régime. The government has itself recently disclosed that enormous numbers of Jews had been disenfranchised when there was no basis in law for such action. This was due entirely

to the placing of the wrong interpretation on government ordinances by local officials.

The Soviet constitution names the following categories of citizens who should be legally disqualified from voting and from the privileges that go with the Soviet ballot:

First: All persons who employ hired labor for private profit.

Second: Persons who depend for their livelihood on incomes not earned by their own labor, such as inheritances, interest, and the like.

Third: Private traders and middlemen.

Fourth: Monks and other servitors of the church and of religious cults.

Fifth: Former police officials and agents of the Czar's secret service; also former members of the royal household.

Sixth: Feeble minded and those under age.

Seventh: Persons serving a prison term, including those who were sentenced to exile by the administrative process of the G. P. U., or the Soviet's political police.

When applied in concrete instances these more or less oracular provisions of the Soviet constitution have resulted in gross abuses. Thus a Jew receiving money from a brother in America was disenfranchised on the ground that he was living on an income which he did not earn. In seven cities in a single Jewish region of the Ukraine—Kamenets Podolsk—from half to two-

thirds of the populations were disenfranchised on this ground.

With the advent of the Five Year Plan and more especially the agricultural part of the plan, the status of the peasantry became very uncertain. Peasants who a short time before were considered poor or middle peasants were officially lifted to the dignity—and persecutions—of rich peasants or kulaks by the local authorities. If they objected to the government's programme they were at once disenfranchised and their property was taken from them. Even government reports of the extent of this tyranny by local officials over the peasantry stagger one with their injustice.

Thus in the sparsely settled region of Irkutsk in Siberia there were 23,282 declassed individuals in December, 1929. Subsequently this figure increased rather heavily. In northern Caucasia almost the entire population of a village was disenfranchised because the village had its own public bath and its inhabitants were therefore classed as rich peasants or kulaks. In Uzbekistan 1200 peasants, the population of the entire district, were pronounced to be kulaks and were disenfranchised. In another region of the same republic 450 peasants were disenfranchised by the local officials at one stroke. Moscow sent out a commission to review the sentences and a little more than half of the declassed men were ordered reinstated in their rights.

A census taken among one group of the declassed, the religious group, in a single Soviet republic, Georgia, reveals a striking decrease in the number of clergymen in a period of nine years. In 1921 there were 1521 ordained ministers in Georgia. Of these only 312 remained in 1930. The rest had found other occupations.

IN JEWISH FIELDS

IN a provincial Soviet newspaper I came across the following item:

"In the city of N——, in the Kirghize Soviet Republic, the chief of police and the fire chief were accused of having employed discriminatory tactics against the local Jewish population. The N—— Communist bureau heard the charges and found the allegations of antisemitism against these two officials to be well grounded. It referred the matter to the Regional Communist bureau which held the two officials for trial and summarily dismissed the entire city administration for having permitted such conditions to continue unrebuked."

The revolution has made an end of Jewish persecution in Russia. It has made an end of geographic, economic and religious discrimination to which the Jews were for centuries subjected under the Czars. Jews in the Soviet Union may now live anywhere and engage in any occupation they choose. Schools and colleges are open to them on the same terms as they are to

all others. They mingle on an equal social basis with the rest of the population. Intermarriage has become frequent. Jews hold public office.

The Soviet régime has abolished the commercial pursuits in which the Jews formerly engaged and they must now accustom themselves in a large measure to work on land and in factories. Jewish reorientation under the multiplying Communist restrictions is more difficult than it is for groups and races whose foundations have not been so deeply uprooted. Nevertheless their problems are not of persecution but of adjustment, not of race, but of economics, and are part and parcel of the general industrial and agricultural recasting and reshaping of the country.

MENTION the word Jew in Russia today and the person you are speaking with, whether he is Jew or Gentile, unconsciously associates it with the word Land and with another word that goes with Land—Crimea.

More than a quarter of a million Jews—280,000 to be exact—live on land in the Soviet Union today. There are impressive Jewish colonies in Kherson, in the region of Krivoirog, in the former province of Yekaterinoslav. There are lesser Jewish land settlements in White Russia, on the Soviet's western border, and in Birobidjan, in the Far East. Yet in Russia today Jewish colonization is connected in the public imagination almost exclusively with Jewish pioneering

in the Crimean peninsula and with the 111 Jewish land settlements located in the Crimean steppe.

There are several reasons for this.

In the first place there is a spirit of romance associated with the land itself. Geographically Crimea is the California of the Soviet Union. It borders on the Black Sea and has mountains and the desert, which the Russians speak of as the steppe. Greek and Latin poets have sung the praises of its sunshine and its climate. In the middle ages Mongol Khans built their fortresses and castles there. In the modern era the Czars of Moscow and the Sultans of Constantinople have repeatedly fought for the peninsula. The Romanovs won it and made it their playground. Here on its southern slope they built their beautiful summer palaces and surrounded them with villas for their ministers. Here, too, they established the little "cozy cottages" and "Sparrows' Nests," which actually were sumptuous palaces, for their mistresses.

In the second place there is, or more correctly was, the glamour of adventure about Jewish colonization in the Crimea. The Jewish pioneers were not merely going to the steppe for themselves and their families, but for the Jewish people as a whole. The Race as well as the individual was to find its home there. What Jewish Zionists had dreamed for Palestine, the Jews of Russia, or at any rate their Bolshevik leaders, dreamed for the Crimea. It was to become an autonomous Jewish republic. The Soviet government en-

couraged this dream. It began to look as though it might be realized.

The dream of a Jewish republic on the shores of the Black Sea won the sympathy of Jews the world over. American Jews responded with utmost generosity.

In Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, an organization of American Jews which since the World War has been rendering financial aid to their stricken coreligionists in Eastern Europe, established offices. It opened a half dozen warehouses in various parts of the steppe. American tractors and combines began to pour in. Houses were built and new communities rose up in record time. While the budding Jewish farmers, or peasants, as the Russians insist on calling them, were raising grain, a staff of agronomists, engaged by the Agrojoint, as the Russian branch of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is known, was experimenting with "new cultures."

The Jews were enterprising farmers. They were not tied to the land with traditions and superstitions as the peasant was. And in a short time new crops made their appearance: grapes and cotton, fruit orchards. Engineers called in from Moscow were building up an irrigation system in the steppe. Young Jewish agronomists of proved ability were dispatched to America to acquaint themselves with the latest agricultural methods in that country and to try to transplant these

methods to the Crimean colonies. A Jewish agricultural college was established.

I shall present the picture of the various types of Jewish colonists—the newly arrived immigrants to the soil, the established Jewish farmer, as well as the discouraged farmer who after five or six years leaves the land to go back to the city—in the order in which they presented themselves to me in the course of a ten-day journey through the Crimea.

AFTER a three hours' ride through the moonlit steppe and just as morning was breaking we reached a railroad station on the treeless plateau. The freight depot we were told was two miles away and we drove there. About half an hour earlier three cars had been detached from a passing freight train and moved to a side track. People were slowly starting to unload them. I hurried out to examine the inside of a car the contents of which was still untouched.

One half of the car contained the household utensils of several families: Bedsteads, barrels and crates with pots, pans, dishes; bundles containing bedding, featherbeds and pillows. There were wash basins here, and bowls for the mixing of dough; there were shoemakers' benches; locksmith's tools. Here, too, the families had slept during the journey.

The other half of the car was transformed into a sort of barn. Two horses, belonging to two separate

families, had made the journey with their owners. The horses had already been removed from the car and were making their first acquaintance with the dry, brittle vegetation of the steppe. At the farther end of the animal compartment in the car was a box with several chickens in it which were letting the world know that they were there. Here, too, in a hastily improvised stall stood a white goat. A man and a boy were climbing into the car to remove the goat and the chickens.

At one end of the car stood a bucket with drinking water. At the other end stood another bucket—for something else.

There were about two score people in the party which the three freight cars had brought to the steppe. The impression which they made was similar to that which immigrants made thirty-five or forty years ago on reaching Ellis Island after a three weeks' journey on one of the cheaper steamers. The boys were unwashed. The girls' heads looked wild. Children whined and mothers were scolding. Some one was heating water on a kerosene stove. After a time they ate breakfast, walking, standing, sitting on pieces of lumber or on the rocky earth. Breakfast consisted of black bread and tea. There was no sugar and in place of real tea the women had put into the kettle a little chicory to give the water the coloring of tea.

After breakfast I interviewed the heads of the families. Their stories were old. They were tailors,

tanners, bakers. There were among them several who had once been merchants. There was little bread in their ghetto towns and no future. The young people were going to the cities. But the middle aged, too, needed to live; they had families to support. The government offered to pay their expenses to the Crimea, so they emigrated.

About ten o'clock a man arrived from the local Jewish colonization office, the Ozet. An hour later two trucks came and took the emigrants and their belongings to the Ozet's shelter house in the nearby town.

The shelter house had about a hundred cots with boards in place of mattresses. The manager explained that mattresses of any kind were unsanitary. Typhus was an ever present danger in Russia. It was best to let each family spend the night in the shelter on its own rags. The boards, he explained, were flushed with hot water daily.

It was the height of the harvest season. By the afternoon the people of the morning's consignments had been bundled into automobiles and sent off to the various colonies for which they originally set out and where their help was sorely needed.

I STARTED for the Jewish colonies by automobile from Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea. Five kilometers beyond the city the macadamized road ended. Seven or eight miles more and we lost the graveled

road also. We were traveling over the dry, hard surface of the earth. There were no sign posts and the road itself was like a trail, with grass and stubble under foot. The highpowered machine, of American make, capable of devouring space and distance at the rate of seventy miles an hour, barely registered thirty kilometers.

The Jewish settlements for which we were heading were seventy-five miles to the north. We passed Mohammedan villages, two rows of earthen huts on either side of a wide, treeless street. The clay houses were surrounded by clay walls and the color of both was a drab pink or yellow. In the middle of the street stood a raised platform, like a scaffold. It was reached by fifteen or eighteen steps. Five times a day the village elder ascended the platform to summon the faithful to pray to Allah.

A Tatar village came into view. It was followed a few minutes later by a German settlement. The agronomist who accompanied me suddenly announced: "Jewish fields."

We approached a sea of ripened wheat. There were no fences to mark ownership, no artificial cutting up of the huge field to indicate that this part belonged to one owner and the next to another. The entire field was part of the season's crop of one collectivized farm, a Jewish "Kolkhoz."

The chauffeur made one or two short cuts. The agronomist searched the field with his gaze and finally

exclaimed: "There they are; those are our men harvesting."

A combine, dragged by a tractor, came into view. We approached it slowly. Our machine stopped and at a hand wave from the agronomist the combine too came to a standstill.

Half a dozen men jumped to the ground. Their ages ranged from 17 to 35. They were naked from the waist up and their brown backs and chests were covered with grease and perspiration. I was introduced—"a writer from America"—and was given a quick but penetrating examination by six pairs of darting, intelligent eyes.

The foreman of the group plunged into explanations. He spoke in Russian, rapidly, and told the agronomist of the difficulties he had faced in the past two days. The combine had broken down in certain places. All moved closer to the giant harvesting machine and the agronomist proceeded to examine every part of it carefully. He indicated what repairs were to be made.

I was about to put questions to some of the men when a youth of eighteen with burning coal black eyes and tousled hair spoke to me first.

"How soon do you think the revolution will come to America?" he inquired.

I did not wish to offend the youth—he looked so pathetically sincere—and told him that I could not give him any information on that point, that I was

in fact unaware that the revolution was headed toward America.

The others smiled. But the youth continued to examine me gravely. He, too, seemingly did not want to be impolite to me, but his eyes were cold and disapproving.

By noon we reached the village we had started out for in the morning: thirty or forty houses strung out in two even rows in the barren steppe. A sow with a litter of sucklings lay outside the first Jewish house we came to; apparently there was no room for them yet at the collectivized barn. As we drove on through the village women stopped their work to observe who was coming. They were barefooted. Their dresses were of peasant material and were cut in peasant fashion. The steppe had coarsened their features and, as we stopped to talk to some of them, we noticed that it had also coarsened their speech.

The land has turned them into peasants.

THOUGH Jewish colonization in the Crimea is only ten years old, its beginnings are already legendary and uncertain. No one knows when the first party of settlers arrived, who they were, where they came from. In 1921 a number of Jewish families were found working on the land. In 1923 the Agrojoint was already rendering assistance to these and other Jewish settlers scattered through the steppe. The emigration of Jews

from the ghettos of the Ukraine and White Russia to the Crimean desert continued and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, like a Sister of Mercy, followed in their trail and rendered what assistance it could.

At first this assistance was personal and consisted in alleviation of the immediate wants of the colonists. As the people on the land took root this aid became more planned. It was given in such forms as would render permanent service to the colonists. Early in 1923 the first American tractor found its way to the Crimea and the march of American agricultural machinery to the Jewish colonists in the steppe has not ceased since.

With American financial aid the colonists began to build homes. They bought cows and horses. They obtained dairy equipment. The land was not yet flowing with milk and honey, but it was beginning to yield a living to most of the newcomers.

In 1924 the Soviet government actively allied itself with the cause of Jewish colonization. The "Comzet," a government committee for the settlement of Jews on land, was organized. Vast tracts of land and large sums of money were placed by the Soviet authorities at the disposal of the Jews. At present the Soviet government supplies 75 per cent of the funds required for Jewish colonization, while the Jews of America, through the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, supply the remaining 25 per cent.

IN spite of the fact that the settlement of Jews on land in the Soviet Union has not only the moral but the material support of the Soviet government, Jewish colonization in Russia today is distinctly on the downgrade. Only the poorest and most helpless of city dwellers avail themselves of the government's offer to go on land. All others rush to the industrial centers to apply for factory work. The dream of a Jewish agricultural republic is dead. Even the continued maintenance of the established colonies is becoming psychologically impossible as the result of the government's relentless collectivization programme. In view of this programme Jewish colonization has lost its purpose and its meaning. Established farmers drop everything and run to the cities.

Jews sought the land in the first six or eight years after the revolution in order to find a new economic base under their feet, since private trade and commerce in which they mostly engaged prior to the Bolshevik upheaval had been abolished. Today, however, they are sent—and sometimes driven—to the land “to assist with the building of the socialist order,” instead of rehabilitating themselves.

Not the building up of the fortunes of the individual, but of the state is Stalin's slogan. The Jewish farming regions, because they were dependent upon the government for assistance, are more rigidly collectivized than other districts. The four autonomous Jewish farming regions in the Ukraine and Crimea are col-

lectivized nearly 100 per cent. Let us go back for some minutes to the collectivized "Jewish fields," observe the men at work once more and find out what his toil brings to each one of them at the end of the harvest.

Behind the combines as they cut down the wheat and separate the grain from the straw and chaff, there follows a huge automobile truck. At intervals the combine is stopped and the pure grain is taken from one of its compartments and transferred to a huge box on the truck. When the box has been filled, the truck drives away. Where does it take the grain? To the warehouse of the Jewish collective, whose members had produced it? No. The grain is taken to the nearest government owned elevator. The government's agents dispose of the year's crop, when it has been fully harvested and gathered, as follows:

Thirty per cent of the crop goes to the government and is paid for at an established contract rate.

Twenty-five per cent of the crop again goes to the government, into a different pocket, to pay for the use of the government's machinery. (The fraction of Jewish colonists using the American machinery of the Agrojoint is exempt from this tax.)

Another twenty-five per cent of the crop goes to the government for the third time to be used as an "emergency fund" to aid other collectives in want or trouble.

Twenty per cent, all that now remains of the crop,

will be rationed out to the farmers, the producers, by the government agents for their sustenance until the next crop.

Approximately the same system of distribution prevails with regard to all other farm products, about one-fifth going to the producer.

The cabbage and potato crops which the Kolkhoz produces are taken to the government warehouses. Eggs go to the government's provisions store; butter goes to the "Maslocenter" or butter trust; milk is taken to government refrigerating cars. Only a trifling percentage of what the farmer produces stays with him. The rest is taken by the government for export abroad and to feed the population of the cities and especially to feed the industrial workers employed on any of the big projects and undertakings of the Five Year Plan.

An elderly Jew, wide-awake and not hostile to the Soviet régime, in outlining the government's methods of requisitioning the products from the Jewish peasants, said to the writer:

"Do you recall the line from Jeremiah—I think it is in Jeremiah—'you shall sow, but you shall not reap'? This has been fulfilled in our case. We sow but we do not reap, that is, we do reap, but for the government's warehouses, for the big cities and for foreign countries. We have not the same joy in farming today that we had three and four years ago when at the end of the harvest each took the season's grain into his

own granary and saw what it was he had been working for since early spring.

"Three and four years ago," the aged Jew continued, "our boys would hitch up a pair of horses in the evening and drive twenty miles to town to 'take in a show.' Today they don't see the town, except when one of them is sent on an errand. Our horses are in the collective; we walk. A peasant without a horse is not a happy peasant."

"But is not the Soviet government applying the identical requisition methods to the gentile farmers?"

"It is," the man replied, "but that does not help us any. The gentile peasant has been on the soil hundreds of years. He has conquered the soil; he is not pioneering. We are pioneering. The pioneer must see something ahead to be able to go on with his work and hardships. We are not averse to helping build socialism, but first we must eat and acquire a roof over our heads. To build socialism on starvation rations, to create a paradise for our grandchildren, while we are all to give up from ten to twenty years of life for it—that is asking too much from any man who is not a Lenin or a Stalin."

In one of the villages I asked a middle-aged colonist to explain concretely the grievances of the men on the land, why they were going back to the cities. He said:

"This collectivization business is making life on the land uninteresting as well as uncomfortable. Nothing

is left for individual initiative. A man's experience counts for nothing beside a slip of paper from Moscow. Last spring, for instance, one of the officials in Simferopol received an order from Moscow that the Crimea should plant so and so much cotton. He came to our collective and told us that we must plant 400 acres of cotton. We pointed out to him that with the other crops already contracted for, 90 acres of cotton would be all that we could reasonably be expected to take care of. The man waved the telegram in our face and told us we would have to plant 400 acres of cotton as ordered from Moscow.

"We planted 400 acres, but we were able to take care of only 40 acres; 360 acres were lost. So much work wasted."

As I was going through one of the villages I hailed a Jew who was carting a barrel of water from a well, two miles distant.

"What is the name of this village?" I asked.

"You may call it the village of last resort," the man replied with grim humor. "Some of us are here because we have not the fare back to the city. Others, like myself for instance, are 'declassified.' We must stay here to atone for our past sins."

A HIGH colonization official, with whom I talked over the Crimean situation, conceded that the plan to make of the Jews an agricultural people on a vast scale has

failed. Their future lies more in the factories than on the soil. It lies in clerking, in salesmanship, in managerial work for government-owned industries. But there will always be colonies in the Crimea, he thought. A few will stick to the land because they will get used to it—too used to go away.

Besides there were already signs on the Soviet horizon that collectivization may ultimately be limited only to grain and that the peasant would be allowed to own his garden and his chickens, his horse and his cow. Should this come about, life on the land will become easier and more attractive.

JEW IN OFFICE

RETURNING from the heart of the city, late one winter evening, I missed the last street car. An izvostchik asked twenty rubles to drive me home, a distance of four versts. He swore that twenty rubles would no more than buy a day's ration of hay for his horse. But however small the buying power of twenty rubles may have been to the Russian cabman, to me this sum represented ten American dollars and I decided to walk.

My room was in a workmen's district of Moscow, "back of the railroads." Factory smokestacks and dark unlighted storage plants alternated with large apartment houses and smaller tenements. As I neared my street I suddenly came upon a long line of peasant sleds, all of them carefully loaded with boxes, bales, crates. There was a man beside the driver on each sled and both the driver and his guard looked particularly alert. The horses were steaming and trotted briskly despite their heavy loads.

A few evenings later I again tried the experiment

of walking home from the "center," as the heart of Moscow is called. This time I came upon a line of automobile trucks, even more heavily loaded. Three or four men accompanied each load and driver. I glimpsed the inscriptions on a number of crates and boxes. They were addressed in English, Swedish, Spanish. Their destinations were London, New York, Stockholm and less familiar cities in South America, in the Near East, in the Orient.

Evening after evening thereafter I came upon similar scenes. Huge trucks would emerge from government warehouses, which were guarded by soldiers, and make the run to the railway freight house, where their contents would be loaded into freight cars, having for their destination the Soviet's foreign border.

Officially this particular form of Moscow's night activities was explained as a matter of routine. It was pointed out that the Soviet government had established a twenty-four hour day for a number of the more important and strategic industries. Transportation was in that class, the railroads of the Soviet Union being the weakest link in the whole of Russia's industry.

Unofficially this rather intensified movement of freight, mostly foodstuffs intended for export, at night, was declared to be more a matter of policy than of accident. It was done, so it was said, to obviate any unpleasant comment and possibly also an occasional riot by the hungry and exhausted populace.

With small exceptions, such as the credits accorded

it by the German government, the Soviet Union has none of the international backing and good will which other nations have and without which a modern state can exist only with great difficulty. To make up for this want of international credit the Soviet government bears down upon its foreign exports "until it hurts"—both at home and abroad.

It hurts abroad because the Soviet government's desperate need for cash in foreign denominations compels it to sell its wares at any price—to underbid all of its competitors, if that becomes necessary—and a situation is created which is known as dumping.

It hurts at home because such forced and stimulated export has reduced many parts of the Soviet Union to a state bordering on famine, which mercilessly wipes out the aged and the infirm and undermines the health of one and possibly two generations of the future.

Russian butter, cheese and eggs, Russian meat, fish and fowl, Russian flour, fruits and honey, Russian flax, wool and leather, Russian shoes, Russian coats, Russian pelts, and a host of other commodities of daily use too numerous to be listed are shipped to foreign countries in every part of the globe.

These products, often forcibly extracted from a cowed but resentful peasantry, pay for the agricultural machinery and factory equipment which the Soviet government buys abroad. They pay for the outfitting of new oil wells and the laying of new mines, for the numerous and huge electric stations which the Kremlin

government is constructing in various parts of the Soviet Union.

These commodities, literally taken from the mouths and backs of the Russian workmen and peasants, supply the funds with which the government pays its imported laborers and foreign experts.

They supply the "valuta" which makes the wheels of the Five Year Plan go round.

THE Soviet régime lives very largely by its exports. Foreign trade has literally come to be the life blood of the Communist state. Four of the country's principal commissariats combine to fashion the foreign trade policy of the Soviets. Each of these commissariats is headed by a Jew.

Four Jews holding ministerial portfolios at one and the same time in a single cabinet, is a phenomenon that modern history has not heretofore recorded. That the enemies of the Kremlin both within and without the Soviet Union, have not used this fact as a pivot for defaming, attacking, belittling the Moscow régime, only emphasizes the extent to which this régime has succeeded in eliminating questions of race and religion, and more especially the prejudice toward certain races and religions, from the social, political and economic life of the Russian people.

Speaking to this writer in Moscow about the futility of race chauvinism and the injustice of race pride,

George Bernard Shaw, referring particularly to Russian conditions, said: "If I were running the G. P. U. and I saw two proletarians arguing with one another over questions of race, and displaying signs of race pride, I would imprison both."

The Shaw comment in reality is but a statement of the policy of the Soviet government—and of its G. P. U.—in the matter of race prejudice and discrimination. People in the Soviet Union deal with one another, work with one another, visit one another for months and sometimes even years without once stopping to think in terms of the race into which one or the other was born, or the religion which he had at one time professed and for that matter may still be professing.

Appointments to office in the Soviet Union are made by the Communist party. Like the Catholic church, the Communist party is concerned only with the loyalty of the individual member to its tenets. If his loyalty is unquestioned and his ability warrants it, he is recommended for office. The fact that the Council of People's Commissars, the Soviet Cabinet, may have two, three or more members who are of Jewish or Polish or Georgian origin is a matter of supreme indifference to the Political Bureau, the Committee of Nine within the Communist party, which recommends and approves all governmental appointments before they are officially confirmed by the Sovnarkom, or the Council of People's Commissaries, the Soviet cabinet.

THE four commissariats which are headed by Jews are the following: Foreign Affairs, headed by M. M. Litvinov; Agriculture, headed by Y. A. Yakovlev; Foreign Trade, headed by A. P. Rosengoltz; Railroads, headed by M. L. Rukhimovich.

I shall begin with Rukhimovich because his job—the reorganization of Russia's railroads—at the moment represents the most complicated problem that the Soviet Union is faced with.*

The "awakening" of the Russian people is nowhere more in evidence than on its railroads. On my way to the Dneprosroy I arrived at the city of Alexandrovsk, or Zaporozhie, as it is now called, a little after three o'clock in the morning. The sights which greeted me on leaving the train are unforgettable. On the railroad platforms, in the station, along the tracks and for blocks into the streets, men, women and children were either sleeping, going to sleep, or waking.

A line of twenty or thirty people was standing in front of the pump, washing. Mothers, having infants to feed, were going about with kettles in search of "kipiatok," or hot water. Sixty or seventy persons stood packed like sardines in front of the ticket window, with their money and "documents" tightly clenched in their hands.

A railroad official estimated the crowd at 500. The particular day I came on was not exceptional; all through the summer they had had such crowds, he said.

*Rukhimovich has since resigned.

People were traveling singly and in families. The peasantry has become restless. It has heard of new factories, new cities, and it is on the move.

The total migrations in Russia today are really phenomenal and can be explained and accounted for only in terms of an awakening of the Russian peasantry, of a yearning to move, to explore, to go to new places—an awakening comparable only to the migrations to America from Eastern European countries during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Since the Revolution the Russian people have become footloose and restless.

In 1913, the year before the outbreak of the world war, the railroads of Russia carried 184,000,000 passengers. In the year 1930 the number of passengers was 557,000,000. Incomplete figures for the current year indicate that the number of passengers will reach 700,000,000.

Thousands of freight cars have been quickly reconstructed into third class passenger cars by the Soviet government to take care of these vast passenger armies, but in vain. In my travels through the Soviet Union, I have repeatedly come upon people who had spent from two to three days in and about railroad stations before they could find even third class accommodations.

The freight situation in Russia is becoming alarmingly serious in view of the government's vast building projects connected with the five year plans. While Russian railroads carried 132,000,000 tons of freight

in 1913, they carried 208,000,000 tons in 1930. They have carried 300,000,000 tons of freight in 1931.

The concrete task laid before M. Rukhimovich, as Commissary of Transport, was to reconstruct the Soviet railway system, by renovating the old railroads and building new ones wherever necessary and possible. The main problem of the transport situation in the Soviet Union is to bring the Russian railroads to the level of efficiency of American railway transportation. M. Rukhimovich has made a beginning in that direction.

Nearly a year ago he sent a committee of Russian railroad men to the United States to pick an American engineer for the job of reorganizing Russia's motive power. He took the best engineer the Baltimore and Ohio railroad had to offer, Mr. Charles A. Gill, who is now "curing" Russia's sick locomotives, rebuilding its dilapidated cars and reorganizing its railroad shops on an American basis.

M. Rukhimovich has done other things in that direction. He has imported American locomotives and is reconstructing Russia's railroad tracks to adapt them to the broader dimensions of the American engines. He has organized fleets of automobile freight trucks. He has started work on the construction of sixteen branch railroads in Kazakstan and in other places.

Rukhimovich was born in a peasant village near Rostov-on-the-Don. He is at this writing 44 years old. His father was a blacksmith. The family was poor and

the future commissar attended a peasant school which had but a two-year course of study. His revolutionary career, the thing which Communist biographers stress most, began in Rostov, where he organized the dock laborers into a union and led a strike of shoe workers. In 1906, when he was only 17, Rukhimovich was exiled from his native state, and went to live abroad for two years.

He managed to pick up an education and in 1911 entered the Kharkov Technological Institute. Two years later Rukhimovich joined the Bolshevist party. War came and he was called to the colors by the Czar. He served at the front until the revolution. He took part in the revolution of 1917, in its military operations. In 1918-19 he was a member of the Ukrainian Soviet government. Later he served as the head of the Don Coal Trust. Still later he was an important official—Vice President—in the Supreme Council of National Economy. Slightly less than two years ago he received his appointment as People's Commissary for Railroads.

Arkady Pavlovich Rosengoltz, Soviet Russia's People's Commissary for Foreign Trade, is of the same age as Rukhimovich. He, too, was born in 1889. His birthplace is not mentioned, but events in M. Rosengoltz's life would tend to place it in a district which was formerly "the Pale" or ghetto. In 1905, when he was only sixteen, he joined the Bolshevist party. He was arrested two years later. In 1915 he was exiled

from Moscow. He commanded an army in the civil war.

In 1923-1924 he was a member of the War Department and director of the Air Fleet. He served as the Soviet representative in England and stayed in this job until relations between the two countries were broken. Since November, 1930, Rosengoltz has been the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade.

Rosengoltz is responsible for the conduct of such organizations as the Amtorg in New York, the Arcos in London and numerous other Soviet Trade Delegations in South America, in the Orient, in Australia. His work is not spectacular, but basic. He is the go-getter of Soviet business, but he is neither the backslapper nor good fellow type. He is rather a man of large ideas and far-reaching plans.

Yakov Arkadieievich Yakovlev, Commissary for Agriculture, who with Stalin has made himself responsible for the present agricultural programme in the Soviet Union, hails from Belostock. He is the youngest man to have reached so high an office—he is only 37 years old. The February revolution found him in a Lenin-grad prison. It freed him and he immediately joined the Bolshevik ranks. By occupation a journalist he early turned his pen to proletarian writing. He was editor of the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, The Peasant's Paper, until his appointment to the post of Commissary of Agriculture a little less than two years ago.

Yakovlev has hitched his wagon to a very great,

but uncertain star. If the programme for the industrialization of Russia's agriculture and for the urbanizing of her peasant communities and population is successful, Yakovlev will command a very high place in Russian history. If it fails he will share the blame and discredit for it along with Joseph Stalin, whose policies he is carrying out.

THE city of Belostock besides claiming Yakovlev claims also M. M. Litvinov, though Litvinov does not claim it, at least not enthusiastically. The Soviet Foreign Minister keeps his personal life strictly out of the public eye. Trotsky brought his father to Moscow. People knew who his sister was. Litvinov is known to the public only as the statesman. Beyond stating that he came of "bourgeois parents," Litvinov makes no reference to his family.

The career of Litvinov as a Bolshevik antedates the Soviet régime. Early Communist publications contain a group photograph of a convention of Russian revolutionaries in Stockholm at which the Bolshevik wing of the social democratic party was born. Lenin is in the center of the group, for it was he who organized the new movement. But Litvinov is in it too—and so is Joseph Stalin.

I once asked Litvinov what his occupation had been in London. He replied that he had resorted to many ways to make a living, but that he had had only one

occupation all his life and that was being a revolutionary. This is true. Litvinov has given himself to the Russian revolution in a manner not unlike Stalin. He did the organizing work, the work that spells much danger and very little spotlight. For years he was a sort of business manager of the Communist party. He was the man who kept the underground channels between Russia and Europe unobstructed and in working order. When Stalin expropriated a bank in Tiflis and obtained a large sum of money for revolutionary work, Litvinov, in Paris, was changing this money into small denominations and distributing it among the various institutions of the party to keep them alive and functioning.

Litvinov's career as a statesman is many sided and brilliant. In his long exile in England he became a close student of British politics and diplomacy. If comparisons can be made, he is a sort of Soviet Austin Chamberlain. He is consistent and he knows what he is aiming at for his country, for Russia, fully as much as Chamberlain knows what he is aiming at for England.

Four other Jews, though not having the rank of cabinet members, occupy positions in the Soviet Union of almost equal importance. Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikoff is, since 1929, the Soviet ambassador in Great Britain.

Sokolnikoff is the son of a physician and is himself a jurist and a Doctor of Economics. His great service

to the Soviets was in reorganizing Russia's banking system and currency, when he served as Commissar of Finance, in 1922. He has also been actively connected with the Soviet's Planning programme and it is safe to say that not a few of his ideas are in back of the five year plans. He had seen exile in Siberia and was one of the delegation who had signed the Brest-Litovsk peace. For a while, during the years 1925 and 1926, he had wavered between Stalin and the Opposition and finally ranged himself on Stalin's side as the side having more practical promise for Russia.

The successor to the place of wizard of finance, which was held by Sokolnikoff, is a man named M. I. Kalmanovich, who is the Chairman of the Board of Managers of the Gosbank or State Bank, a position comparable to that of the head of the Bank of England. Kalmanovich is one of the younger men whom Stalin has rapidly moved to the front. He is forty. The Communist *Who is Who* still does not include his name, but the Political Bureau knows his record and has faith in the man.

Recently several airplanes were dedicated by the Russian army. One of the planes was named after War Commissar Climenty Voroshilov, another after the leader of the Ukrainian Army—Jonah Yakir.

Yakir, a son of the Jewish "Pale," is today one of the outstanding figures in the Red Army but no more outstanding than Yan Gamarnik, another young Jew, who is a member of the Revolutionary Military Coun-

cil of the Soviet Republic and is the assistant secretary of war. Gamarnik, among other duties, has the task of instilling ethics and idealism into the Red Army, to link military service with civilian life, to keep the soldier in touch with the issues which he will have to face and act upon when his term of military service has ended and he has resumed private life.

The Political Bureau of the Communist Party, the famous Politbureau headed by Stalin, is even more powerful than the official government of Russia, for, as has been stated above, it is the Politbureau which selects the candidates for office. Among the most influential members in this bureau is a former Jewish shoemaker, L. M. Kaganovich. Kaganovich and Stalin make their reports at Communist congresses and Soviet conventions side by side. Kaganovich is reputed to be Stalin's closest adviser. Those initiated into Communist politics unhesitatingly pronounce Kaganovich, next to Stalin and Molotov, the most powerful man in the Soviet Union.

YOUNG RUSSIA

I WAS not given the young man's name, but the place where I saw him was the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute in Moscow. It is a detention prison maintained in connection with the criminal courts of the whole of the Soviet Union, to which murderers of varying degrees of insanity are sent for observation and study. They remain at the Institute from one to three months until a board of scientists determines the degree of potential danger which each prisoner holds for society and recommends what sentence the court should pass on him.

The young man in question—he was not yet twenty-two—was a teacher by training. He occupied a padded cell, though he was not aware of it. When I entered with the physician who took me through the Institution he greeted us quite rationally. Speaking to the doctor with the familiarity with which students in Russia are wont to address their professors, he inquired how soon he would be discharged. The doctor replied vaguely that the record in his case was not

yet complete. When we were outside the young man's cell the physician, a professor of psychiatry at the First and Second Moscow Universities, said to me:

"This boy will never be free again. He is hopelessly insane. Within a week he will be taken to an institution for the mentally incurable."

This is how the young man happened to be in this predicament.

He had been a bright intelligent boy in a provincial Russian town and, upon graduating from the local high school, the trade union of which his father was a member requested for him a stipendium to go to a higher school in Moscow. The stipendium was granted. The boy was ambitious to become a teacher and entered a Teachers' Technicum, specializing in literary subjects. He graduated from the Technicum with high honors in the spring of 1930 and was waiting for an appointment to teach.

One day the authorities sent for him. They were not appointing graduates to teaching positions that season, he was informed, but instead were sending them out on practical social work. *He* had been assigned to the collectivization department. He was handed the address of a government office where he was advised to call at once. Upon receiving credentials and fare to an outlying province, he and six other graduates left for that province the following afternoon.

His job consisted of calling meetings of the peasants

nightly, to prevail upon them to transfer their individual possessions such as horses, cows and pigs, as well as their farm implements, to the government. These were to aid in the establishment of large collective farms where the peasants would work and be paid in much the same manner as men in factories. His instructions were first to try to convert them to the government policy by moral suasion. If that failed he was to warn them of serious and even dire consequences. But if that too were unavailing and the peasants steadfastly refused to part with their property, he was to send on the names of two or three of the most aggressive foes of the government for arrest.

He never made a step now without a revolver. He stayed up nights, fearing that the peasants might come and murder him in his sleep. One day the chief collectivization official of the province was found dead.

The young teacher went on with his work, but he had ceased to eat as well as sleep. He was afraid that the peasants might poison his food. He had become a shadow of his former self. The peasants remarked on this; some of them jeered him about it. They knew that he was afraid of them and were growing bolder and more recalcitrant daily.

One evening he called a meeting and the peasants came in large numbers—larger than usual. This disturbed the young man. There was something ominous in the air; if trouble started he would not be able to cope with it. He opened the meeting and began speak-

ing. After some minutes he became incoherent, jumped from the table and began shooting in all directions. Two men fell to the floor, one dead and another injured. Brandishing his revolver he forced his way through the crowd and fled.

He was found the next morning—insane. Because of the circumstances under which he had committed the act the government ordered that he be set free the moment he regained his reason. The foremost specialists in the country had been called in by the Psychiatric Institute, but their skill was unavailing; his reason could not be recaptured. He had become a dangerous and incurable maniac.

By actual count 80 per cent of the criminal patients at the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute were found to be between the ages of 20 and 30. The "mania of persecution" led among all other forms of sickness. Some believed themselves persecuted and threatened by peasants opposed to the government programme. Others, on the contrary, suffered from delusions of persecution by the G. P. U., the political secret service.

In Western Europe the average age of psychopathic criminals is usually above forty. In the Soviet Union, until very recently, it had been between thirty and forty.

"Why such an unusual proportion of insane criminals among Russia's youth?" I asked of Prof. Evgeny Nikolayevich Dovbnia, the director of the Institute.

He paused before answering. Every one in the

Soviet Union pauses before making any statement that might even remotely be construed as a criticism of the course and methods of the government, especially in view of the present trying period.

"Our young generation," the director finally said, "is called upon to make greater sacrifices than young people anywhere in the world. We are short of trained, intelligent and loyal personnel—*kadri*, we call them in Russian. We are therefore compelled to shorten our school programmes and to impose upon our youth not only work and assignments that tax their physical capacities to the danger point, but we also impose upon them legal and mental responsibilities that are beyond their years. This frequently brings in its train grave psychiatric disorders."

The young generation of the Soviet Union and more especially the student youth, the members of the Comsomol, have in the past three years had their heaviest cross to bear in connection with the government's collectivization programme. A veritable reign of terror had been instituted by the peasantry at the beginning of the year 1928 in retaliation of this programme. Government agitators from the cities, as well as the local young Communists who sided with the authorities in the matter of collectivization, were slaughtered wholesale. Village correspondents to the government newspapers, telling which of their fellow citizens were hoarding grain and where such hoardings could be found, were frequently torn limb from limb

by the infuriated peasants who had been thus betrayed into the hands of the authorities.

An account of this wave of terrorism, giving facts and statistics of a most startling nature, was recently published by the Soviet government. The circulation of the volume, which was entitled "The Struggle Between Classes and Criminality" was limited to a small number of officials for their private information and guidance. Not a word of mention of the work was made to the public.

What one of these death raids by an infuriated peasant mob upon a government agent, or commissar, is like was pictured to me by a man who had been through such an experience. My informant, not yet thirty, was already suffering from a heart ailment that might cut his life short at any moment. I interviewed him at a sanatorium in the Crimea where he was a patient. I quote his story verbatim:

"There was a grain shortage in a number of big cities and the Communist Party sent out brigades of party workers into the various provinces to prevail upon the peasants to part with their grain hoardings, for a price, to the government. I headed such a brigade. My territory was in a section where the government had had considerable trouble before and I was instructed to proceed as carefully as possible, to give the peasants time and to resort to no threats.

"I was going from village to village holding meetings of the peasants, laying the government's demands

before them. They were bargaining with me. They wanted to give up less grain and to get more in return for what they were giving up. I sent on their offers to Moscow and brought the government answers back to them.

"A week passed and the second week was drawing to a close. At first I never went to one of these villages alone. But since the peasants seemed so tractable, I was thrown off my guard and relaxed my vigilance. One evening I went over to a village unaccompanied. I had something to talk over with the village deputy and went straight to his house. He was most friendly. We sat down at the table to straighten out matters. Peasants came in and took part in the conversation. They left and others came and took their places. I did not notice the hour. It was quite late when I finally rose to go.

"The peasant deputy suggested, in view of the lateness of the hour, that I stay overnight at his house. It seemed to me that I could cement our good will by doing so and agreed. His wife started to make up a bed for me, while the peasant left the house.

"A side glance which the woman gave me caused a frightful suspicion to flash through my brain. I rose and announced that I had forgotten an important matter and must rush back to attend to it. I jumped into the saddle and rode off at a fast clip. As soon as I was sure that the horse's hoof beats could not be heard from the house I stopped, tied the horse in a pasture

and crawled into a haystack. With revolver drawn I settled down to await developments.

"I did not have more than a few minutes to wait. Men were coming, speaking in hushed voices. I discerned the figure of my host among them. They stopped as if holding counsel. Then, at a given signal they started at a wild run toward the hut.

"Brandishing axes, knives, scythes, they were shouting: 'Kill him!' 'Gouge his eyes out.' 'Cut his throat.' 'Bring out the dirty little commissar into the open.' 'Bring him out!'

"They did not find me in the house and apparently realized that it was they who were trapped, for they began slinking away in all directions, speechless. I lay in the haystack awake and watchful until day broke. Then I quickly untied my horse, jumped into the saddle and galloped the half dozen versts to our headquarters. Before noon a patrol of G. P. U. troops had arrested the village deputy and three other peasants whom I recognized as having been in the murder mob the night before."

MUCH has been written about the lighter sides of Russia's young generation: about its elastic morals, its casual marriages, its easy divorces. These are passing phases and a new and more sombre side has come to the fore. Beginning with the grade schools, children in the Soviet Union are today taught to take their citi-

zenship with Athenian clarity and Spartan strength.

Every school room in Russia is today a public forum and the three "R's" are only a small part of the school curriculum. The other subjects in which all pupils, starting with the age of seven, are required to have systematic training, are Soviet politics and government, the economic programmes of the Communist party, the Soviet's foreign policies, the country's plans for warfare and defence.

I recall an evening at the house of a friend in Moscow. His wife was very much worried. It was nearly ten and their fourteen-year-old daughter had not yet returned from school. Finally the girl came.

"Why so late?" the parents asked in unison.

"We were given as part of our practical work in Civics," the child explained, "an assignment to inspect a number of public restaurants and to make a detailed report of their shortcomings. Our reports will be used as a basis for action—possibly criminal action—against the managers of these places and we had to be very careful in our findings and especially in the way we put them down."

Another instance: A boy of fifteen, the son of an acquaintance, came home at a run one evening, took off his civilian clothes and got into his khaki. The Moscow River was overflowing. Guards were posted along its edges. These guards were without exception high school boys. They would be on duty the greater part of the night.

"Aren't there enough men," the father of the lad asked, "to assign to such work?"

"There are," the boy replied, "but it is considered good experience for us. This is good preliminary training for the army."

Four million boys and girls between the ages of seven and sixteen are united in an organization known as the Pioneers. Five million youths and girls between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two are members of the Comsomol—the League of Communist Youth. These nine million young men and women, together with the two million adult members of the Communist party, form a sort of patrician caste in the Soviet Union. They are soldiers of the Communist cause who know no blood ties, no father and no mother. Their sole allegiance is to the State, which in Russia is synonymous with the Communist party.

It is this caste which supplies the Soviet Union with officials. But it is in their unofficial capacities that the members of the Comsomol and of the Pioneers do perhaps their most effective service for the Soviet order. Every child or youth belonging to these organizations is the censor—or worse—of his parents' speech, thoughts and actions. A father who attempts to criticize certain Soviet policies is promptly rebuked by his own son. A mother who complains publicly about the difficulty of the food situation, for example, is promptly warned by her own daughter that to speak in that manner is counter-revolutionary.

There are other very efficient and very practical ways in which these youth organizations assist the government.

In a certain Soviet factory the conditions of work had become so bad that about 200 employés threatened to quit. This would cripple the output of the factory and materially retard the government programme in that district. The director of the plant reported the matter to the proper officials. These decided upon a novel experiment. They enlisted the aid of the school authorities in that particular district. The school heads laid the matter before their pupils at a general assembly.

The children decided to prevail upon their parents to sign agreements not to leave the factory until the end of the Five Year Plan. In order to improve conditions in the factory the children offered their services in their spare time and on those days when there was no school. In this manner they removed the causes which might have led to a general walkout and a disastrous stopping of work.

One other instance deserves mention in this connection.

In one of the remote rural districts in the Ukraine the peasants stubbornly refused to accede to the government programme for collectivization. The government emissaries in charge of the campaign, having exhausted all peaceful methods, were about to take drastic action. "Leave the situation to me," the local

school head counseled. At the end of two days he had the school children of the district lined up for collectivization. Every home had become a battle ground between the parents and their young sons and daughters. The young ones won; their parents submitted to collectivization.

It is in connection with the forced marches of the Soviet's industrialization programme that Young Russia is making its most strenuous sacrifices.

"The youth of Russia," a high Soviet official said to me, "is watering the five year plans with its sweat and blood."

Every man and woman in Russia who is of middle age and very many who are under middle age, realize that the milk and honey that are to flow as the result of the government's industrialization programme, will not come in their lifetime, possibly not even in their children's lifetime. Some very definite and very aggravating consequences follow in the wake of this realization. For example:

Russian factories are working day and night, but the goods they turn out are seventy-five percent damaged or defective. The rank and file of workers have, in recent months, fallen into an indifferent, apathetic mood. Inattention to orders, drunkenness, even theft have become a daily occurrence in factories, on the job.

The five year plans have tremendous odds against

them—odds coming entirely from inside the country, from the Russian people themselves—and the Soviet régime has charged the youth of the country with overcoming these odds.

When production at a certain factory, a thousand or two thousand miles from the center, begins to lag the political manager of the factory, who is directly responsible to the Communist party, apprises Moscow of the situation. The Communist party thereupon orders "reinforcements" to proceed to the particular factory post haste. These reinforcements are usually University students who, under the Soviet régime of education, are also mechanics. Arrived at the factory they are put to work.

But they do not work as ordinary workmen do. They become what in Russian is called "Udarniki"—shock troopers, the speed-up men of the factory.

They work longer hours than the other workmen for it is necessary for them to set an example. They eat the same food the others do, but do not grumble, for here, too, they must demonstrate their loyalty. At night they go to meetings where they make speeches. When it becomes necessary to accelerate the work at any and all cost, rivalries between factories known as "socialist competitions" are organized. These shock troopers work often a round twenty-four hours at a stretch in order to fill a serious gap in production.

They are expected, with their enthusiasm, to overcome the shiftlessness of the average Russian worker,

to cure his indifference, to combat his irresponsibility.

The job of a "shock trooper" in industry is not open to as many risks as is the job of the city agitator who is sent to the peasant villages to force the government's collectivization programme upon them, but it has its physical dangers none the less.

In one of the factories of Moscow, such a progressive worker addressed a meeting of his fellow employés urging them to increase production and to put some real enthusiasm into the job. His remarks were greeted with sullen speechlessness. When the agitation meeting was finished and the man left the hall, he was overtaken by a group of workmen who split his head with an axe, killing him instantly.

This case got into the newspapers. There are others, many others, that the press is not permitted to report.

In a factory in Ukraine employing 7000 people, 150 uniformed soldiers were scattered in various parts of the building, this in addition to again as many secret service men who hung about the place, doing nothing. I asked one of the foreign engineers why so many soldiers were needed at the factory.

"I suppose," he replied, "it is to keep those 'udar-niki' or speed-up men from being slaughtered by the rest of the workers; they are a lazy lot, you know."

I asked one of the workmen at the factory why Russians were working so badly at home, while in the steel mills of Pittsburgh, Gary, or South Chicago they were counted excellent workers.

"Because," he replied, "there a man knows what he is getting. His wages may be big or they may be small, but they have a fixed value. He knows what a dollar will buy. Our ruble has no fixed value. It is fifty kopeks one day and ten the next. But even at best we get nothing for it; there is nothing you can buy here. What incentive is there for a man to work?"

THE Soviet policy of making the young generation the builders of the new order, of systematically forcing youth to the front, is fraught with considerable tragedy. Frequently mere boys are put in positions that are far beyond their age, experience or even capabilities. The result is that they soon find themselves, either through their own neglect or through the faults of others, in the examining chambers of the G. P. U. and consider themselves lucky to get off with a prison sentence instead of being shot.

In the Sokolniki prison, in Moscow, I came upon a youth of 22 with the frank, honest eyes of a country boy, who was serving a two-year sentence. I asked him under what paragraph he was serving. He named it. It implied embezzlement and waste of government funds. I asked him whether he was guilty.

"I suppose I am," the youth said, "because they told me I was guilty and they sent me up here. But I still cannot see how I can be guilty when I have not done any wrong myself."

He explained that he had worked as a clerk in a country cooperative store and was considered "very good at it." The supervisor for the district took a liking to him and turned him into what the Russians call a "vidvizhenets," or a man from among the people who was to be given a chance to come to the front, to rise quickly. When he was only twenty the government, being short of managers for cooperative stores, made him manager of a large establishment in Moscow. He soon discovered that his help were stealing right and left, but he seemed unable to catch them in the act, to fix responsibility upon any one. In the end it was upon himself that the responsibility for this state of affairs was laid. The thefts of his associates were ascribed to him. The judge and the prosecutor showed clearly that he was derelict in his duties and therefore guilty. He was sent to jail.

"I guess," the youth commented sadly, "the job was too much for me. When I am free again, I will take no more jobs which involve responsibility."

Another prisoner of like age whom I found working at a loom spoke in a gentle voice. He had juggled the accounts of a government wholesale house which employed him, to cover up several thefts. I asked him why he stole.

"The first time I took money to get a good meal," the youth explained. "For weeks at a stretch my body had been craving for good food, rich food. For a period of two years I had never eaten my fill. I re-

member one night I went to bed thinking how nice it would be if I could have a meat dinner with enough meat in it to satisfy me. The next day I took the money for such a meal. After discovering how easy it was to take money I began taking larger sums for other pleasures."

"Will you do the same thing again when you come out?" I asked.

"I don't think it will be necessary for me to do this in the future," the man answered. "I have a two-year sentence to serve yet. By the time I am out the Five Year Plan will have been achieved and we will have everything we want. There will be no need to steal in order to eat."

I still cannot make up my mind whether the youth really meant what he said or had merely been ironical with me and with the prison official who accompanied me.

BOOK THREE: PRISONS

THE SOVIET WAY WITH THE CRIMINAL

THE Western statesman or economist visiting Russia seldom leaves the Soviet Republic with more than a laissez-faire attitude. His sense of tolerance dictates a let-alone policy toward the political and economic experiment in progress in that country. His innate and practical experience, however, compels an attitude of watchful waiting until the national structure which is being reared from the Marx and Lenin blueprints has emerged from its present crude and fluctuating state and has demonstrated its ability to bring greater happiness to the people of Russia than that possessed by nations living under older forms of government. The criminologist is more favorably situated. He leaves the Soviet Union with a heartening sense of having witnessed something new under the sun. Soviet prisons and the Soviet penal system open a novel and inspiring chapter in the relations between society and the criminal.

Soviet Russia is successfully coping with the age-old problem of crime and punishment on the basis of a

complete transformation of prison life and a complete reversal of the old attitude of vindictiveness toward the individual offender. It is breaking new ground in the treatment of criminals. Prisons, in the old accepted meaning of the word, are fast passing out of existence. They are being replaced by farms, agricultural camps and industrial colonies, on the one hand, and by medical and psychopathic clinics, laboratories and institutions, on the other. With the antiquated prison system there went by the board the practices of corporal punishment, of solitary confinement and of the "iron bags"—the vault-like individual cells that gave the Czarist prisons their stark appellation of the "House of the Dead," which Dostoyevsky has immortalized in his volume of Siberian memoirs by that name. The word prison itself was put under the ban by the Soviet authorities as something that has come down as a heritage from the middle ages. The young generation of Russia, at any rate, no longer knows the meaning of the word "tjurma," whose mention under the old régime cast a horror over people.

The conception of punishment, of revenge upon the criminal has been outlawed. In a decree issued in March, 1919, the Communist party ordered the country's prisons to be transformed into educational institutions. Confinement in such an institution was declared to be an "economic corrective," for the purpose of educating the offender "in the discipline common to all workers" and was in no way to be turned

into martyrdom. Both the Criminal and Corrective-Labor Codes of the Soviet Union banned the words and the conception of retribution, expiation, atonement by the criminal and their use by judges and other officers of the law was forbidden. Humiliating the criminal, scarring his human sensibilities was in itself made a crime. Since the heads of nearly all correctional institutions in Russia are seasoned communists who have themselves as "political criminals," suffered imprisonment under the old régime the humanitarian attitude toward the confined individual dictated by the Communist party has their fullest personal and ideological sympathy and support.

The prisoner is treated with strictness, but seldom with severity and almost never callously. If an inmate maintains toward the official personnel of the institution the same canons of politeness that prevail among superiors and subordinates in ordinary life, it is all that is demanded of him. He is not required to rise when an official enters his cell, or to remove his hat when speaking to an attendant. Enforced silence is unknown. The prisoner converses freely with his neighbors; he has the right to smoke. Prison guards are trained not to insult their charges, nor to employ abusive methods of any sort. If an attendant violates this rule, the prisoner has the right—and the means—to bring his grievance to the attention of the higher authorities. Prisoners whose conduct becomes boisterous or subversive are tried in the first instance by a

"court of comrades" and unless the prisoner in question is a hardened criminal, or a recidivist, a reprimand from his fellow inmates, coupled if necessary with a threat of social ostracism, is generally all the correcting he requires.

The attempt to make prison life in the Soviet Union approximate normal free life as much as possible and to keep the prisoner from becoming a mere number is interesting and picturesque. But what makes the Soviet contribution to the treatment of the criminal, fragmentary and imperfect though it still is, really epoch making is the promulgation by the Kremlin government of four basic measures for keeping the criminal mobilized, as it were, for the free and normal life that awaits him on his release from confinement.

The four provisions setting apart the Soviet criminal code and Soviet penology from the codes and methods of all other countries are as follows:

First: The abolition of long sentences. Ten years is the maximum prison sentence a judge can impose on any criminal for any offence, murder and treason not excepted. (A legal project to make the maximum sentence only five years is under discussion by the Soviet authorities.) The average sentence is for three years and under the "progressive system" in vogue in the Soviet penal colonies the average casual criminal can shorten his sentence by one half.

Second: The industrial reeducation of the criminal. Teaching the criminal a trade is not nominal but ac-

tual; it is a definite goal and the guarantee of a job goes with it. If his sentence had been too short to permit the inmate to master his trade, he is directed, on his release from confinement, to one of the government factories maintained for men in just such predicament. Here the man is "earning while learning." He stays in this special factory until he has mastered his trade and has qualified for admission to the union when the government shifts the responsibility for finding him a job from itself to the trade organization which has received him into its fold.

Third: Normal sex and family life. After a probationary period the prisoner is given an annual vacation of fourteen days, which he can distribute over twelve monthly visits to his home. Family life is recognized by the Soviet authorities as one of the greatest incentives the inmate has for wanting to go straight and it is encouraged in every way. The Soviet code grants the unmarried prisoner the right to marry while serving his sentence. Almost every prison camp in the Soviet Union has in its vicinity a little colony composed of the wives and sweethearts of the men in prison, who prefer to live near their mates wherever they may happen to be.

Fourth: Complete removal of the prison stigma. The criminal's status as a citizen is not affected by his sentence. Confinement limits his opportunities to exercise his civic rights but these rights are not taken from him. Moreover, he is given a chance to live down his

past completely. If after his release from confinement he had conducted himself in a proper, law-abiding manner for a period of five years (for some categories of crime it is only three years) his criminal past is nullified by law and the records of it removed from court and prison archives and destroyed. He has the right to declare under oath that he has never been tried before and if he again commits a crime he has the status of a first offender.

These far-reaching innovations in the criminal and penal codes of the Soviets have been put into effect as the result of the revolutionary outlook on crime which the Communist leaders adopted as the official outlook of Russia as soon as they came into power.

THE socialist criminology of the Soviet Union is completely at variance with the viewpoint of the foremost criminal authorities in Western countries that crime must in part at any rate be accounted for by the "biological background of the criminal." It views such an attitude as "capitalistic." The Soviet legal and criminal authorities look for the "microbe of criminality" not in the individual, but in society. They view crime as a phenomenon inherent in the social order of each country and deny that it is a matter of blood or heredity and much less of "fate," as one well known European criminologist holds. The fact that many criminals have been found to be abnormal, Soviet

criminal authorities insist, is no proof that their abnormality has caused them to become criminals. The same abnormalities, they argue, can be found in persons who are not criminal. "Persons with weakly developed social instincts have always existed and will continue to exist," writes the Dutch socialist criminologist V. A. Bonger, "but whether such persons will become criminals depends entirely on the environment they will fall into."

"We do not mean to say that alcoholic parents will not bring into the world weakminded children," Boris Samoilovich Utevsky, Professor of Criminology at the First Moscow University and Soviet Russia's leading authority on the subject, explained to me. "But weakminded and degenerate children are also born to the rich, yet they do not often become criminals, because there are no untoward economic conditions to force them into criminal ways. Their living is secured for them. Social conditions make for crime and the way to attack the crime problem is to attack these conditions."

The essence of Marxist criminology upon which the Soviet criminal code and penal system are founded is that criminals are made—not born. They are made by society, or as the Marxist puts it, by "capitalist" society. Soviet leaders challenge most emphatically the viewpoint of Franz von Lisst and other spokesmen of the sociological school of criminology, which they consider the most advanced bourgeois school, according to which it may be possible to reduce crime by a

"transformation of social conditions," but not to achieve its complete eradication since, as the members of this school assert, society will at all times and under all conditions have with it the phenomenon of crime just as it has death and disease. The Marxist criminology of the Soviets flatly states that crime is curable. The cure which it proposes is the abolition of the capitalist system.

What the Marxian approach to criminality and the problem of its total eradication maintains and envisages was outlined by the Italian socialist leader Turati in his book challenging the Lombrosian theory of the "born criminal." Though Turati's statement of the Marxian position on crime was made in 1883 and is therefore half a century old, it has remained the classic definition of the socialist attitude toward crime and the criminal.

"The cause of crime," Turati wrote,* "lies in the chaotic state of our social structure, in the unequal distribution of property, in the antagonism between classes, in the ignorance and poverty of those living in the lower depths. The shameless contrast between the idleness of the rich and the crushing labor of the poor are fatal stimuli to crime.... No one in the lower strata of society is today safe from the nightmare of criminality; no one has the certainty that his near ones, that his children, that he himself may not end his days in a convict's cell."

* F. Turati. *Il Delitto e Questione Sociale*, Milano, 1883.

And again:

"Crime today is the sad privilege of the poor.... On the other hand when the present order of society will be changed, when every man will be safeguarded against hunger, when the needs of his soul will have been provided for as well as the needs of his body, crime will disappear and the danger of having a criminal son will be as remote and improbable as is the danger of having a child born with two heads or with one arm.... Change the foundations of the social order and crime will be at once reduced by two-thirds. There will then remain only crimes of sudden passion or else of outright degeneracy to consider."

THE Soviet government unreservedly subscribes to this deterministic view and has made it the cornerstone of its penal policies and practice. A prison sentence in the Soviet republic is the beginning of the state's interest in the offender. Imprisonment in Russia is for a twofold purpose. First, of course, it is a measure of social defence aimed to safeguard the public from the "dangerous state of mind of the individual (criminal)." The second aim is to put the criminal in the way of such educational, cultural and economic advantages as will restore him to normal industrial society a changed, reformed man in as short a time as possible. Within limits the boast of the Soviet authorities that they have transformed the prisons of the country into educational institutions is true. The pris-

oner has his whole life recut and reshaped during his period of confinement. He gets a complete overhauling physically, mentally and psychically. His emotions are drained of past bitterness and disappointments and attuned to a course of labor and peace with his fellows, with the world.

If the socialist philosophy with its ultimate ideal for the complete elimination of crime (with the exception of the insane or the degenerate) and the abolition of all punishment is at the foundation of the Soviet penal system, its immediate practices are none the less most rigidly determined by the demands and dictates of the revolutionary régime now holding sway. The first duty of the law, it is made clear in the opening paragraph of the Criminal Code, is toward the state apparatus, to "defend the socialist government of the workers and peasants" from all socially dangerous persons and actions. What comes first on the list of crime in other countries—crimes against life and property—comes last in the Soviet Union, partly because very many forms of private property have been abolished by the Soviet régime, but chiefly because of the new Soviet ideology toward crime.

Just as in its ethical code the Soviet order places its strongest emphasis on social morality and considers, for example, a man's loyalty to the Five Year Plan, or to a similarly important government project, of infinitely greater moral weight than his constancy in sex and family relations, the criminal laws in the Soviet

Union put crimes against the social order above all other categories of offence.

To make the country safe for the socialist experiment which the Kremlin leaders are carrying on is the chief aim of the Soviet criminal code. Against those interfering or attempting to interfere with the plans and programmes of the Communist party, which is the government of Russia, the Soviet code knows no limit to its severity. Thus capital punishment is personally condemned by all Communist leaders; they consider its application barbarous and degrading. Yet they employ the death penalty against their political enemies, against their own comrades, and even against parent or brother, when the latter have proved themselves dangerous opponents of the Communist régime. When dealing with "enemies of the revolution" they declare capital punishment to be a necessary "temporary measure." In the same spirit they resort to the so-called class approach in the treatment of political prisoners assigned to the various penal colonies and institutions.

The liberality, consideration and even sympathy which the Soviet government lavishes upon the thief, the robber, the murderer, if he comes from the formerly downtrodden classes, do not extend to "class offenders." The man serving a sentence for "speculation" which is another term for private trading, the "kulak," or rich peasant who has resisted the government's collectivization policy, the intellectual who has been derelict in the performance of his professional

duties, the engineer who has been adjudged guilty of sabotage—these are subject to much harsher treatment than the common variety of prisoners. Their offences come under the head of counter-revolution. Equality before the law in their case would be regarded as a travesty upon the "class justice" which the Proletarian Dictatorship is pledged to uphold.

The opportunities granted ordinary prisoners for lightening their confinement and for ultimately shortening their sentence are, for the most part, denied these men. Imprisonment in their case is aimed not at correction, but at suppression. N. V. Krylenko, the famous Soviet prosecutor who has recently been made People's Commissar of Justice, is decided in his views that "class enemies" cannot be corrected, that it is too much to expect the more aggressive elements from among the former ruling classes to experience a genuine change of heart toward the Soviet régime which was responsible for their economic and social ruin. It is insisted therefore that their confinement or exile be attended with such rigid privations and exclusions as will utterly destroy their effectiveness as a force opposing the Soviet régime when they finally have regained their freedom.

A change in government policy minimizing and sometimes totally nullifying the offences for which certain categories of so-called politicals have been convicted is one of the means such prisoners have of attaining their freedom before the expiration of their

maximum sentence. And in the present experimental stage of Soviet economic policies such changes are not infrequent. Another means is government amnesty which is likewise granted at frequent intervals. There is also a third means by which, however, only a very limited group of political offenders may hope for commutation or lightening of sentence.

If a political prisoner, or a group of political prisoners happen to be experts in their profession or calling, their prison stay is likely to be made as light as possible in return for their faithful services to the government in their special branch of knowledge or technique. Such was the case with Professor L. K. Ramzin whose death sentence was commuted to imprisonment because he was the greatest technological authority along certain lines in Russia and the Soviet government was loath to deprive itself of his services by letting the death sentence stand. A number of other scientists and experts who have been tried and convicted on counter revolutionary charges similarly have had their lives spared in return for their promise to serve the government faithfully in the future.

With the changed classification of crime, making offences against the rising Soviet order paramount and crimes against persons and property secondary, the following basic procedure, corresponding to the new classification, has been adopted for the enforcement of the Soviet criminal statutes:

I. Suppression of class enemies who are trying to

reestablish the old order and to injure the socialist state in the process of construction.

II. To prevent further harmful actions by persons belonging to the obviously "declassed" elements who have committed socially dangerous acts.

III. To adapt the less stable elements from among the workers themselves, who have committed socially dangerous acts, to the discipline common to all workers through the application of corrective-labor influences upon them.

The lay meaning and application of the above legal provisions, for all practical purposes, may be summed up as follows:

The adaptation of the common or accidental criminal, of the man who stole to eat, to a life of labor and responsibility is the first concern of the Soviet criminal and corrective labor codes. For offenders falling into the category of the "less stable elements from among the workers themselves" isolation, which is the Soviet's newer term for imprisonment, has become almost nominal. After a brief, probationary period in the district prison the common criminal is despatched to an agricultural camp or colony where the penal authorities promptly set to work to rehabilitate him.

With the more deep-seated offenders against the new social order, with members of the former upper classes, with former merchants who have now become "nepmen" or "speculators," with habitual criminals or recidivists, a stricter regimen of "isolation" is em-

ployed in accord with the "class dictates" of the Soviet Criminal code.

Toward the active plotters against the Soviet régime, whether former monarchists whose hatred of the Bolsheviks has become pathological, or socialists who harass the communist régime from motives of conviction, or plain bandits who are so corroded with crime that their reform seems utterly unlikely—toward these the Soviet code employs the "highest measure of safety," the death penalty.

- c) Factory-prisons for those who must serve at least part of their sentence "in strict isolation."
- d) Closed prisons for those awaiting trial.

The agricultural prison colonies, which are the type of institutions chosen by the Soviet government ultimately to replace all other types of prisons, are of two classes, deviating but slightly from each other. One is the agricultural colony, the other the so-called agricultural farm. The agricultural colony is an all around agricultural commune. It is a collectivized village whose population is composed exclusively of prisoners. It has its own machine and blacksmith shops, its own tractor station, its own corps of instructors and mechanics. It has its own social and educational life, its own theater and theatrical performers. The agricultural farm is a much smaller, less well-rounded institution. It has fewer inmates and smaller means. Neither of the institutions is connected with inclosed prisons of any sort. They represent the new Marxian régime in Soviet penology.

Besides these two types of agricultural prison communes there is still another, less extensive type, the prison farm. This is a stretch of land in the nearby country which has been assigned to an inclosed city prison. It serves a twofold purpose. It helps to make the prison self-sustaining by making it possible for the inmates to raise most of their food supply and it gives the prisoners, whose lot or sentence it is to serve

their time in an inclosed institution, an opportunity for periodic work in the open air.

The inclosed prisons, with the exception of those reserved for the "isolation" of class enemies while they are awaiting disposition by the courts, or for temporary detention of other categories of prisoners, have been very widely converted into factories. The industrialization of Soviet prisons is guided by what the Kremlin terms its "revolutionary utilitarianism." In other words the man in prison is made to serve the state's programme fully as much as the man on the outside. The industries developed in the prisons have been harnessed to the five year plans to the same degree that all other industries are.

Thus the 3000 inmates of the Lianozovo-Kriukovsk factory-prison on the outskirts of Moscow, in a single summer produced 30,000,000 bricks which the government utilized in its vast construction projects. Prisoners with any sort of industrial or mechanical training are required to perfect themselves in their special occupation under competent instructors. They are then organized into "artels" or gangs and sent away to work hundreds and sometimes thousands of miles distant from their original place of detention. They live in open-air camps in the summer and in hastily constructed barracks in the winter. It is from among this class of prisoners that the government recruits large portions of its section hands, of its bridge and road builders, of its lumber workers, the

laborers in peat fields and a large variety of other skilled and unskilled toilers.

JUST as the Five Year Plan stimulated the rapid transformation of the country's prisons into factories, the government's collectivization programme gave the movement of the prisoner to the land its real impetus. A programme for the establishment of open-air communes for prisoners was adopted by the Bolshevik leaders shortly after they came into power. In 1919 the first of these prison colonies were established. It was not, however, until 1929, the opening year of the Five Year Plan and of Stalin's first collectivization drive, that the movement gained its present stride and significance.

By a peculiar twist of domestic policy the Soviet government decided to utilize the collectivized colonies of prisoners as an argument for collectivization generally. It supplied these prison communes therefore with the very latest machinery and with expert mechanics to operate them. Trained agronomists decided on the crops to be planted. Expert stockmen looked after the cattle raising. In a short time these prison farms were turned into experimental stations for the peasantry. From these prison communes the peasants now received their best seed grain and the young stock from which to raise a higher grade of cattle. The government thus impressed upon the peasantry of each given district the benefits of collectivization, its supe-

riority to the individual manner of tilling the soil.

While removing the prejudice against collectivization the government also drove home to the peasantry its new prison ideals and policies. The masses are made to see that there is no real gulf between themselves and the man in prison and that the government does not consider him "inferior" or the victim of an "evil spirit," but rather as a man who had been wronged by circumstances. The commingling of the prisoner with the free peasants in itself promotes the government's penal aim of curing the criminal by keeping him as close to free, normal life as is consistent with the limitations of his position as a man who had taken the law into his own hands and therefore has to be made aware of this and corrected for the future.

Even the bare dimensional description of some of these prison colonies gives a fairly good indication of what their social and mental impact is both upon the criminal and upon the free population that comes in touch with them. The communes here described are located in widely scattered parts of the Soviet Empire:

Agricultural Prison Commune "Volia" (Freedom) in the Province of Gomel has 299 desiatins of land (a desiatin is 2.70 acres). Of this land 163 desiatins is tilled, 45 desiatins is pasture land and 75 desiatins is composed of garden land. The colony has its own flour mill, lumber works. It has a tractor and an electric station. Total number of prisoners employed is 170. The government's sustaining fund to this com-

mune in 1925 was 7,600 rubles. Income 28,847 rubles. Expense 27,759 rubles.

Agricultural Prison Commune "Krasnaya Poliana," Province of Kursk, has 821 desiatins of land. Of this number 721 desiatins are arable. It has sixty heads of work-cattle. It has a leather factory, a brick factory, three tractors. This colony is self-sustaining. Number of prisoners is slightly more than 100. Income 49,013 rubles. Expense 43,625 rubles.

First Leningrad Agricultural Prison Colony "Znamenka" has 330 desiatins of land. It has 53 heads of work-cattle and a large gardening enterprise. An electric station is operated in connection with this commune. It has one tractor. The number of prisoners employed is slightly more than 750. In 1925 the government subsidy amounted to 19,180 rubles. Wholesale turnover of the commune: Income 63,188 rubles. Expense 35,501 rubles.

Tagansky Agricultural Colony operated in connection with the famous Tagansky prison in Moscow has 1,083 desiatins of land of which 325 desiatins are cultivable and 17 desiatins are planted in gardens. The commune has 62 horses, 103 cows, 40 pigs. It has a mill, an automobile, a tractor. The number of prisoners employed is slightly more than 200. Government subsidy to the commune in 1925 was 20,340 rubles. Income 65,412 rubles. Expense 52,467.

First Novgorod United Agricultural Prison Commune has 1,780 desiatins of land of which 191

desiatins are arable. The commune has 45 horses, 138 cows, 57 pigs. It has two electric stations, three mills, two leather factories, one tractor. Total number of prisoners employed is 350. Colony is self-sustaining. Income 51,628 rubles. Expense 43,288 rubles.

Sovkhoz Number 25, Province of Omsk (Siberia) has 498 desiatins of land, 48 horses, 74 cows, 40 pigs, 104 sheep. There is a brick factory on the premises and a flour mill. The total number of prisoners is 80. The colony is self-sustaining. Income 37,181 rubles. Expense 33,753.

Soviet judges in their sentences merely state that the individual is to be deprived of his freedom for a certain length of time. They do not specify the institution at which the sentence is to be served. This is determined by a Distribution Commission, consisting of members of the court, of representatives of the local welfare body and of the Peasants' and Workers' Inspection Committee, operating directly under the Corrective Labor authorities. An Observation Commission consisting of the prison director, of the judge and of a representative of the Trade Unions receives complaints from among the prisoners and among other things facilitates the transfer of a prisoner from one type of institution to another, if it can be shown that this will be of benefit both to the offender and to the community.

To the agricultural prison communes the government sends in the first instance prisoners who have

received a sentence of not more than five years, in whose case it has been established "that they belong to the working class and that they have committed the crime for one of the following reasons: Either through ignorance, accidentally, or else as the result of the difficult material conditions under which they lived." All such prisoners must be first offenders and must satisfy the court "that they will not attempt to escape." The types of crime for which a prisoner may be sent to the open-air colonies are murder or attempted murder; other crimes against the person; crimes against property; crimes against the established order; crimes connected with one's occupation or position; military crimes.

ALL places of confinement in the Soviet Union—indoor as well as open-air camps and colonies—operate under the so-called "progressive system." The name is, of course, taken from the progressive system long in operation in the prisons of England and Ireland, whose primary objective was to limit and humanize the system of solitary confinement. The Soviet system, however, far outstrips the progressive system of these countries and the Russian prisoner starts with many of the privileges which the prisoner in Western Europe gains, if at all, only after serving a considerable portion of the sentence originally imposed.

The essence of the progressive system as practiced

in Soviet penal institutions is that the prisoner must not remain under the same rules and conditions too long. As soon as he shows improvement his discipline is made lighter. He is given opportunity to display his independence and initiative. His routine and habits are made to conform as much as possible to the routine and habits of free citizens and the degree of isolation from the rest of the world becomes perceptibly smaller. In a very literal sense the prisoner in the Soviet Union, by means of the progressive system, determines not only the length of his sentence, but the conditions under which he is to serve it. He very largely makes his own prison régime.

In consequence of the progressive system prisoners who start in as inmates of indoor and even of isolation prisons may soon win their way to one of these open-air colonies. If the authorities are convinced that such a prisoner has actually lost or outgrown the proclivities which made him "socially dangerous" they will recommend his transfer. Prisoners who have received a sentence of more than five years, but who have already served a part of it and who have no more than five years of the original sentence left, may gain transfer to the open-air prison colonies by applying to the Distribution Commission. There are even certain categories of "class offenders" who, when mitigating circumstances with regard to the character of their crime or their person have arisen, may win transfer to the open-air communes.

There is one class of prisoners that receives priority over all other classes in the matter of assignment to these open-air labor colonies—the prisoners with a tendency to tuberculosis. These automatically go to these communes. Prisoners suffering from malnutrition are also directed here, because the food in the colonies is better and more plentiful. Besides the atmosphere generally is more agreeable to the man of peasant origin and bringing up and since Russia is very largely a peasant country its prison population is preponderantly peasant, 65 per cent to be exact, in spite of the veneer of city life and factory civilization which many of the men under confinement display.

The discipline prevailing in these agricultural colonies is exceedingly mild. The Corrective Labor Code of the Soviet Union prescribes for these colonies a régime which "must approximate the conditions of work and life that obtain in corresponding organizations for free citizens." Prisoners have the same industrial code as do the workers on the outside. They have an eight-hour day. They work four days and rest on the fifth. They are entitled to receive wages for such work and may sue for such wages. They share in the benefits of the Soviet insurance system the same as do all other workers. They enjoy, of course, the previously mentioned right to smoke. They may subscribe to as many newspapers and periodicals as they wish or can afford. They may receive food packages with which to supplement their food rations. On the

premises of the Commune the inmates move about freely and they can be sent out on errands beyond the limits of these colonies unaccompanied. They have the right to private appointments with friends. In appearance these prison colonies look no different from all other farming collectives. There are no fences about them, no armed guards at the gates. There is no lock on any of the buildings and the dormitories of the prisoners are kept open day and night.

Escapes have occurred, but only in the case of professional criminals who have been admitted to the colonies without sufficient investigation as to their recidivist tendencies, or because of a sentimental regard for their proletarian origin and their early privations. The fear of losing his prison credits and delaying his release from confinement is sufficient to keep the average accidental or casual criminal from attempting to escape. From time to time "false escapes" occur. Thus a young prisoner will steal away after the evening roll call to the nearby village for a visit with his sweetheart and may not return till after roll call the next morning. Elderly prisoners, too, were known to overstay the legal limit after a clandestine visit to a wine shop where they had a few drinks too many. A warning by the authorities or a trial by the "court of comrades" of the colony is usually sufficient to put a stop to these irregularities.

Statistics with regard to these agricultural prison communes are very desultory and incomplete. The

Crimes in which the motive of gain enters.

Crimes of a recidivist character.

On the basis of the above classifications criminals are then divided into the following general categories:

First Category: Criminals from among the non-productive elements of the population, who have been sentenced to imprisonment with strict isolation and who have committed the crime of which they were found guilty in consequence of their caste habits and interests, as well as criminals from among the working class who are considered a special danger to the republic.

Second Category: Professional criminals, that is all those who have made crime their occupation and who have become unused to honest labor; also criminals from among the non-productive elements who were not condemned to strict isolation, but who have committed their crimes in consequence of their class views, interests and habits.

Third Category: All other classes of offenders, that is workers who are not professional criminals and who have been sentenced to imprisonment without strict isolation, or those who, though they have been sentenced to imprisonment with strict isolation, are nevertheless not considered either by the courts or by the Distribution Committees as constituting a special danger to the republic. Finally all other non-professional criminals, even if they spring from among the non-productive elements, who have committed their

crimes not in consequence of their class habits or interests and who are not considered a danger to the republic.

The first category has in the past year or two become practically obsolete since Soviet criminal authorities have decided that strict isolation, even in modified form, violates both the letter and the spirit of the Soviet criminal code which provides that "punishment ought to serve an object and at the same time must be devoid of all martyrdom and must not cause the prisoner unnecessary suffering and pain." Strict isolation is now reserved almost exclusively for prisoners charged with counter-revolutionary offences against the Soviet government and the Soviet social order. The two other categories remain in full force.

THE criminal's road back to freedom starts from the moment that he has become part of the prison routine. It takes the shape of a ladder, necessitating an upward climb on the part of the criminal both in the matter of character and training. Prisoners are subdivided into three groups—beginners, intermediary and highest. As the prisoner goes up the scale the difference between prison routine and life on the outside decreases. His rights become numerous while his duties decline. The prisoner's chances to go free before the expiration of his term increase materially.

It is in connection with the distribution of prisoners among the various prison groups that their previous

classification into "categories" assumes importance. The class origin of the criminal determines to a not inconsiderable extent the rapidity with which he is allowed to climb the ladder leading to the outside world and freedom.

Prisoners falling into the third or last category, who are obviously of proletarian origin and cannot be suspected of a deep-seated hatred for the new social order, are shown greater leniency and tolerance and are speeded up on their march toward freedom. At the discretion of the prison heads and of the Distribution Commission they may from the start be assigned to the intermediary and even in the highest group, thus gaining at once the rights, privileges and preference for release which other prisoners can acquire only by model conduct and faithful work over a stated period. For prisoners of the first and second categories enrollment in the beginners' group is mandatory. Members of the first category remain in the beginners' group until they have served half of their sentence, while members of the second category have their stay in the beginners' group reduced to only one-fourth of their sentence. When a prisoner of the third or proletarian category has been placed in the beginners' group he cannot be kept there longer than one-quarter of his sentence.

According to the group they are in prisoners are granted privileges as follows:

In the beginners' group prisoners are permitted to

see their relatives and friends once in ten days. They may receive food packages once a week and may call for a third of their salary with which to buy themselves clothes or to improve their diet. Prisoners in this class are not permitted any vacations which would entitle them to leave the prison premises.

In the intermediary group prisoners may receive friends and visitors every five days. They may receive food packages with the same frequency. They are entitled to two-thirds of their wages to spend on themselves or as they see fit. Prisoners in this group may absent themselves from prison for seven days each year.

Prisoners in the highest group may receive visitors twice every five days. They are entitled to fourteen days' leave of absence from prison. They may demand three-fourths of their pay to spend on themselves. They have the right to privacy when they receive visitors and do not need to talk to them across a barrier. They have the right to appeal to the Parole Board for their conditional release from prison on the strength of their model conduct and also by virtue of having served half their allotted sentence.

Political expediency—the desire to impress upon the workers that they are the ruling class and that all other classes of citizens are subordinate to the proletariat—dictates the rigid class approach toward these prisoners which the above gradations imply. In practice, however, the severity of the régime is mitigated

by the prison authorities and particularly by the observation commissions assigned to all prisons with power to revise and modify all sentences and their application.

The tendency "to bait the bourgeoisie" out of sheer revenge for its privileged standing in the past, which was much in evidence in the early stages of Bolshevik rule, is dying out now that the Soviet government feels itself safely intrenched and an attempt is made to broaden justice, in and out of prisons, to the needs of all classes. Prisoners of proletarian origin, but who are thoroughly depraved, are unceremoniously consigned to the beginners' group. On the other hand, prisoners "from among the classes foreign to the proletariat," but whose crimes were not of a class nature, are frequently advanced by the observation commissions to a higher grouping, if such reclassification serves the interests of the prison or the state in the same measure as it serves the interests of the prisoner.

Prisoners condemned to "strict isolation" are governed by a harsher code. They are kept either in the special prisons reserved for counter-revolutionary offenders or else in the special "political divisions" set aside for such offenders in ordinary prisons. Offenders of this character are not permitted to leave the prison grounds. They cannot be assigned to outdoor work and visitors who come to see them must speak to them through a screen. They are entitled to receive only one food package in two weeks. One or all of these privi-

leges may be taken from them for insubordination. Theoretically, at any rate, the prisoners falling in this classification are denied the right of parole after they have served half of their sentence and must continue to serve it to the end.

by the prison authorities and particularly by the observation commissions assigned to all prisons with power to revise and modify all sentences and their application.

The tendency "to bait the bourgeoisie" out of sheer revenge for its privileged standing in the past, which was much in evidence in the early stages of Bolshevik rule, is dying out now that the Soviet government feels itself safely entrenched and an attempt is made to broaden justice, in and out of prisons, to the needs of all classes. Prisoners of proletarian origin, but who are thoroughly depraved, are unceremoniously consigned to the beginners' group. On the other hand, prisoners "from among the classes foreign to the proletariat," but whose crimes were not of a class nature, are frequently advanced by the observation commissions to a higher grouping, if such reclassification serves the interests of the prison or the state in the same measure as it serves the interests of the prisoner.

Prisoners condemned to "strict isolation" are governed by a harsher code. They are kept either in the special prisons reserved for counter-revolutionary offenders or else in the special "political divisions" set aside for such offenders in ordinary prisons. Offenders of this character are not permitted to leave the prison grounds. They cannot be assigned to outdoor work and visitors who come to see them must speak to them through a screen. They are entitled to receive only one food package in two weeks. One or all of these privi-

leges may be taken from them for insubordination. Theoretically, at any rate, the prisoners falling in this classification are denied the right of parole after they have served half of their sentence and must continue to serve it to the end.

THE DRAMA OF REGENERATION

I WAS looking for the Lefortov prison on the eastern edge of Moscow, the historic *Lefortovskaya tiurma*, which has been known with horror from one end of the Russian empire to the other under a long succession of Romanov Czars. For generations it has had its tragic uses. It has been an army fortress and has served as a place of confinement and execution for the most dreaded foes of the monarchy: nihilists and conspirators who sprang from the military caste, from the ranks of the nobility and from circles near or related to the royal house. During the World War, toward the end of the old régime, high officers from all fronts, charged with neglect, mutiny and treason, were gathered at Lefortov, there in the walled-in and maddeningly noiseless cells, known as "iron bags," to await a hearing, a court-martial and death by the firing squad.

A cross in the prison yard marks the place at the foot of the high stone wall where the condemned were stood up to be shot in the presence of as many of their fellow prisoners as cared to look on. The Soviet gov-

ernment has changed the Lefortov penitentiary into a model prison. With four other institutions, joined under a single administration, Lefortov has become an experimental station in the Soviet's new system of coping with the age-old problem of crime and punishment. The other four institutions are a 5,000-acre farm, named Ushino, used as an open-air prison; the Novinsky penitentiary for women; the Juvenile Reformatory and Factory-School; and the "Express," a factory which serves as a sort of graduate school where discharged convicts perfect themselves in the trades which they have learned in prison, before being sent out to compete for jobs in the open market.

The "Express" has another important use. It takes care of the family of the convicted man during his term in prison, giving its members employment and paying them living wages.

The conductor at the end of the car line vaguely indicated the direction in which the prison was to be found. I had been walking for fifteen minutes without catching a glimpse of it. I looked around for some one to direct me. A man was coming up behind me at a brisk pace. I asked if he knew where the prison was located.

"I am looking for it myself," the man answered. We walked side by side.

"Going to visit some one?" I inquired.

"No, I am a prisoner," the man replied.

He was dressed like a mechanic and his appearance

was not like that of a man who was kept in confinement. I remarked to that effect.

"But I am not kept in confinement," he explained. "I am an inmate of the prison farm 60 versts from here."

Briefly he outlined his case.

He had been a railroad worker and was given a three-year sentence for negligence, or worse, in connection with a railroad accident. As he was a machinist and the government does not like to lose the services of trained men, he was sent to the farm and assigned to the tractor squad, where he was now holding the position of assistant mechanic. Something had gone wrong with a tractor that morning and as he knew exactly what parts were necessary to repair the machine, he was told to go to the Lefortov prison, which is the headquarters for all the institutions connected with it, and obtain the necessary parts. He had been to the prison only once before and that was why he himself was not sure of its location.

"Aren't the authorities afraid that you will run away?" I asked.

"Why should I run away?" the man spoke reflectively. "I am not treated badly. My family visits me every five days and once a month I go home for a day. Besides I get credit for good conduct and more credit for proficient work. With these credits I ought to be able to finish my three-year sentence in a year and a half. I have already served nearly six months of it. In

another year I will be free. It is better to serve out the sentence than to run away and become an outlaw for life, for without a proper document you can never get a job, at any rate not a decent job."

A small grove through which we were passing ended abruptly and the outline of the huge red prison building came into view. We approached it quickly. My companion reported to the military guard who directed him to a machine shop with no more concern than he would if the man were an ordinary visitor on a business errand.

THE pre-revolutionary prisons have left a "gloomy remembrance" with the Russian people which the Soviet authorities are most careful not to permit the new penal institutions to duplicate. This, in combination with the wide system of self-government, fostered by the Soviet correctional institutions as a part of the reeducation of the criminal for normal social and communal life, makes the task of maintaining discipline among Soviet prisoners one of great delicacy and diplomacy.

Prison attendants in the Soviet Union operate under strict military law. In case of urgency they have not only the right but the duty to enforce order by every means at their command. Yet they are most seriously cautioned against resorting lightly or inadvertently to any measure of force or punishment that might be construed as oppressive, caste-like and therefore as

reminiscent of the old order. The law schools of the country have for a number of years been conducting courses in the Marxist methods of combating crime and rehabilitating criminals as these are practiced in the Soviet penal institutions. More recently the Institute of Administrative Training in Moscow has established a separate faculty of penitentiary sciences whose students are drawn exclusively from among the directors and chiefs of prisons, of prison colonies and of prison labor camps.

For the lower grade prison attendants, the Commissariat of the Interior, which until recently has had charge of all correctional institutions, has issued a handbook entitled "What the Prison Personnel Should Know." In simple language, such as a man who has had only three or four grades in the public schools would understand, the booklet attempts to strike a balance between the strict revolutionary discipline demanded by the dictatorial programme of the government and the visions of a "socialist future" in which there will be neither crime nor prisons, which the Russian people have come more or less to accept and to expect. The instructions of the Commissariat of the Interior build a veritable wall around the rights and privileges of the prisoner which no prison attendant can break down with impunity.

"The Soviet government," the prison personnel is instructed in this handbook, "cannot look upon the criminal as upon an enemy who is to be subdued or as

upon a sinner who must be brought around to a state of penitence by means of humiliating punishment. . . . It does not believe in the theory of 'bad will' as a causative factor in crime, nor does it call for the 'bridling' of this so-called bad will by means of such punishment as will remain in the criminal's mind forever. . . . The purpose of imprisonment in the Soviet Union is not to cause pain to the man who has been sentenced, but to reeducate him, to draw him away from the bad habits and degenerating associations that were responsible for his fall and to train him in other, healthy habits, in habits of labor and of usefulness to society.

"It has been repeatedly shown," the handbook continues, "that men who have been condemned as criminals have committed the wrongful acts of which they were charged in consequence of their neglected education, of their poor upbringing and of their hard and cheerless life. . . . Experience has demonstrated that the rise and fall of crime stand in close ratio to the material conditions of life. Hopeless poverty, dingy, sunless habitations, the want of adequate educational opportunities will often compel a man of excellent predispositions to become a criminal. . . . Among the Russian peasantry especially is there a great deal of darkness, illiteracy and superstition. . . . Prison attendants should act as older brothers to such prisoners."

And again:

"Prison attendants must not look upon themselves

as jailers but as older comrades of the prisoners. They should not employ coarse or insulting language, but should, on the contrary, set an example to the prisoners by their speech and conduct. They should at all times act with calmness, with restraint and impartiality. . . . Prisoners should not be exposed to pain and suffering. They should not be handcuffed or be made to wear chains of any sort. They should not be deprived of food or thrown into solitary confinement. Corporal punishment in any form is forbidden and attendants violating this rule should at once be handed over to the authorities for trial."

Grafting on prisoners is a crime of first magnitude. By destroying the prisoner's confidence in the employés of the state, his confidence in the state itself, in the Soviet régime, is destroyed or at least impaired. Prison attendants are categorically forbidden "to enter into any kind of a transaction with the prisoner. They are forbidden to receive presents from inmates or to avail themselves of the prisoner's labor or services for personal use."

The emphasis against causing suffering to the prisoner, or making a martyr of him has resulted in a system of disciplining prisoners which consists of a withdrawal of privileges already earned by them rather than in the application of any measure that might result in detrimental physical or psychic effects. The commonest measure of discipline applied to the inmate is a reprimand administered by the director of the prison

or some one else in authority. If the offence is not very aggravating the prisoner is called into the office and the rebuke is administered privately. In more serious cases the prisoner is reprimanded publicly, so that he may be made aware of the disapproval of his fellows. When these milder forms of discipline fail to produce the desired effect, the prisoner may be subjected to one or all of the following types of punishment:

1. He may be denied the right to have visitors for a period not exceeding one month.

2. His right to receive newspapers, periodicals and similar articles may be limited or denied for a period not exceeding one month.

3. He may be denied the right to receive food packages during a period not exceeding one month.

4. The prison authorities have the right to refuse to let him spend more than one-quarter of the money he has earned while in prison, thus limiting his purchases from the prison store.

5. Isolation may be applied to him. He may be placed in an individual cell for a period not exceeding fourteen days. The cell, however, must not be of the type known as a solitary cell. It must have light and must be provided with a bed. The prisoner has the right to 30 minutes a day for exercise and warm meals must be served to him the same as to all other prisoners.

A more serious form of punishment for obstreperous or malevolent prisoners is demotion to a lower group

which automatically reduces the distance between the man in prison and the free world outside. Prisoners who border on the recidivist or incorrigible type may be transferred to prisons in more distant parts of the country, where the climate is more severe and conditions more primitive. Violent prisoners may have the so-called restraining belt applied to them. This, however, is not a measure of punishment, but of precaution. As soon as the director of the prison has ordered an inmate into a restraining belt—and such order can be issued only by the director or some one equally high in authority—a physician must be called and the prisoner be given a complete physical and mental examination.

The application of any or all of these disciplinary measures is by no means a simple matter under the Soviet Corrective-Labor Code. Officials resorting to such matters lightly and without sufficient provocation lay themselves open to severe penalties. A written account must be given by the prison director detailing his reasons for the application of disciplinary measures. The Observation Commission attached to each prison has the right to reverse the judgment of the prison director in such matters and order a milder punishment for the inmate or declare all such punishment uncalled for and unnecessary. The separate Soviet republics, too, have special provisions which are added to the general code. In some of these republics the prison authorities are denied the right to limit the prisoner

in his purchasing privileges, considering that such a step might permanently impair his health. Food conditions are not particularly rosy in the Soviet Union generally and are even worse in prison. Some of the republics forbid the keeping of a criminal in an individual cell for isolation purposes more than seven days.

There is a large group of offences by prisoners which authorities leave to be settled in the "Courts of Comrades" maintained by the prisoners themselves. These courts first came into vogue in 1929 in a number of the more progressive penal institutions. Today there is not a prison in the Soviet Union that does not have such a Comrades' Court.

THE prisoner's right to complain against officials is jealously guarded by the Soviet correctional code. One of the festering wrongs of the Czarist prisons was the circumstance that any complaint against the authorities was viewed in the light of insubordination and as an incitement to rebellion. The Soviet government welcomes any suggestion from prisoners which may result in some sort of benefit to the institution in question.

A handbook entitled "What Every Prisoner Should Know" and likewise issued by the Commissariat of the Interior, outlines the methods by which a prisoner may gain relief from unjust treatment by his immediate superiors. He may make a complaint against any one connected with the prison administration and feel certain that the complaint will receive the fullest and

most sympathetic attention of the government department to which it is addressed. All complaints made by prisoners against superiors are entered into a special volume in the Director's office giving the date when the complaint was filed. The complaint with all attendant information about the prisoner making it must be forwarded by the prison authorities to the government department addressed not later than three days after the filing of the complaint. The prisoner is given a receipt for his communication properly numbered and attested, so that he can refer to it in subsequent communications. Friends and relatives of the inmate making such complaint have the right to make inquiries regarding the matter and to help speed the answer to the prisoner's plea.

The Soviet government considers that in the matter of making the prisoner articulate it has gone ahead of every other country in the world. It therefore demands of the prisoner, in view of the opportunities he has for fearlessly asserting his rights in legal and orderly form, that he refrain from committing any disturbances in prison in order to call attention to real or fancied wrongs. The calling of hunger strikes and the raising of riots or near riots may bring dire consequences in their wake. "The only way for the prisoner to conserve his rights is to present an orderly complaint."

Following are among the more frequent complaints made by Soviet prisoners against the prison authorities and personnel:

1. Incorrect assignment to one or another of the class categories.

2. Inadequate promotion or failure to promote the criminal from a lower to a higher group, which correspondingly raises his privileges and his credits toward an abridged or suspended sentence.

3. The incorrect or unjustified application of disciplinary measures upon the criminal.

4. Illegal or unwarranted denial of attended (by an official) or unattended interviews with relatives and friends.

5. Assignment to improper work.

6. Illegal or uncalled for limiting of his rights to order newspapers and other reading matter.

7. Unjustified curtailment of the prisoner's right to spend his prison earnings for needed personal uses.

8. Refusal by the prison authorities to entertain the prisoner's complaint.

9. Coarse and improper conduct toward the prisoner by officials.

10. Failure by officials to live up to the Soviet correctional code and to the subsequent additions to it as prescribed in government circulars and instructions.

Regarding a number of other grievances the prisoners may apply to the Observation Commission assigned to each prison which has the power to adjust the grievances quickly and on the spot. The Observation Commission, in turn, also has not only the authority but the obligation to file complaints against the

prison personnel for mistakes, failures and injustices of the following character:

1. Improper distribution of prisoners among the various correctional institutions.

2. Failure by the prison authorities to pay proper heed to the recommendations and conclusions of the Observation Commission.

3. Failure by the prison authorities to carry out properly the orders and instructions of the ministry in charge of correction, of the state's attorney's office, of the workers' and peasants' inspection, of the labor inspection, and other obligatory rules and orders.

4. Failure by the prison administration to maintain proper sanitary and hygienic conditions in prisons.

5. Failure by the prison administration to substitute a lighter outdoor régime for the regular prison routine in the case of prisoners from among the working class whose class status calls for a milder form of imprisonment.

There are a number of other failures and irregularities by prison authorities that the Observation Commission is empowered to deal with in the interest of the prisoners and of the public.

The casual or accidental criminal learns early that an attempt to escape from prison will not serve his interest. At best it can only make of him a man without a country, for he will have to go on hiding his identity all through life. The average sentence of such a prisoner is only around three years. By strict application

to his job he may have two days' work counted for three days' residence in prison and his sentence is thus automatically reduced by nearly one-third. If the prisoner is of peasant origin and has maintained an unbroken connection with the soil he is granted a three months' leave of absence to go home and do his spring sowing and summer harvesting, and the time which he had spent behind the plow is counted as if he had spent it in prison.

As a matter of simple expediency it pays the criminal in the Soviet Union to serve out his sentence without fuss or trouble and to return to his community with his passport properly stamped and documented for work. He is a privileged person in so far as getting a job is concerned; the government sees to it that he is given work. His having served a sentence is, of course, no drawback to a man in Russia. In the first place the criminal is not looked upon as a predatory individual, but as the victim of conditions. And in the second place the government is the sole employer of labor and since the government has decreed that there can be no discrimination against a man with a prison past, there is none. The ex-convict need not fear a "whispering campaign" by his fellow employés. Any one trying to make an issue of another man's prison experience is subject to reprimand and fine and sometimes even to severer forms of punishment. The ex-prisoner, too, generally is better dressed than the average citizen who has never been behind the bars and that, too, is in his favor.

However, for the thoroughly depraved, reckless and unthinking criminal, who attempts to escape regardless of the fact that he has much to lose and nothing to gain from such action—for, to repeat, without a properly authenticated document no creditable enterprise in the Soviet Union will give him employment—the following penalties have been established:

Escape from prison by means of breaking open doors or gates, or digging one's way out from under walls, is punishable with imprisonment up to one year, which is added to the unexpired sentence.

If the escape has been attended by an act or acts of violence upon prison attendants or officials, the prisoner is tried for this act or acts on the same basis that he would have been tried if he were a free citizen on the outside. His crime is compared to the crime of any free citizen who places himself in opposition to the constituted authorities. The Soviet criminal code knows no such category of crimes "that can be committed only by prisoners." A man's sentence for a crime cannot be made heavier simply because he is already under sentence.

In other words the Soviet law does not punish the prisoner for attempting to escape, but only for the criminal act or acts which he has committed in connection with this attempt. Escaped convicts who have committed no criminal acts in connection with such escape, when apprehended and returned to prison merely lose their advanced standing, with the privi-

leges to which such standing had entitled them. They are given a beginners' rating for the second time. The convict having broken faith with the authorities, the officials, on their part, withdraw their confidence in him. Such a prisoner is not likely to be transferred to the open-air colonies or camps, where escape is made easy. The officials may refuse to credit him with three days' prison residence for every two days' work and thus materially lengthen his sentence. If he has stayed away from prison for any considerable time he must make up that time in prison.

Mass disorders, whether resulting from attempts to escape or from other causes, especially if the prisoners responsible for such disorders had been warned by the authorities, are punishable with imprisonment up to two years. If such disorders result in murder, arson, or in the infliction of severe bodily injuries, the death penalty may be applied. When faced with mass disorders of this nature the prison personnel has the right to draw weapons and to use them in self-defence.

MEN march to prison under the Soviet régime in the same approximate age ratio as in "capitalist countries." The preponderance of criminals in Russia are under thirty-five and their right to lead a normal love, sex and family life is not interfered with by their status as prisoners. The Soviet code grants every inmate of a correctional institution the right to marry

and the Soviet system of prison discipline makes it possible for him to lead a more or less sustained family life during his confinement.

In the first place the rule in Soviet courts is for the prisoner to serve his sentence in the county or district where he had been tried and sentenced, which means near his home and family. Prisoners who for special reasons are sent to prisons some distance away—this applies primarily to offenders convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes—may, at the expiration of certain conditions or limitations, ask for a transfer to a prison nearer their homes. The 14-day leave to which prisoners are entitled after a certain probationary period, affords them an opportunity to spend one day a month at home with their families. The system of open-air prison colonies and camps is an even greater aid to the prisoner in the matter of family life. As already mentioned, the wives of prisoners often move to the vicinity of the camp or colony where their husbands are detained and, with the easy discipline prevailing in these places, are able to see them almost daily. In a number of prisons inmates have the right to live with their visiting relations over a period of several days in special quarters set aside by the prison authorities for this purpose.

In the prisons of Sevastopol, Kursk, Belgorod, Uripursk, Saratov, Samara, Astrakhan, Nizhni-Novgorod, Oriol and a number of other cities, men and women prisoners, while having separate dormitories

for the night, work side by side during the day. They meet at the movies. They go for walks together. Frequently men and women prisoners arrange to take their days off or even longer vacations together. Nobody controls or censors their conduct so long as it does not verge on the indecent—when it becomes a matter for the “Court of Comrades” to take up and to mete out punishment. If they decide to get married while serving their prison sentence and to maintain a sort of a “love nest” in the vicinity of the prison colony on their days off, it is nobody’s affair. The authorities are not interested in such matters.

Needless to emphasize that having the right to marry the prisoner in the Soviet Union has also the right to divorce. The prisoner’s “family, marriage and parental rights” are authoritatively defined as follows:

1. “The right to contract marriage belongs to the prisoner in the same degree that it belongs to all free citizens. Nowhere in the Soviet code are there any indications pointing to exceptions for prisoners in the form of contracting marriages. Statute 54 of the Soviet Code with regard to acts of citizenship remains in force also for prisoners. Moreover in conformity with the decisions in the matter by the Chief Department for the Control of Prisons and of the People’s Commissariat of Justice, prisoners when registering their marriage have the right to change their names on condition that all particulars bearing on their trial

and police status are attested to on the court record both under the old and new names. The fact that a prisoner has entered a marriage relationship creates no material change in the régime to which he must continue to adhere. The contracting of a marriage by a person whose case is still under consideration by the courts must be consummated with the knowledge and sanction of the state's attorney and of the special police branch which has charge of the prisoner's case.

2. "The right to terminate marriage by means of divorce is, in like manner, retained by the prisoner. The prisoner has the right to demand that he be taken to court on the day when his divorce action is heard.

3. "The parental rights of the prisoner remain in full force during his confinement, even if in practice he is unable to exercise them fully. The fact that one of the parents is in prison does not free the other parent from the obligation to obtain from the imprisoned parent consent to all such measures to which, according to law, both parents must give their consent.

4. "The problem of guardianship over children of prisoners does not arise in consequence of the imprisonment of one of the parents, if the other, free parent is living. But where one parent is in prison and the other is dead the appointment of a guardian over minor children becomes mandatory under Statute 192 of the Code."

The war, the revolution, the civil wars which fol-

lowed both and finally the scourge of famine and disease which swept over vast areas of the Russian empire from 1918 to 1921 inclusive, left that country with a heritage of nearly six million "wild children," children, most of whom remembered neither their parents, their birthplace, nor their homes. The government proceeded to establish homes for large numbers of these "bezprizornie" or roofless children as the Russians refer to them occasionally with pity, but more often with dread. Millions of youngsters of both sexes have been salvaged in this manner. Others among these hordes of wandering children salvaged themselves. Having reached the age when they could work they fused with the industrial and farming population of the country and took leave of their roving past forever. Large numbers of these untaught and undisciplined youngsters inevitably followed the path of crime.

Juvenile criminality is today a far more serious problem in the Soviet Union than it is in any other country. What has been done by the Soviet authorities to counteract this problem is scientific, thorough and exceedingly worth while. But it is inadequate. Russian penologists are unanimous on that score.

There are seven institutions of a "medical-pedagogical" nature for the treatment of offenders between the ages of fourteen and eighteen in the whole of the Soviet empire at this writing. Two of these institutions, at Leningrad and Saratov, are especially adapted

to the needs of delinquents between sixteen and eighteen, the others are for boys between fourteen and sixteen. For juvenile offenders between eighteen and twenty room is made in ordinary prisons, though caution is exercised to make sure that these youthful offenders cannot mingle with the more vicious professional criminal or with recidivists. Children under fourteen are by law absolved from all criminal responsibility.

The mentally incapacitated persons who commit crimes, the psychopathic and insane criminals, whether their insanity is of a temporary nature or deep-seated, are promptly segregated from the general run of prisoners and placed in special hospitals, or in special wards set aside for such cases in the general hospitals. The law in their case is still more lenient and a man who has committed murder in a fit of temporary but genuine insanity is likely to go free when the government's medical experts certify that he has been cured and is normal once more. Criminals suffering from chronic ailments and incurables are sent to farm colonies especially limited to inmates of this type.

THE extent to which human nature is redeemable is poignantly dramatized by an experiment with the most predatory elements from among the homeless children which was undertaken by none other than the G. P. U., the dreaded Russian Secret Political Police.

In 1925 the G. P. U. requested the Soviet govern-

ment for a grant of land not far from Moscow to found a colony for homeless children. There was ample precedent for the request. Felix Dzersinsky, associate of Lenin and Trotsky in the revolution, who headed first the "Cheka" and subsequently the G. P. U., was also the chairman of the first commission organized in Russia to salvage the orphaned and homeless children. Under Dzersinsky's inspiration every member of the Government Political Bureau constituted himself as a sort of older brother to the "little street wolves" of the cities. The request for land was granted and, in addition to providing the colony with the necessary farm implements, several factories were established on the premises.

The doors of the Butirky prison, of the prisons of the Solovetsky Islands and elsewhere were thrown open to a thousand or more youngsters who had a record for theft of five years and over. They were told that they could become members of a free commune, where they could work the soil or learn a trade, as they saw fit. Every one of the boys availed himself of the offer to exchange his prison cell for the commune. More than 300 boys from the streets of Moscow, who heard of the commune, banded together and came knocking at the gate for admission. In June, 1931, after an existence of six years, the colony boasted of a membership of 1,598 inmates. Its "graduates" on that date numbered 163 full-fledged mechanics who had been admitted to trade unions.

The criminal record of 17 of these graduates was lifted and they have today the same standing in the eyes of the law as if they had never committed a crime and were never tried. Six of the graduates had decided upon a career in the army and were promptly admitted. The Communist party admitted into its ranks eleven of these former criminals, while the League of Communist Youth (Comsomol) granted membership to 105 of these "graduates."

The significance of these last figures lies in the fact that admission to the Communist party and its subsidiary organization, the Comsomol, is the equivalent of a patent of nobility in the Soviet Union and is granted only to men and youths of unimpeachable character and a high standard of social ethics.

A second G. P. U. colony was organized in October, 1927, also from among the street waifs of Moscow. It is located on the premises of the former Savinsky monastery, likewise a short distance from Moscow. This second colony has a membership of 1,500 boys and girls and claims to be equally successful in its efforts to "reeducate the youngsters to a life of honest toil." The Communist authorities point to both of these experiments as proof of the correctness of their "thesis," the Marxian thesis, that improper social conditions breed criminals and that a proper social environment will eliminate crime in the same manner as proper immunization eliminates disease.

SOVIET DYNAMICS OF CRIME

IN striking contrast to the situation in most countries, murder is not considered news in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Even the murder of a mother by her young son, if free from "social" or "class" complications, will not get past the Communist censor. Hence it is that the following incident, which occurred during the writer's stay in the Soviet Union, came to him from the lips of a prison official instead of through the Moscow newspapers.

A youth of seventeen, in a workingman's section of the Soviet capital, strangled his mother, placed her dead body in a closet, locked it and ran away. Nothing was heard of him for four months. Then he returned to his former home a free man. This is what had transpired with the boy from the time of his flight to the time of his return:

For three days and nights after the crime the boy roamed the streets of Moscow hungry, ragged and hysterical over his act. Then he gave himself up to the police. He made a full confession of his crime

laboratory buildings. The Serbsky Institute has seventeen distinct medical and psychiatric departments, each of which is presided over by a famous scientific and clinical authority. Its biochemical and psychologic laboratories are described as the most advanced institutions of the kind in the world.

The Institute has 130 beds and these are used by six to eight different groups of psychopathic criminals in the course of a year. The time required by the institute to establish the mental status of a patient is anywhere from two weeks to two and a half months. Unbalanced or pathologic offenders from every part of the Soviet Union are directed to the Institute for examination, treatment and a medical verdict which becomes their legal sentence. The group of scientists connected with the Institute in effect constitutes the highest court for all unbalanced and abnormal criminals, the legal authorities generally taking its recommendation without question. Under the Soviet criminal code, moreover, it is not possible for lawyers either for the defence or prosecution to delay or confuse the verdict of the experts.

A writer in the "Medical Worker" (Meditsinsky Rabotnik), a leading medical journal in the Soviet Union, recently described the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute as "a triumph of Soviet criminal justice over court procedure in every other country in Europe." Dr. Yevgeni Nikolayevich Dovbnia, Director of the Institute and Professor of Court Psychiatrics at the

First and Second Moscow Universities, upheld this viewpoint and elaborated on it.

"Under Soviet law," Director Dovbnia explained to the writer, "an individual is not punished for a crime which he committed when his physical and mental conditions were such that he could not know what he was doing. With us the sick offender is looked upon as a sick man first and as a criminal afterward. He has the status of a patient before and after his trial. He has the right to medical treatment and when he has been cured of his malady his legal status automatically changes. He is entitled to a shortening and even to a complete reversal of his sentence—if such sentence has already been passed upon him by a court in an outlying province, which cannot be expected to be as up to date in such matters as courts in the central part of the republic are."

In case of the abnormal or unbalanced criminal the Institute by its clinical and psychiatric researches seeks to establish the following basic facts: Did the criminal commit his offence when he was sick? Was he well at the time of the commission of the crime and did he become sick in consequence of this experience? Is his malady curable or will he continue to be a menace to society in the future?

The incurables are disposed of in the manner in which incurables are disposed of in other countries, that is, they are confined in institutions maintained for the purpose. It is with the patient who is curable that

the Institute takes its greatest pains. He is treated either at the Institute or in an institution which is still more adapted to his needs. When he has been cured of his ailment and there is definite medical assurance that he is not likely to repeat his offence and that he consequently is no longer a menace to his fellows the patient is ordered returned to his home in custody of his family, if he has one, or of an organization for the rehabilitation of prisoners, which sees to it that he gets a job and makes proper social and ethical connections.

Psychopathic criminals who fall between these two groups, that is, those who are neither hopeless incurables, nor yet entirely normal, are assigned to certain specialized forms of manual labor which, in conjunction with the medical treatment they receive, are calculated to bring them around ultimately to a more or less normal and, at any rate, safe mental state.

In the matter of age, too, the psychopathic criminal in the Soviet Union offers a marked contrast to the criminals in other countries. While in Western Europe the age of psychopathic offenders for the most part is above forty, eighty per cent of the prisoners—or patients, as the Russians insist on calling them—at the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute are between twenty and thirty. In older persons psychopathic effects are not so active in Russia. There is a considerable amount of so-called harmless insanity induced by the violent changes brought about by the revolution. Some pris-

oners imagine themselves as being royal personages who have suffered by the revolution and go around pleading for the restoration of the Czar. On the other hand there are numerous patients who suffer from delusions of persecution. They believe themselves to be counter-revolutionists who are wanted by the G. P. U., the Soviet secret service. The number of "simulators," that is prisoners who feign insanity in the hope of escaping legal responsibility for certain serious crimes, is very small, only slightly more than one-half of one per cent.

Eleven per cent of all patients at the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute were found to be under 20 years of age. Measured by the standards of other countries this is a record breaking figure for mental disturbances among the young. Medical authorities in the Soviet Union account for it by the harrowing experiences which the youth of Russia has gone through since 1914. In addition to the World War and the revolution they have lived through years of famine, epidemics and civil war. At one time the Soviet was attacked on thirteen fronts. Millions of homes were broken up during this period and hordes of children became pathetic wanderers over the face of the Soviet empire.

The more frequent types of mental ailments treated at the Serbsky institution, together with the percentage of patients supplied by each type, follow:

Psychopathic personalities, that is, persons of espe-

cially strained mental attitudes, but neither feeble-minded nor otherwise abnormal, 28 per cent.

Feeble-minded persons, 14 per cent.

Persons whose mental ailments were caused by organic trouble such as arteriosclerosis, paralysis, brain hemorrhages, 12 per cent.

Congenital feeble-mindedness, 7 per cent; epilepsy, 9 per cent; psycho-neurotics, 9 per cent; alcoholism in aggravated stages, 7 to 10 per cent.

Five per cent of all patients at the Institute were suffering from mental ailments classified as "prison psychosis," that is their sickness had come about as a result of their prison experiences.

Designed primarily as an aid to the legal and criminal authorities in the disposition and treatment of insane and pathologic offenders, the Serbsky Institute of Criminal Psychiatry has since acquired additional functions and uses. It has become a foremost research center in the science of the mentally abnormal. More than thirty works on criminal psychiatry and related subjects have been published by members of its medical staff. In addition it serves as a postgraduate school for physicians, judges, prison and hospital attaches, who come to it from all parts of the Soviet Union. A six months' course, covering the principal aspects of psychopathology, has been arranged for these visiting specialists and officials.

Advanced students in medicine, law and criminology of the First and Second Moscow Universities attend

clinics at the Serbsky Institute as part of their curricular requirement.

PRECISELY as the Soviet government's policies in the fields of economics, finance and international relations have been modified by time and reality, the criminal and penal sciences in the Soviet Union have also undergone certain far-reaching changes and developments. In the first place the Kremlin leaders in late years have come to realize—and to admit—that the economic order which they have brought about in Russia is not socialism. They define this order as a “transition stage from capitalism to communism.” In the second place the Soviet apparatus has itself created certain “dynamics of crime” which give rise to crime fluctuations in the Soviet Union similar in their general aspects to the crime waves in capitalist countries—except that in the Soviet Union they are not discussed in the Russian press, but only in the closed conferences of social scientists and trusted Communist officials.

Soviet criminologists and criminal authorities have thus veered around from the purely dialectic and frequently inspired discussions of crime as “a problem of capitalist society,” which marked their earlier writings, to the more practical and much needed study of criminality as it manifests itself in the propertyless state of the Soviets.

Without deviating theoretically from their main thesis that in a *fully developed* socialist state crime in its economic aspects will totally disappear, the Kremlin authorities, for some time, have been calling for a "gradual" elimination of crime, the criminal and prisons, as the only logical way to meet these problems while their country was passing through this "transition period." A host of experimental medical, legal and sociological institutions and commissions have sprung into existence for the study of the Soviet-made criminal and criminality as well as those phases of the problem which have come down by inheritance from the old régime. The dominant purpose running through all of these commissions is the substitution of science for force in the treatment of the criminal. The aim is to dissociate the subject of penology from prisons of any sort in the Soviet Union.

Historically the development of Soviet criminal policy falls into three sharply defined stages of approximately five years each—in the Soviet Union everything seems to be running in five year cycles or plans. During the five years immediately following the November revolution of 1917, years filled with internal warfare between the adherents of Lenin and the partisans of such "white generals" as Denikin, Wrangel and Koltchak, justice was either extreme or sentimental. Offences directed against the budding Soviet order were punished with death. On the other hand crimes against property and persons, which carried no impli-

cation of political antagonism to the Bolshevik régime, were treated with utmost leniency.

The old Czarist laws had been swept under by the revolutionary current and the new laws were still unwritten. The few statutes passed by the central government in Moscow, for the most part had not yet penetrated to the great masses of Russia's dark people. Courts and justice reverted to primitive conceptions and tribal simplicity. There were no lawyers—they had been outlawed by the Bolshevik revolution—and the accused did his own pleading and defending. Peasants from the plow, elevated to the position of judges, meted out justice "po sovesti," that is, in accord with what their conscience and common sense dictated.

The second period falls between the years of 1922 and 1927. In 1922 Soviet law formally entered its written stage. In that year the Soviet Criminal Code was adopted. Two years later the Corrective Labor Code, a body of laws governing the conduct of prisons and of all other penal and corrective institutions and methods, was adopted. At the end of another two years, in 1926, the Criminal Code underwent certain vital changes and additions. The sections of the code dealing with sick, subnormal and insane criminals in particular were modified. This revised criminal code of the edition of 1926 is the code which has been in operation in the Soviet republic since.

With the adoption of the revised criminal code the

Soviet government has definitely entered upon the third stage of its criminal policy, the present stage, which insists on viewing crime as a disease and as an affliction to be eradicated by the scientific laboratory in the first place and secondly by the factory. Work, the acquisition by the criminal of a trade or calling that will secure for him an honest livelihood is an ingredient which enters into every type of remedy for the regeneration of the criminal that the Soviet government has been able to devise.

The following are among the outstanding scientific and research institutions which are dedicated to the task of making Russia a country without crime and without prisons: The Government Institute for the Study of Crime and of the Criminal at Moscow and its branch institutes in Leningrad, Saratov and Rostov on the Don; The Serbsky Institute of Legal Psychiatry, Moscow; The Institute for the Study of the Personality of the Criminal, Moscow; The Bio-Chemical Institute of the People's Commissariat of Health, Moscow; The Pathological-Reflexological Institute of the Neuro-Psychiatric Dispensary of the People's Commissariat of Health, Leningrad; The Anthropological and Psychological Institute of the People's Commissariat of Education, Moscow; The Institute of Soviet Jurisprudence, Moscow; The Section of Soviet Law and Government, Communist Academy, Moscow; The All-Ukrainian Bureau for the Study of Crime, Kharkov; The Bureau of the City

of Kiev for the Study of Crime, Kiev; The White Russian Institute for the Study of Criminality, Lenin University, Minsk; The Experimental Prison for the Study of Methods of Correction, Moscow.

A series of laboratories in criminal psychology has been established by the government in connection with the more representative prisons throughout the country. Significant, too, in this campaign for the demobilization of crime, are the citizens' legal societies which have sprung up all over the Soviet Union and whose members render invaluable assistance to the government in its struggle for the voluntary preservation of law and order.

Supplementing and encouraging the work of these organizations are a number of criminological and legal journals, both of a professional and popular character. The more important of these publications are: "The Weekly Soviet Justice"; "The Messenger of Soviet Justice"; "The Workers' Court"; "The Proletarian Court"; "The Administrative Messenger"; "Law and Life."

The source from which spring all of the innovations and reforms in the Soviet penal system is the "Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal," which entered upon its functions in October, 1925. The membership of the Government Institute is drawn from sixty-five of the foremost medical, legal and scientific organizations in the Soviet Union and it works hand in hand with the prin-

cial government departments concerned in the work of apprehending and reclaiming the criminal, namely the Commissariats of Justice, the Interior, Health and Education. Though antedated both by the Serbsky Institute of Legal Psychiatry, which was founded in 1921, and by the Institute for the Study of the Personality of the Criminal, organized two years later, the Government Institute, in its scope and duties, actually ranks as the parent organization to the chain of scientific and criminological institutions affiliated with it.

The functions of the Government Institute are twofold, practical and academic. It seeks to lend flexibility to the methods of correction in the Soviet Union, to keep Soviet justice from losing its fluidity and becoming fixed and rigid. Its expert advice and recommendations are sought and heeded by police authorities, by prosecuting officials, by the heads of prisons and of penal colonies. Along with these purely reformistic efforts the Government Institute, as the central organization, directs and coordinates the fundamental investigations into the whole range of criminality which are conducted by the scientists and institutions connected with it.

These studies and researches fall into four distinct classifications and are conducted by as many different departments or "sections," each of which is headed by a leading authority, as follows: a) The Social-Economic section, headed by the veteran criminolo-

gist, Professor M. N. Gernet; b) The Penitentiary section, headed by E. G. Shirvindt; c) The Bio-Psychological section, headed by Professor P. B. Gannushkin; d) The Criminalistic section, headed by B. S. Tager.

The first of these sections, social-economic, has for its special province the clarification of the causes and conditions which give rise to criminality in general and to certain special forms of crime in particular. It studies the quantitative and qualitative changes in crime, seeking to establish the social and economic causes underlying such changes and it subjects the whole field of penology to sociological analysis and proof. The Penitentiary section is engaged primarily in the study of the comparative efficiency of the various "measures of safety" applied to criminals under the Soviet Corrective Labor Code. It acts as a board of inquiry into certain phases of prison policy. The Bio-Psychological section studies the mechanism of the criminal's conduct and character. Upon it devolve the duties of safeguarding the psychopathic criminal both before the law and against too severe prison regulations. It studies the psychopathic phases of contemporary criminality and the findings of its experts are written into the statutes.

The fourth, the Criminalistic section, stands more or less apart. It is an organization of practical workers and scientists in the criminal field which makes available to the police and prosecuting authorities in-

formation on the latest methods of disclosing crime and ferreting out the criminal. The experience which foreign countries have had in such matters is heavily drawn upon by this organization and adapted to Russian uses. Russian criminologists generally receive frequent orders from the government to make surveys of foreign prisons and to study foreign police methods for whatever technical advance such studies and surveys may disclose.

Though not classed with the enumerated categories, the Experimental Prison for the Study of Methods of Correction is a research institution of unique character and high importance. It was organized in 1927 on the grounds and in the buildings of the old Ivanovsk Prison in Moscow. The Experimental Prison has a total of 200 inmates, the more serious types of criminals being especially well represented. Excellent factory facilities have been provided for them at the prison and the cultural work of the institution has been made especially high and efficient. Students from the First Moscow University frequently change places with the regular guards. High legal, medical and penological experts likewise mingle with the prison personnel so that one cannot be told apart from the other. Every inmate thus becomes the subject of intimate study. Ultimately it is expected that these researches will contribute vital information as to the best methods of reclaiming and restoring criminals of the more hardened, recidivist types.

The Experimental Prison also serves an immediate practical purpose. It affords an almost priceless "clinical" experience to the future jurists, sociologists and penal workers in the Soviet Union.

Just as it is insistent on a certain fluidity and tolerance in the application of criminal justice, the Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal also believes in making the findings of experts and its laboratories available to the proper government departments and the public at large with the least possible formality or delay. It is its own publisher and as soon as an investigator has finished an experiment or study that has practical criminological application, it is at once put into type. The Government Institute publishes annually a volume of such shorter studies and reports under the title "Problems of Crime" (*Problemi Prestupnosti*) while contributions of a more ambitious nature are published separately either as books or brochures.

In addition to five volumes of "Problems of Crime" the Government Institute has, since 1926, published the following works of book or monograph length: Contemporary Crime, First and Second Issues; Embezzlement and Embezzlers; Hooligans and Hooliganism; Forced Medical Treatment of Socially Dangerous Psychopaths; Soviet Penal Law; Studying the Personality of the Criminal; The Struggle With Child Criminality; What Every Prisoner Should Know; Freeing Prisoners Before the Expiration of their Sen-

tence and Amnesty; What the Prison Personnel Should Know; The Artistic Creations of Prisoners; Bandits and Banditism; Alcoholism and Crime.

Among the contributions published collectively under the title "Problems of Crime" the following studies are of fundamental importance despite their short length; Recidivists and Professional Criminals, by Professor B. S. Utevsky; The Killing of Newborn Babies by their Mothers, by A. Shestakova; Abortions in the City of Moscow and in the Moscow Province, by V. Khalfin; Women Murderers for Profit, by S. Ukshe; Sexual Crimes Against Children, by P. Lublinsky; The Psychology of Prison Escapes, by Professor M. N. Gernet; The Literary Creations of Prisoners, by V. Lvov-Rogachevsky; The Murder of Village Correspondents, by A. Piontkovsky; Day of a Prisoner, by G. Ivanov. The total number of such criminological studies carried on under the direction of the Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal is nearly one hundred.

It is the alarming rise of certain types of crime rather than a general increase in criminality that has resulted in this spectacular concentration of the scientific, legal and penal resources of the Soviet Union in an anti-criminal crusade.

Whether crime in Russia has receded under the Soviet régime or has expanded over what it has been

under the last Czarist epoch, no impartial criminological student, whether in the Soviet Union or abroad, has as yet been able to determine. The Soviet criminologist, Professor M. N. Gernet, in his latest book, "Crime in the Soviet Union and Abroad," points out the difficulties in the way of such an investigation. What was the highest form of criminality under the old régime became trivial offences under the Soviet Constitution. Moreover the Soviet's own conception of crime has at no time been a fixed quantity. It is governed by political necessity rather than by established legal and ethical conceptions. A peasant taking a cart load of wood from a government-owned forest may get one of three or four different sentences at different times, or may not be punished at all if conditions in the country are peaceful and the motive for the offence was found to be personal need and not a desire for gain or speculation.

Statistics are of small value in such a comparative study of crime under the old and new régimes, as all criminal statistics in Russia have been more or less incomplete since the beginning of the century. The Czarist government did not list all categories of crime for the public gaze. As the revolutionary movement spread to all classes, many political and especially military offenders were arrested and disposed of without a public record of their case. The Soviet government's struggle with its own counter-revolutionaries, with the *kulaks*, or rich peasants, who resist its nationalization

and collectivization programmes, likewise are matters concerning which statistical records are still vague.

It has been established that crime in Russia doubled between 1900 and 1913, under the old régime. Crimes against property increased twofold during that period; crimes against persons two and a half times. There was an even greater rise of criminality during the war, despite the fact that the male population was greatly depleted by millions going into the army. The last prison figures available for this period are those for the year 1913. On January 1 of that year the daily average of prisoners in the Russian empire was 194,418. Statistics for the year 1914, the second half of which saw a phenomenal rise in criminality, were destroyed during the February (1917) revolution. A wave of banditism swept Russia under the Bolshevik régime. It lasted for nearly two years during most of 1918 and 1919. From 1916 to 1922 no criminal records of any sort were kept in the Soviet Union.

Since 1922 criminal statistics have been kept more or less regularly by the Soviet government, but such figures do not always include the whole country. Moreover the frequent reclassifications of both crimes and penalties by the Soviet legal authorities make such data inconclusive for the most part. For example, published government statistics indicate one day that during the year 1926 the prison population of the Soviet Union increased forty per cent over that of the preceding years. But the next day another government

bulletin discounts these figures and attributes the increase in prison population not so much to increased criminality as to the bureaucracy or else the ignorance of Soviet judges, who had not sufficiently digested the latest modifications to the Soviet Code which have replaced many of the prison sentences that are still being meted out with minor punishment, such as fines, or labor without deprivation of liberty.

Nevertheless the consensus of opinion among criminologists in the Soviet Union is that there has been a noticeable increase in criminality during and since 1926.

If figures with regard to the "movement of crime," or crime curves, within the Soviet Union, on the whole, are still more or less nebulous, the "new dynamics of criminality" concerning which the Soviet government has been taking such drastic action, are clean cut. At the head of the criminal list in the Soviet Union today stand three offences connected with what might quite correctly be termed "unskilled management" of public office, public commerce and public property to which the Soviet government however attaches political significance and character. In Soviet court language the above crimes are defined as follows:

Crimes against the methods of governmental management.

Crimes of incompetence or dereliction in connection with one's job, office, or calling.

Crimes committed in connection with the control or

management of government property; theft, waste, indifference.

The Soviet government is the sole owner of the country's industries, banks and railroads. It owns the land and, for practical purposes, the crops thereon. It is in control of domestic and foreign commerce. The chief business of the government is the building up of Russia industrially and technically. The country lives in an atmosphere of revolution and in the constant fear of foreign invasion. A state of martial law, whether so-called or not, exists. Its industrial régime is one of exacting responsibility and high discipline. The willful and, in some serious cases, even the accidental upsetting of a government enterprise or project is held on a par with the betrayal of an army to the enemy in war time.

In the light of these conditions the above purely business or administrative crimes, misdemeanors and conspiracies assume the character of an offence against the government order. Embezzlement by an employee of a government-owned bank becomes embezzlement plus treason. Mismanagement of a government machine shop or packing plant becomes mismanagement plus treason. Theft of property from a government-owned warehouse becomes theft plus treason. Mismanagement of a government-directed project becomes sabotage plus treason. The nature of the penalty is determined by the combined character of the offence plus the class origin of the offender. The degree of

indifference or hostility to the Soviet régime exemplified by his act, rather than the mere monetary damage, is a foremost consideration with the Soviet court when passing sentence.

The importance which these newer categories of crime have assumed in Soviet jurisprudence is due to their startling growth. The progress of the Soviet régime toward socialism has been marked by an even greater mistrust of the former middle and upper classes and their scions. The Kremlin government has removed millions of men springing from these classes from the posts which they held in connection with the country's socialized trade, with commercial and industrial institutions. Their places were filled by men from the proletarian sphere—workers from the factory and peasants from the plow. Some of them had come forward through natural ability, but large numbers of them have only had a hothouse preparation for their jobs.

Very many of the latter have neither the educational background nor ethical and moral stamina required of them in their new callings. The peasant who has been accustomed to steal and squander (when he could) the property of the land owner, now steals and squanders the property of the government. Many steal out of sheer necessity. Almost everybody in the Soviet republic is only two-thirds fed, while a pair of shoes or a woman's dress represents a fortune. There is a class of offenders who though not of noble or merchant origin, nevertheless are opposed to the Soviet régime

and when put in positions of trust cannot resist the temptation of revenging itself upon the régime by acts of dereliction or by downright "wrecking"; *vreditel'stvo*, as the Russians call it. Many offences are committed by peasants and workers in retaliation for certain bureaucratic acts and injustices by ruthless or overzealous communist officials, though they are not otherwise opposed to the Soviet régime.

Criminals in these categories are thirty-five years old and older. Most of them are married. Next in the category of crimes against the economic order are crimes against persons, particularly the phase of it which deals with attacks upon Soviet officials, upon Soviet correspondents and agitators by peasants who are opposed to the government's land policies or by disgruntled factory employees. Stealing government property apparently is more lucrative in the Soviet Union than stealing from your neighbor who is often as propertyless as yourself. The conventional types of crime against property have fallen off. Nevertheless theft—no matter how small the gain from it—continues to be an important factor on the Soviet crime list. A whole array of crimes growing out of prohibition have been wiped off the map by the government through the legalizing of the manufacture of spirits and doing away with its clandestine production.

From a legislative standpoint the Soviet war on crime thus far has produced but a single drastic measure for the fighting of the criminal. It has instituted

the death penalty for theft. Hitherto theft could be punished with death only when it was linked with a counter-revolutionary act or intent. By a decree passed in August, 1932, the property of any collective or co-operative, communal property in short, is declared to be social property and theft of such property a social and political offence of the category punished with death. Except for this provision the Soviet government does not go back on its fundamental penal principles. Scientific investigation of crime has made available to the government much vital information about the criminal. It is the view of the Soviet government, however, that this information only confirms the correctness and practicability of its accepted criminal and penal policies.

Crime in the Soviet Union continues to be looked upon as a phenomenon illustrating the lack of culture on the part of the Russian people which is to be cured with education rather than repression. The Soviet authorities are proceeding apace with their plans and programmes for finding and substituting other alternatives for prisons. For some time now sentences of one year and under are not served in institutions of any sort. The offender remains at home and sticks to his job. But the government withholds weekly a certain sum from his wages as a fine for his offence. It is the theory of the Soviet criminologists that offenders are far more impressed with the wrongness of their conduct when they have to pay for it on the installment

plan than they would be if sent away for six or eight months to a comparatively mild penal colony or camp.

In line with this belief the Soviet government now has under consideration another and even more drastic experiment. It is to make the criminal pay for his depredations to the person or persons against whom such depredations have been committed. In other words the offender would be ordered to pay for the windows he had broken or the shoes he had stolen to the parties that had been victimized by his act. This form of punishment is considered especially workable in Russia where individual property is limited and thefts cannot be for more than small sums. By making him pay for his crime, it is the Soviet view, the criminal would soon find that crime does not pay.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

THERE is one phase of the Soviet prison system which neither I nor any other foreign investigator has thus far penetrated. It concerns the Soviet's political prisoners.

The Commissariat of Justice in Moscow—Krylenko's Commissariat—has given me every facility for visiting prisons for ordinary criminals not alone in the capital, but in every other part of the Soviet Union. Under no circumstances, however, would it grant permission to visit the famous Butirky prison, where the country's most distinguished political dissenters are kept. Even the Tagansky prison, also in Moscow, which I was permitted to visit in 1926, I was denied access to at this time. The official explanation was that the prison was undergoing repairs. Unofficially it was said that the Tagansky prison is now also used as a place of confinement for political prisoners and suspects who have become especially numerous since the inauguration of the Stalin collectivization programme.

I received a similar refusal from the head of the

prison department in the Crimean republic when I asked for permission to visit the "Isolation Prison" at Simferopol, which is the prison reserved for counter-revolutionary offenders in that part of the Soviet Union. I was given facilities to visit the "Ispravdoma," or correctional institutions, in such cities as Sevastopol and Kerch. But I was asked not to insist on visiting political prisoners.

"With regard to ordinary criminals," the head of the prison department in the Crimea explained, "our policy is fixed. It is there for all future time. With regard to political prisoners, however, the situation is still in what is termed as an 'extraordinary state.' Remember we are still in the midst of revolution. It is moreover a passing situation. Today a certain group of people may be held as dangerous to the government. In a month or two their plans and actions may outlive all political significance and they will be ordered discharged and reinstated in their former positions. In some respects the situation with regard to political offenders borders on a family quarrel. It blazes up fiercely, but peace may be reestablished just as unexpectedly."

The term political prisoner has undergone a considerable change under the Soviets. There are distinguished Russian writers, statesmen and men of affairs who today serve indeterminate sentences in such places as the Solovetsky Islands, near the Polar circle, or in Narim, in far Siberia. These men are "politicals" in

the old meaning of the term in Russia. They are opponents of the current governmental policy and consider Joseph Stalin a sort of a false Messiah, who is leading Russia not to a constructive socialist order, but to what they predict will prove a débâcle on a colossal scale. The journalist L. S. Sosnovsky, a close friend of Lenin, and the diplomat Christian Rakovsky, another veteran of the Bolshevik revolution, are the outstanding figures in that group. They have the traditional poise and pride of the Russian revolutionary.

To both of these men Stalin, it is reliably asserted, has repeatedly made peace overtures. They could have their freedom and fairly important posts in the government if they would only "confess their error" and accept the "general line of the party," which means of Stalin, as the only true "Leninist" course for Russia. But these men have steadfastly refused to do. Not even the plight of their families has thus far been able to sway them to accede the slightest recognition to the Stalin policies. The wives of both of these men, women of high culture and refinement, are eking out a scant existence for themselves and their children by hard and tedious labor, one in an office and the other in a factory.

Many so-called political prisoners today, however, are men who are remote from politics in the precise meaning of the term. They are for the most part individuals who had violated the Soviet industrial code or any of the interdictions against private enterprise and

trade designedly and sometimes merely accidentally.

There are among them men who have appropriated government funds for their pleasure, embezzlers, irresponsible executives, and either incapable or indifferent managers of government enterprises. Next in line among these as political prisoners are peasants who have offered resistance to the collectivizing of their property, or men who have shared in assaults on government commissars. Thrown into the scale with the latter are individuals from among the so-called "enemy classes," former manufacturers and traders, nepmen, priests. Pacifists, too, are classed as politicals.

How bewildering to the peasant may become this lifting of a minor infraction of a local or even state ordinance to the dignity of a political crime was illustrated by an incident which occurred to myself and a companion while we were journeying across the Crimea by automobile. As we passed one of the villages in the steppe a peasant woman ran out in the middle of the road and waved frantically for us to stop. Would we have pity on her, she wailed, and take her to the nearest railroad station, a distance of twenty miles! There was only one train for Simferopol that evening and she *had to be* at the capital the next morning. Kalinin was there and if she did not get to see him by noon of the following day, she would miss him.

By Kalinin she meant Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, the peasant president of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. It was true: Kalinin was in Simferopol. He

had arrived the night before for a two days' visit to the Crimean republic. I asked the woman what made her think that she would be permitted to see the president of the Soviet Union and what she wished to see him about.

"It is about my husband I want to see him," she spoke tearfully, "and Comrade Kalinin never refuses to see the wife of a political prisoner."

I ordered the driver of the car to wait, led the woman to a bench beside one of the houses and asked her to tell me her story, which she did.

Her husband before coming to the land, some seven or eight years earlier, had been a tanner by trade. He made a meager living on the land at best. But in the last two years, with collectivization and bad crops, their income from the land had dwindled so that it was not sufficient to support them. Her husband thereupon decided to supplement his earnings by resuming his former trade in his spare time. He was tanning sheep skins for the peasants of the district to supplement his income.

One day two inspectors came from the capital. Her husband showed them his books and bills to prove the exact amount of work he had done and his exact earnings. He asked to be given a license and offered to pay whatever taxes the government would see fit to assess him. The inspectors unable to determine just what category this transaction would come under instructed her husband to go on with his work, that they would

find out what tax he must pay and would let him know on a return visit.

But the inspectors did not come back any more. Instead two secret service agents appeared at the house one day, told her husband to pack a few things in a bundle and to follow them. He was taken to the isolation prison in Simferopol where he was kept as a political offender.

Kalinin, the woman explained, was the best man to appeal to in such cases. He usually recommended that the trial be expedited and sometimes ordered the release of the prisoner, especially if the man was a peasant and had not meant any harm.

The sort of treatment which political prisoners in the Soviet Union are accorded was outlined to me by the director of prisons at Simferopol.

This man, a wide-awake vigorous young Communist, who had served for years in the G. P. U., or political police, explained that pending investigation political suspects are kept in special confinement places known as "isolation prisons." If a man is innocent of the charge on which he has been arrested, he is usually released at the end of three months. That much time is generally required to establish his innocence. But if a man is guilty the matter takes on a different aspect. He may be kept in prison six months, a year and even longer until his case is cleared up.

When the prisoner has been tried, convicted and his sentence definitely fixed he is assigned to a prison along

with ordinary criminals. As a "class enemy," however, such a prisoner enjoys fewer personal privileges while in prison. He is usually required to serve his term in full, unless his sentence is commuted by a general amnesty or else by special permission from Moscow.

I questioned this official with regard to the death penalty.

"The death penalty," he said, "is applied to counter-revolutionists, high and low. The G. P. U. is no respecter of persons of high standing. In fact the man higher up who commits a serious wrong will find it harder to escape the 'highest measure' of punishment than a less important offender. Last year we executed publicly the president of our republic because he was found guilty of gross misuse of his power economically, politically and racially."

I asked him how soon after a man had been condemned to death the sentence is carried out. He outlined the procedure in such cases as follows:

When a man has been sentenced to death he is given the privilege to appeal the sentence, whether it was found in open court or by the G. P. U. in administrative session, to the Supreme Court in Moscow. The appeal is made by telegram. Usually there is an answer in two days. If the answer is unfavorable to the prisoner, he then appeals—again by telegram—to the ZIK, the Central Executive Committee, and at the end of another two days he receives a reply signed by President Kalinin.

If Kalinin has commuted his sentence, the G. P. U., or the regional court, follow out his instructions. But if the sentence is confirmed the man is generally executed within the next twelve hours. Not infrequently men are executed within twenty minutes from the moment the Kalinin telegram, confirming the death sentence, has arrived.

Such rapid-fire execution, it was explained, is sanctioned entirely in the interest of the prisoner himself. Why subject him to the torture of a long wait, or of a formal march to an execution chamber? He is called into a certain room and informed of the contents of the telegram. The death sentence is then read to him and he is asked to sign it. Some sign their death sentences; others refuse. The man is then led by a different route apparently back to his cell and somewhere on the way a bullet is driven into the back of his head and his misery is ended.

In instances where the person about to be executed is part of an organized conspiracy and it is necessary to make his execution formal, the district attorney who prosecuted him, the judge who convicted him, the G. P. U. heads and the director of prisons, all are present during the execution.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

THE Kremlin leaders print more about what they are doing and planning than any other government in the world. While my chief source for this book was the Russian people and the day-by-day contact with the various phases of Soviet life, I nevertheless consulted in the writing of it more than a thousand works in the Russian language—books, brochures, government reports. All of this literature, whether written urbanely for the statesman and the scholar, or popularly for the peasant behind the plow or the worker in the factory, was of vital documentary value. It is manifestly impossible, however, to list all of these works and I am limiting myself to the mention of two or three score of the more important studies among them.

BOOK ONE: WAR

LENIN OB INTERVENTSYI (Lenin on Intervention), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. V. I. Lenin: O Voinye i Zadachakh Proletariata (About War and the Problems of the Proletariat), Government Publishing House, Leningrad, 1925. Lenin i Vostok (Lenin and the Orient), articles by M. Pavlovich, N. Narimanov and A. Khodorova, published by the Far Eastern Society of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1924. I. Stalin and L. Kaganovich; Otchiot Tsentralnogo Kommiteta XVI Syezdu VKP (b) (The Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party), Government Printing, Moscow, 1930. I. Stalin: Novaya Obstanovka—Novie

Zadachi Khoziaistvennogo Stroitelstva (The New Situation and the New Problems of Our Economic Upbuilding), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. I. Stalin: K Voprosam Agrarnoi Politiki v SSSR (Concerning Our Agrarian Policy), Government Publishing House, Moscow, 1930. L. M. Kaganovich: Mezh-dunarodnoye i Vnutrennoye Polozhenie i Zadachi Komsomola (Our International and National Situation and the Problems of the League of Communist Youth), Moscow, 1931. V. Molotov: Borba za Sotsializm i Borba za Mir (The Struggle for Socialism and the Struggle for Peace), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. Shkola i Oborona SSSR (The School and the Defence of the Soviet Union), a resolution of the All Russian Conference on Military Work in the Elementary and Higher Schools, Commissariat of Education, Moscow, 1931. Voyennaya Perepodgotovka Kadrov Prosveschenia (Military Reeducation of the Teaching Personnel), an order of the People's Commissariat of Education, Plans and Programmes, Commissariat of Education, Moscow, 1931. Mezhdynarodnoye Polozhenie SSSR i Zadachi Sovetskoi Shkoli (The International Situation of the Soviet Union and the Problems of the Soviet School), a report of the Vice Commissar of Education, M. S. Epshtein, Commissariat of Education, Moscow, 1931. A. Markov: Nasha Borba za Mir (Our Struggle for Peace), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1930. N. Semashko: Krepi Oboronu SSSR (Strengthen the Defence of the Soviet Union), Government Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1931. Komsomol Shef Aviatsyi (The Comsomol as the Head of Aviation), a collection containing an address by K. Voroshilov entitled "Facing Our Defence Problems," Moscow, 1931. Galianov and Gorshenin: Voyennaya Rabota Komsomola (Military Work of the Comsomol), Moscow, 1931. M. Smilga: Ekonomichesky Boikot SSSR (Economic Boycott of the Soviet Union), Moscow, 1930. V. Karpinsky: Kapital v Borbe Protiv Sovetskoi Vlasti (Capital in a Struggle Against the Soviet Power), Moscow

Worker, Moscow, 1930. P. Lapinsky: Sotsial-Faschizm i Interventzia (Social-Fascism and Intervention), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. N. Bliskavitsky: Kapitalisti Gotoviat Novuyu Voinu Protiv SSSR (The Capitalists Are Preparing a New War Against the Soviet Union), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. V. Bogushevsky: Podzhigateli Voyny za Rabotoi (The War Incendiaries at Work), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. A. Lunacharsky: Kak Oni Razoruzhayutsia (How They Are Disarming), Priboi Publishing, Leningrad, 1931. F. Blumental: Kak Imperialisti Gotoviat Voinu (How the Imperialists Are Preparing War), Government Military Printing, Moscow, 1931. V. O. Milkov: Pod Maskoi Razoruzhenia (Under the Mask of Disarmament), Osoaviachim Publishing, Moscow, 1930. Rabochy Sport Protiv Imperialisticheskikh Voin (Workers' Sport Versus Imperialist Wars), Physical Culture and Sport Publishing, Moscow, 1929. F. Maslenikov: Obronosposobnost Strani i Standardizatsia (The Defense Resources of the Country and Standardization), Moscow, 1931. N. Dubrovsky and K. Pavluchenko: Oborona Strani i Zadachi Profsoyuzov (The Country's Defence and the Problems of the Trade Unions), Moscow, 1931. V. Khripin: Vozdushny Flot (Air Fleet), Moscow, 1931. B. Verkhovsky: Grazhdanskoye Naselenie i Voina (The Civil Population and War), Government Publishing House, Moscow, 1930. G. D. Khakhian: Voyennaya Opasnost i Zadachi Pechati (The War Danger and the Problems of the Press), Kharkov, 1931. F. Rodionov and I. Borisov: Krasnaya Armia na Strazhe Sovietov (The Red Army Guarding the Soviets), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. N. Kharitonov: Armia Proletarskoi Diktaturi (The Army of Proletarian Dictatorship), Government Publishing, Moscow, 1930. N. Krushkol and N. Pospelova: Tcherez Ekonomicheskuyu Blokadu k Vooruzhionnoy Interventsyi (From an Economic Blockade to Armed Intervention), Priboi Publishing, Leningrad, 1931. N. Kuzmin: Rabochaya

Molodiozh—v Voyennii Shkoli (The Working Youth—to the Military Academies), Government Military Publishing, Moscow, 1929. Programma Voyenzirovannikh Zhenskikh Kursov Osoaviachima (The Osoaviachim Programme of Militarized courses for Women), Osoaviachim Publishing, Moscow, 1930. A. Stoklitsky: Legenda O Dempinge (The Legend About Dumping—a New Stage Toward Intervention), Government Printing, Moscow, 1930. Z. Kokorina: Rabotnitsa Izuchai Voyennoye Dielo (Working Woman, Acquire the Military Sciences), Government Publishing, Moscow, 1930. Evgenyi Kuo: Za Sovietskii Kitai (For a Soviet China), Moscow Worker, Moscow, 1931. S. E. Burshtin: Zashchita Naselenia ot Vozdushno-Khimicheskogo Napadenia (Defence of the Population from Chemical Attacks in the Air), Medical Publishing Company, Leningrad, 1931. V. Zarzar: Osoaviachim Detishche Oktabria (Osoaviachim as the Child of the October Revolution), Osoaviachim Publishing, Moscow, 1928. L. Rabinova: V Nogu s Pionerami (In Step with the Pioneers), Moscow, 1931. S. Sterlin: Tchem Naselenie Pomozhet Krasnoi Armii vo Vremia Voiny (What Help Can the Population Give to the Red Army in Time of War), Government Military Publishing, Moscow, 1930. N. Makhov: Tekhnika i Krasnaya Armia (Technique and the Red Army), Government Military Publishing, Moscow, 1930. Spravochnik Osoaviachima po Podgotovke Trudiashchikhsia Zhenshchin k Oborone (Guide of the Osoaviachim for the Preparation of Working Women for Defence), Osoaviachim Publishing, Moscow, 1930.

BOOK TWO: PEACE

P. ZAITSEV: Kogo i Pochemu Sovetskaya Vlast Lishayet Izbiratelnykh Prav (Whom and For What Reasons the Soviet Government Deprives of the Right to Vote), published by "Power of Soviets," Moscow, 1931. Kommunisticheskaya

Moral i Semeinie Otnoshenia (Communist Morals and Family Relations), a collection of articles, Leningrad, 1926. Trudi Vsesoyuznogo Siezda uchastkovikh Vrachei (Reports of the All Union Conference of District Physicians), published by the Commissariat of Health, Moscow, 1926. A. N. Iodkovsky and A. K. Rodniansky: Kodeks Zakonov o Brake, Semie i Opeke (The Code of Laws Concerning Marriage, the Family and Guardianship), Government Juridical Printing, Moscow, 1931. 1,600,000 Rabotnits v Sotsialisticheskoye Khoziaistvo (1,600,000 Women Workers for Socialist Construction Work), Moscow, 1931. K. Ovsiannikov: Klassovaya Borba v Visshey Shkole i Zadachi Komsomola (The Class Struggle in the Higher Schools and the Problems of the Comsomol), Moscow, 1931. V. Lebedeva: Tshto Takoye Sotsialnoye Obespechenie i kak Ego Osushchestvovliat (What Is Social Security and How to Bring it About), Moscow Worker, 1931. A. I. Gringolts and M. S. Perlovagor: O Trude i Sotsialnom Strakhovanii na stroitelnykh rabotakh (About Work and Social Insurance in the Building Industry), Juridical Publishing, Moscow, 1931. Zakonodatelstvo o Spetsialistakh (The Law with Regards to Specialists in Industry, in Agriculture and in Transportation), Juridical Publishing, Moscow, 1931. Borba s Poteriami v Narodnom Khoziaistve (The Struggle with the Losses in Public Enterprises), a collection of articles, Government Planning Publishing, Moscow, 1930. I. Tsitron: Borba s Poteriami v Torgovle (The Struggle with Losses in Commerce), Government Trade Publishing, Moscow, 1930. L. Brontman: Borba za Kadri (The Struggle for Personnel), Government Publishing, Moscow, 1930. B. M. Markus: Okhrana Truda (The Protection of Labor), Government Labor Printing, Moscow, 1930. O. Biryukov: Borba za Novy Byt (The Struggle for a New Civilization), Government Publishing, Moscow, 1931.

BOOK THREE: PRISONS

UGOLOVNY KODEKS R.S.F.S.R. (Criminal Code of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic), Official Publication, Moscow, 1931. Ispravitelno-Tudovoi Kodeks R.S.F.S.R. (Corrective Labor Code of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic), Official Publication, Kremlin, Moscow, 1924. N. V. Krylenko: Sud i Pravo v SSSR (Court and Law in the U.S.S.R.), three volumes, Government Printing, Moscow, 1930. N. V. Krylenko: Sudebnie Rechi (Court Addresses), Juridical Publishing, Moscow, 1931. Tri Projekta Reformi Ugolovnogo Kodesksa (Three Projects for Reforming the Criminal Code. Theses by N. V. Krylenko), Moscow, 1931. U. Bekhterev, M. Kessler, and B. Utevsky: Ipravitelno-Trudovoye Delo v Voprosakh i Otvetakh (Corrective-Labor Code in Questions and Answers), Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1930. Prestupni Mir Moskvi (The Criminal World of Moscow), a collection of articles under the editorship of Prof. M. N. Gernet, Law and Life Publishing, Moscow, 1924. Problemi Prestupnosti (Problems of Crime), four volumes, Government Publishing, Moscow, 1930. Sovremennaya Prestupnost (Contemporary Crime), two volumes, Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1930. Dushevno-Bolnie Pravonarushiteli i Prinuditelnoye Lechenie (Mentally Sick Criminals; Their Obligatory Treatment), a collection of studies conducted under the direction of the Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal, edited by Prof. P. B. Gannushkin, Moscow, 1929. Ubyistva i Ubyitsi (Murder and Murderers), a collection of studies, edited by E. K. Krasnushkin, G. M. Segal and Ts. M. Feinberg, Moscow, 1928. A. Y. Estrin: Nachalo Sovetskogo Ugolovnogo Pravo (The Beginning of Soviet Criminal Law), published by the First University of Moscow, 1930. L. M. Vasilevsky: Besprizornost i Dieti Ulitsi (Homelessness and the Children of the Streets), Proletary Publishing.

- V. I. Kufayev: *Yunnie Pravonarushiteli* (Young Lawbreakers), published by the First Moscow University, Moscow, 1929.
- B. S. Utevsky: *Struggling with Child Criminality*, Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1927.
- P. I. Karpov: *Tvorchestvo Zakluchionikh* (Creative Work of Prisoners), Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1929.
- M. M. Isayev: *Osnovi Penitentsiarnoi Politiki* (Beginnings of the Soviet Prison Policy), Government Publishing, Moscow, 1927.
- E. G. Shirvindt and B. S. Utevsky: *Sovietskoye Ispravitelno-Trudovoye Pravo*. (The Soviet Corrective-Labor Law), Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1931.
- V. Vnukov: *Problema Izuchenia Lichnosti Prestupnika v Svete Marksistkoi Kriminologii* (Problem in the Study of the Personality of the Criminal in the Light of Marxian Criminology), Juridical Publishing, Kharkov, 1930.
- V. A. Bonger: *Prestupnost i Borba s Neyu* (Crime and Its Repression), Published in *Problem of Crime*, Second Collection, Government Printing, Ukraine, 1924.
- E. G. Shirvindt: *O Metode Izuchenia Prestupnosti i Mer Borbi s Ney v SSSR* (About the Methods of Studying Crime and the Means for Struggling Against It in the U.S.S.R.), Published in *Problems of Crime*, Second Volume, Government Printing, Moscow, 1927.
- M. Gernet: *Sotsialisticheskaya Shkola Nauki Ugolovnogo Prava i Uchenie Eyo Storonnikov o Sotsialnikh Faktorov Prestupnosti* (The Socialist School of the Science of Criminal Law and the Teachings of the Supporters of this School about the Social Factors of Crime), Published in the *Problem of Crime*, Second Collection, Government Printing, Ukraine, 1924.
- F. Miller: *Selskokhozaistvennyye Kolonyi dlia Zakluchionnikh* (Agricultural Colonies for Prisoners), Published in *Problems of Crime*, Second Issue, Government Printing, Moscow, 1927.
- E. Shirvindt and B. Utevsky: *Tchto Nuzhno Znat Zakluchionnomy* (What the Prisoner Should Know), Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1927.
- L. Kornblitt and F. Miller: *Tshto Dolzhen*

Znat Nadzor v Mestakh Zakluchenia (What the Prison Personnel Should Know), Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1928. E. Shirvindt. Perspektivi Ugolovnoi Politiki i Lishenie Svobodi. (Perspective of Our Criminal Policy), Published in Volume 3, Problems of Crime, Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1928. N. Spasokukotsky: Organizatsia i Pervie Shagi Deyatelnosti Gosudarstvennogo Instituta po Izucheniu Prestupnosti i Prestupnika (The Organization and the First Steps of the Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal), Published in Problems of Crime, Volume 1, Commissariat of the Interior, Moscow, 1926. N. N. Spasokukotsky: Deyatelnost Gosudarstvennogo Instituta Po Izucheniu Prestupnosti i Prestupnika (The Activities of the Government Institute for the Study of Crime and the Criminal), Published in Problems of Crime, Volume 4, Moscow, 1929. A. A. Gertsenson: Borba s Prestupnostiu v R.S.F.S.R. (The Struggle with Crime in the R.S.F.S.R.), Juridical Press, Commissariat of Justice, Moscow, 1928. Maxim Gorky: O Trudkoloniakh Ogpu (Concerning the Labor Colonies of the United Government Political Bureau), Pravda, July 14, 1931, Moscow.

INDEX

- Abortion, legalized, 96
- ABRAMOVICH, 5
- Afghanistan, 39
- Agriculture, Nationalization of, 28
- Agrojoint, 155, 161
- Air routes, 65
- Alexandrovsk-Zaporozhie, 174
- All Union Election Commission, 140
- America, relatives in, 149; migrations to, 175
- American, tractors, 155
- Joint Distribution Committee, 162
- locomotives, 176
- Amtorg, Falsifications, 44, 178
- Anti-semitism, 132, 152
- Anti-Soviet bloc, 46
- Arcos, 178
- Army Press, 54
- Assassinations, 43
- Atheism, League of, 134; as a religion, 148
- Aviation, 48, 52; technicums for study of, 53; air circles, 66

- Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 176
- Banditism, 280
- Basic industries, 22
- Belostock, 178, 179
- Besserabia, seizure of, 48
- Bigamy, 98, 262
- Birobidjan, 153
- Bismark, 44
- Bonger, V. A., 209
- Brest-Litovsk, 181
- Briand, Aristide, 45
- Bukharin, 18, 31
- Bureaucracy, 115
- Butirky prison, 259

- Capitalism, collapse of, 42
- mistakes and failures of, 43
- Capital punishment, 213
- Catholics, 141
- Cattle, slaughter of, 30
- Caucasia, 150
- Central Executive Committee, 293
- Chamberlain, Austin, 180
- Chaos, in Russia, 17, 18
- Chemical equipment, 49
- Chemical industry, 67
- college, 68
- Chicago, South, 196
- Children, care of, 99
- Chinese Eastern Railroad, 45
- Class antagonism, 131
- "Class Approach," to justice, 20, 122; as an instrument of vengeance, 123; in universities, 137; in prisons, 235
- "Class Enemies," 214, 293
- Class Justice, 214
- "Class Offenders," 213
- Class Origin, 144
- of prisoners, 234
- Collectivization, edicts, 29; collectivization movement, 30, 168; effects of, 163, 185; opposition and retaliation by peasants to, 187, 287, 291
- Colonial revolts, 43
- Colonies, penal, 206, 213; agricultural, 220; enumeration of, 223, 224, 225
- Commissariat of Justice, 255
- Communist Party, as the government, 13
- Comsomol, 37, 86, 96, 187, 192, 260
- Comzet, 162
- Constantinople, Sultans of, 154
- Cordon sanitaire, 49

- Corrective Labor Code, 216, 228, 246, 271, 275
 Council of Commissars, 173
 Council of Labor and Defence, 65
 Counter revolution, 129, 214
 "Court of Comrades," 206, 229, 247
 Credit, international, 171
 Crime, in the Soviet Union, 203;
 revolutionary outlook on, 208;
 crimes of sudden passion, 211;
 crime against social order, 213;
 Soviet "dynamics of crime," 269;
 gradual elimination of, 270;
 Crime Commissions, 270;
 viewed as disease, 272;
 research institutions for abolition of, 273;
 Soviet war on, 284;
 cure of, 285;
 paying for, 286
 Crimea, "Red Crimea," 143, 146, 153
 Geography of, 154, 156, 158, 290
 Criminality, "The struggle between Classes and Criminality," 188;
 microbe of, 208;
 new policy with, 218;
 Juvenile, 257;
 substitution of science for force in treatment of, 270;
 statistics on, 279, 280;
 increase in, 281;
 new dynamics of, 281
 Criminal Code, Soviet, 205, 209;
 duty toward state apparatus, 212;
 chief aim of, 213, 217;
 adoption of, 271
 Criminals, Soviet way with, 203;
 breaking new ground in treatment of, 204;
 abnormal, 208;
 "born criminal," 210;
 rehabilitation of, 216;
 decline in numbers of, 219;
 reeducation of, 241;
 civic rights of, 255, 256;
 psychopathic, 258, 266;
 Soviet-made, 270
 Criminology, Soviet, 206;
 socialist criminology, 208;
 Marxist, 209
 Cults, erotic, 113
 Czechoslovakia, 41
 Agreement with Poland, 49
 Danubian States, Union of, 46
 Death penalty, 217;
 for theft, 285;
 no respecter of rank, 293, 294
 Debacle, presentiment of, 18
 Declassed, 4;
 officers, 77;
 civilians, 123;
 sons of, 144, 145, 146;
 rehabilitation of, 147, 148;
 reinstatement of, 150;
 clergymen, 151;
 on land, 167, 216
 Defence, 15
 Denikin, 270
 Dictatorship, Proletarian, 214
 Dirigible construction, 67
 Disarmament conferences, 44
 Distribution Commission, Prison, 225, 227, 232
 Divorce code of 1931, 99;
 tragedies of, 101;
 divorce and foreigners, 119
 fictitious, 145
 Djersinsky, Felix, 259
 Dnieper, 23
 Dneprosrovy, 174
 Dostoyevsky, "House of the Dead," 204
 Dovbnia, Evgeny, Nicolayevich, Prof., 186, 264, 265
 "Dumping," 36, 171

 EDUCATION, COMMISSARI-
 AT OF, 6
 Émigrés, White Russian, 46
 Employment insurance, 29
 Enemy classes, 290
 England, 41;
 protest by church of England, 44, 180
 Espionage, 129
 Estonia, 49
 Executions, 294
 Experimental Prison, 276, 277
 Experts, foreign, 26, 171, 172

 Family, 95;
 stability of the, 97;
 coarse trading in family conveniences, 103
 Lenin ideas on family, 119;
 family history, 144
 Far East, 45

- Fascism, 43
 Fashions, Russian, 116
 "Fatherland of the Proletariat," 41
 Finland, 39; naval base at, 41
 non-aggression treaty with Soviet, 49
 Fish Commission, 44
 Five-Year Plan, 12; *first* five-year plan, 13; as a Tower of Babel, 13; "overtaking and surpassing," 14; as a war instrument, 15; War pace of, 22; mistrust of intellectuals and the, 128, 150, 172, 212, 222
 Food, export of, 21
 Forced Labor, 36; products of, 44
 Foreigners, living in the Soviet Union, 38
 France, 45; control of Russian industry by, 45; Rumania financed by, 45; antagonism to U. S. R. R., 46; white army on French soil, 46

 Gamarnik, Yan, 181; member of Revolutionary military council, 182
 Gannushkin, P. B., 275
 Gary, Ind., 196
 G. P. U.—Political Secret Service, 5, 6; woman, secret service, 9; G. P. U. regiments, 10; shadow of, 20, 90, 149, 173, 185, 190, 197, 292, 293
 Georgia, Soviet Republic of, 151
 Gernet, M. N., 275; "Crime in the Soviet Union and Abroad" by, 279
 Gill, C. A., 176
 Godless, Society of the, 127
 Gomel, city of, 132
 Government Institute for Study of Crime and Criminal, 273; functions of, 274; Publications of, 277, 278
 Grand Dukes, Russian, 47
 Greek Orthodox Church, 23, 141; Priests, 146
 Groman, 129

 Holland, 23
 Home, stability of, 100

 Illegitimacy abolished, 99
 India, 43, 85
 Indo-China, 43
 "Industrial front," 21
 Industrialization, programme of, 16
 Industry, light, 24; heavy, 25
 Institute of Administrative Training, 242
 Intelligentsia, 120, 121, 125
 Intervention, 43
 Irkutsk, 150
 Ivan the Terrible, 50

 Japan, Union with France, 46; Russia beaten by Japanese, 50
 Jews, 132, 152, 153; Jewish republic, 154, 158, 159; Commissariats headed by Jews, 172

 Kaganovich, L. M., 86, 182
 Kalinin, M. I., 290, 291, 292, 293, 294
 Kalmanovich, M. I., 181
 Kamenets-Podolsk, 149
 Kamenev, 18
 Karelia, Republic of, 49
 Kazakstan, 176
 Kerch, 288
 Kharkov, Technological Institute, 177
 Kherson, Jewish colonies in, 153
 Kiev, 23, 70
 Koltchak, 270
 Kondratiev, 129
 Kremlin, The, 15; collectivization policy of, 29; leaders, 40; people united behind Kremlin, 41; view of world depression, 42; on colonial difficulties, 43, 50, 132, 171, 213, 221, 270
 "Krestyanskaya Gazeta," 178
 Krivoirog, Jewish colonies in, 153
 Krupskaya, Mme., 56

Krylenko, N. V., 214, 219, 287
Kulaks, 33, 150

Lefortov prison, 238; as an experimental station, 239, 240

Lenin, V. I., 23, 28, 29, 31; war against capitalist Europe, 42; Lenin slogan, 52; on remaking Russia, 56; fairy tale about last war, 79, 132; Lenin and Nep, 142, 166, 203, 270, 289

Leningrad, 178

Liszt, Franz, von, 209

Litvinov, M. M., 174; student of British diplomacy, 179, 180

Living, Standard of, 14; rationing system, 14, 16

Loans, foreign, 26

Lombrosian theory, 210

London, 179

Ludendorf, 37

Marriage code, amended, 97; legal age of, 97, 98; church marriage, 101; ideals of Soviet marriage, 111

Marx, Karl, 42; *Das Kapital*, 79, 203

MENSHEVISM, 4

"Military qualification," 53; military circles, 60

Mohammedans, 141

Molotov, Viacheslav, 36, 182

Mongolian Menace, 50; Khans, 154

Moscow, a Bohemian city, 112

Munitions plants, 47

Murmansk, 25

Narim, 288

Nationalities, 41

Nep, 142

Nicholas II, 50

Non-aggression pacts, 40

Observation Commission, Prison, 225, 246, 249

Odessa, port of, 48, 70

Old age pensions, 29

Osoaviachim, 37, 60, 68; women in ranks of, 71

Ozet, 158

Pacifists, 290

"Pale," the, 177, 181

Palestine, 154

Famir, 25

Parents, legal rights of, 97

Paris, 180

Peasants, 29, 30, 31, 32; uprisings, 33; boycott of, 34; taxation of, 35; awakening of, 175

Penology, Soviet, 206; abolition of punishment at base of, 212; Marxian régime in, 220

Peter the Great, 23; imported foreign officers, 50

Pioneers, 192

Pittsburgh, 196

POLAND, 7; WAR on Polish territory, 8; war budget of, 47; intensive war preparations of, 48

Political Bureau, 173, 181, 182, 259

Political prisoners, 146, 213, 287, 288

Pope, protest by, 43

Port Arthur, defeat of, 50

Preparedness, 38

Preparedness programme, 50

Prisoners, commingling with peasants, 223; care of families of, 239; rights of, 242; discipline of, 244; demotion, 245; complaints of, 248, 249; ages of, 253; marriage of, 207, 253, 254, 255; methods of reclaiming, 276; ages of, 284

Prisons, Sokolniki prison, 197; transformation of, 204; as educational institutions, 211; alternatives for, 218; industrialization of, 221; collectivization in, 222; progressive system in, 226; transfer from,

Prisons—continued

- 227; outlook for prisonless era, 231; pre-revolutionary, 241; escape from, 250; "isolation prisons," 292
- Private ownership, 29
- "Problems of Crime," 277
- Professors, 131; "Red Professors," 131, 132, 133, 134

RAILROADS, TRAIN, 8; sleeping car accommodations, 9; dining car, 10; new railroads, 24, 28, 170, 174, 176; Peoples' Commissariat for, 177

- Rakovsky, Christian, 289
- Ramzin, L. K., 129, 215
- Rasputin, Gregory, 113
- Red Army, 37, 51, 54, 58, 79, 80
- Revolution of 1905, 50
- "Right" and "left" criticism, 31
- Romanov, in the Crimea, 154, 238
- Rosengoltz, A. P., 174, 177, 178
- Rostov-on-the-Don, 176
- Rukhimovich, M. L., 174, 176, 177
- Rumania, 41; no treaty with Soviet, 48; war budget, 48; military aviation, 48; agreement with France, 49
- Rykov, 18, 31

- Sabotage, 20, 214
- Sakhalin, 25, 39
- Sarajevo, 45
- Saratov, 257
- Second Five Year Plan, 16, 25
- Sentences, criminal, abolition of long, 206
- Serbsky Psychiatric Institute, 183, 167, 168, 169, 186, 263, 264, 266, 274
- Sevastopol, 288
- Sex, 95, 118, 119, 212
- Shirvindt, E. G., 275
- "Shock troopers," of industry, 195, 196
- Shooting circles, 54

- Simferopol, 143, 155, 158; isolation prison at, 288, 290, 292
- Skilled labor, aristocracy of, 30
- Soap, use of, 30
- "Social status," 125, 128
- Socialism, 23, 34, 42, 166, 269
- "Socialist competitions," 195
- Socialist state, injury to, 216
- Sokolnikoff, G. Y., 180; and opposition, 181
- Solovetsky Islands, 146, 259, 288
- Sosnovsky, L. S., 289
- Soviet imports, 44
- SOVIET JUSTICE, 4
- Soviet Schools, 53
- Soviet Scientific expeditions, 24
- Soviet State Farms, 26
- Soviet Trade Delegation, 178
- "SOVIET WIVES," 106
- Sport, 57
- Spy mania, 38
- Stalin, Joseph, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22; Stalin's Ladder, 13; civil service plan, 23, 24; as Bolshevik pope, 28; Stalin régime, 30; collectivization tempos, 31, 32; on subjugation, 40; on revolutionary foreign policy, 42; Stalin and Lenin, 56; his "will to victory," 64; Stalin and Nep, 142, 163, 166; Yakovlev and, 178, 179; opposition to, 181; Kaganovich and, 182, 289
- State Bank, 181
- Stepchildren, treatment of, 99
- Stockholm, Bolshevik congress at, 179
- Students, 195
- Sukhanov, 129
- Supreme Council of National Economy, 177
- Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., 19
- Tagansky prison, 287
- Tager, B. S., 275
- Tardieu, A., 46
- Tartars, 50
- "Technicums," 53

Territorial differences, 44

Text books, 57

Third International, 37

Tiflis, 180

Tomsky, 18, 31

Torgsin, 106

Trade, foreign, 172

Transport, army, study of, 58

Transportation, 170

Trotsky, 18, 179, 259

Turati, F., 210

Ukraine, 25; health in, 30, 50, 149, 162, 193, 196

United States of America, 44

United States of Europe, 45

Universities, 59; "Red Universities," 131

Unmarried woman, 118

Utevsky, B. S., 209, 230

Uzbekistan, 150

Versailles, Peace of, 37; Treaty of, 48

Village Correspondents, murder of, 187

Vladimir the Holy, 23

Voroshilov, Climenty, 37, 72, 84, 85

WAR, THE COMING, 7; to wipe out Bolshevism, 8; defence

and war implements, 15; raw materials in, 24; war fears, 34; danger of world war, 37; war economies, 38; holy war against Soviet, 41; "war psychosis," 41; public sentiment mobilized for, 43

WARSAW, 7; Warsaw's aristocracy, 8

WELFARE, COMMISSARIAT OF, 6

White Collar workers, 128

White Russia, Jewish colonies in, 153

"Wild children," 257; G. P. U. colony for, 258, 259; second G. P. U. colony for, 260

Women and the war specter, 74; in higher military schools, 75

Workers' Clubs, 100

World Market, 22

Wrangel, 270

"Wrecking," 20, 128, 284

Yakir, Jonah, 181

Yakovlev, Y. A., 174, 178, 179

Yekaterinoslav, Jewish colonies in, 153

Young Russia, 183, 194

Zinoviev, 18

Zionists, 154

